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ABSTRACT 
The Russian terms '(a) future war' and 'contemporary 
war(fare)' are sometimes used almost synonymously, 
sometimes with distinct nuances, the former now equating to 
'World War III' in English. They have been used this way 
since the 1870s, when the volume of analysis of the effect 
of new technology on warfare increased. The character of 
future war forms a major part of Military Doctrine, and 
like Military Doctrine is divided into political and 
military-technical components. During most of the Soviet 
period, Doctrine was defined as the state's agreed system 
of views on the likely course and character of a future 
war, although it has recently been redefined as a system 
of views on the prevention of war. It is argued that this 
does not shift the character of future war from its 
central position in Doctrine. The Russians produced much 
analysis of 'future war' before 1914, including the only 
such work hitherto widely known outside Russia, Bliokh's 
Future War, which requires a reappraisal. Most of the 
Russian literature predicted the character of the Great 
War accurately. Military-scientific works constitute most 
of the analysis. There were a few fictional treatments of 
future war, although far fewer than in western languages. 
Although the demonstrable continuity between Imperial and 
Soviet writing on the subject transcends the 1917 
Revolution, Marxist-Leninist emphasis on prediction 
reinforced the main stream of military analysis. The 
quality and quantity of Soviet analysis of the character 
of future war was particularly marked in the inter-war 
period, when it preoccupied some of the Soviet Union's 
most perceptive military thinkers and again foresaw the 
character of the next great war accurately. After World 
War II, analysis focused on the 'Revolution in Military 
Affairs' caused by the ballistic missile and nuclear 
warhead, the only area of 'future war' thinking hitherto 
extensively analysed in the west. Since 1945 scientific 
techniques for forecasting have been more fully developed 
and there is now an accepted definition of short-, medium- 
and long-term forecasts, the latter stretching 25 to 30 
years ahead and now coinciding with the symbolic 2017 
horizon. Throughout the period the General Staff and its 
associated military academies, which together form a 
network of future war 'think-tanks' have dominated the 
view of possible future war. This is now changing with the 
emergence of some well qualified analysts and respected 
organs outside the General Staff. The disparity between 
the highly futuristic views of the General Staff and the 
requirements of realpolitik appears to be growing. 
Throughout, concentration has focussed on a great war 
between major states and political systems. Internal and 
'low-intensity' conflict have been neglected, the reasons 
for which are analysed. 
2, 
Rule 3.4.3 
A small amount of material relating to the relevance of 
Kuhn's concept of the paradigm to revolutions in military 
affairs (Part 2, section 7) was also utilised in chapter 2 
of the candidate's book, The Evolution of Modern Land 
Warfare: Theor and Practice, out e ge, London, 1990), 
although in ai erent form-and a different overall 
context. This rule permits previous publication of 
material with the supervisor's permission and providing it 
is recorded in the thesis. 
RULE 3.4.7 
I confirm that this thesis: text, art-work and photographs 
has been composed and executed entirely by myself, and 




The cut-off date for source material for this 
thesis is 7 June, 1990 
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NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY AND TRANSLITERATION 
The system of transliteration from Soviet Russian used 
in this study is based on the NATO standard system (STANAG), 
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1. 'Ye', 'ye' are used at the beginning of a word and 
when Russian letter 'e' is preceded by another vowel, 
as in the adjectival ending '-oye', 'Gareyev', 'Leyer'. 
2. Russian '8' is pronounced 'o' or 'yo', as in Mr 
Gorbachev.. 
3. The adjectival ending 'ug', which strict application 
of this system would render '-yy' is simplified to '-y'. 
The ending ' xg' , after '-k-'., --for 'example, is 
rendered in full, as '-iy', as in Tukhachevskiy. 
Transliteration of pre-1917 Russian presents special 
problems. The system adopted is as follows. Where 
letters used in Tsarist orthography have disappeared but 
are replaced in modern Russian-by letters which existed 
before 1917 with almost identical values: old %p modern 
e, old i, modern x, then the transliteration similarly 
adopts the replacement letter. The same applies to the 
pre-Revolutionary use of the hard sign -b after all 
concluding consonants that are not soft. As in modern 
Russian, these are dropped. 
Where pre-1917 spelling differs from modern 
spelling, but using letters still extant: the adjectival 
plural -bIH, modern -xe, the adjectival singular - aro, 
-sro, modern -oro, -ero, then the original spelling is 
transliterated to preserve an element of the original 
flavour. Adjectival plural -bin is transliterated -ya, ° 
rather than -yya . Modern cyrillic-. edabecomes . 
'yeyd 
in transliteration. Before 1917, the form-'e was-" 
used, which is transliterated yeya. 
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PART ONE. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE 
THESIS. CLASSIFICATION AND REVIEW OF SOURCES 
'Military science is. in essence, the science 
of future war" 
Shavrov and Galkin, 
Methodology of Military- 
Scientific 
Understanding, 19771 
1. REASONS FOR UNDERTAKING THE STUDY 
Anyone familiar with the extensive body of Soviet and late 
Imperial Russian writing on the study of war will have 
encountered the phrases budushchaya voyna: '(a) future 
war', and sovremennaya voyna: 'contemporary war(fare)', 
frequently. The reasoning behind the translation of these 
terms is explained in part 2, while the range and variety 
of research materials in which they appear is documented 
below and throughout this thesis. The terms are 
prevalent in military-political works, examining the 
preparation of the state for possible future conflicts in 
the widest sense; in military-scientific works, analysing 
the possible shape, appearance, scale and pace of future 
battles, including the influence of new technology, and in 
military historical works alluding to the way past views 
of the character of future wars and warfare affected 
preparations for wars which then occurred, and the 
outcome. The personalities most frequently cited as 
significant contributors to Soviet military thought and 
the evolution of Soviet military art were all writing 
about the character of 'future' or 'contemporary' war, and 
used the phrases frequently, as this study will 
demonstrate. Frequently, their views were, and are 
expressed in a graphic and panoramic fashion, and"past 
assessments of the character of future war have been 
strikingly accurate when compared with conflicts which 
happened. 
Even a preliminary survey of Russian and Soviet` 
writing on the character of future war since the late 
11 
1870s reveals a common thread of panoramic scope and 
foresight which links works widely separated in time and 
of widely differing character. The reader is reminded of 
-the words of Tolstoy, who was no stranger to the reality, 
of war, and no war-monger, but who described the 
'animated, majestic and unexpected' scene as battle 
unfolded, the erupting smoke giving the whole vast diorama 
a terrible, bizarre 'beauty'. 2 Likewise, the First World 
War Russian poet Valeriy Bryusov described the western 
front from afar as if it were a giant electrified model, a 
vision, furthermore, which in 1914 was more a prediction 
of the future than a description of the present. 
3 Such an 
expansive vision is not the exclusive preserve of 
novelists and poets. In the 1890s, Ivan Bliokh, in his 
scientific study of future war4 foretold 'a great war of 
entrenchments ... the duration of battle, which may be 
prolonged for several days and which... may yield no 
decisive results'. 5 In 1939, with equal prescience, VA 
Melikov foretold 'the gigantic scale of modern war, in 
which the most powerful armed coalitions with millions of 
people and many thousands of armoured vehicles will 
participate, which may be brought to a victorious 
conclusion only by the skilful employment of three types 
of armed forces acting on land, in the air and at sea'. 
6 
In 1970, Colonel Sidorenko described the possible nuclear 
battlefield, with forces fighting' under conditions 
involving the presence of vast zones of contamination, 
destruction, fires and floods. 
7 All are almost biblical 
in their apocalyptic scope. Yet this does not mean that 
the: Russians are 'a nation of incorrigible, dreamers',:. as 
the retired Major-General Sir Alfred Knox (1870-1964), 




the 1935 showing of film. of. the, first large-scale trials of 
paratroops. 8 On the contrary, all thea. examples: cited,. are. ýF. 
works of extreme rigour, -drawing: specificiconclusions,. -for ,. 
equipment, - composition and : employment=iof armed -forces.,. -: - , 
The 4 first. ýtwo., also ;, foretold=; accurately-, in certain.;. ways.. the-. °-:. 
12 
character of the-World Wars which followed them. 
Sidorenko's prognostication will, it is hoped, °remain 
untested. 
It is not possible to demonstrate scientifically 
whether there is something in the Russian character which 
induces a particularly far-sighted and expansive view of 
the character of future war and its-implications. Two 
notable figures in the sphere-of predictive fiction have 
been Russians by birth, but have published or worked 
abroad, and can in no sense be considered part of the 
officially approved forecasting process in the USSR 
itself. These are Yevgeny Zamyatin (1884-1937), whose" 
novel We anticipated and inspired. Orwell's Nineteen 
Eighty-Four and Huxley's Brave New World, 9 and Isaac 
Asimov (1920- ). 10 However, even a preliminary perusal, of 
officially sanctioned Russian and Soviet works on future 
war suggests that there is a breadth and prescience about 
this vision which requires some explanation. This study 
argues that the scope and coherence of the Russian and 
Soviet vision of future war, and its combination with an 
ability to grasp the potential of technology and a 
willingness to push technology beyond what other nations 
might consider appropriate or 'safe' limits is the result, 
at least in part, of a particular methodology and a 
particular set of priorities. 
11 The study reveals that 
there must exist within the Soviet military and associated 
civilian establishments a mechanism, an intellectual and 
organizational structure,. which not only formulates a 
view of the character of future war(Soviet pronouncements 
make this quite obvious),. but also translates it into 
specific requirements for force structures and equipment 
procurement. This mechanism has its origins in. the. late 
Imperial period, but has been reinforced by Marxism 
Leninism', s emphasis on. scientific prediction. The:.. 
activities . and 
interactions of individuals and 
institutions are cardinal-in, converting something as 
13 
elusive and apparently subjective'as a vision of future 
war into hard and fast policies and requirements. 
Naturally, the military-technical character of future 
war is not a peculiarly Russian and'Soviet preoccupation. 
As General Gareyev explicitely stated recently, 
developments in military science, the Soviet phrase` 
equating to polemology in its widest sense, are not 
confined to one nation, but are, in the main, universal, 12 
as Clausewitz also realised over a 'century and-a half 
ago. 13 However, the present thesis appeared a worthwhile 
and important project for several reasons. These were: 
the undoubted significance of Russia and'the Soviet Union 
as a military power in the twentieth century and 
especially since 1945, notwithstanding the recent internal 
unrest and imminent Soviet withdrawal from eastern Europe; 
the huge resources still being invested in equipment and 
research for a 'future war' by both the Soviet Union and 
the United States, ' notably the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) and its Soviet equivalent, Kosmicheskaya 
strategicheskaya oborona KSO)14; the enormous amount of 
intellectual capital which the Russian Empire and the 
Soviet Union has invested in the study of war; and the 
highly theoretical and academic character of the Russian 
and Soviet approach to these matters. 
The author's own background as a Russian linguist and 
graduate, a historian, a student of military history and 
War Studies, a former soldier and author of books on 
military science including one entitled The Future of 
Land Warfare, 15 seemed likely to lend themselves to' the 
study of such an area. Furthermore, as the classification 
and review of sources demonstrates, this was a'tract of 
largely virgin soil, which needed to be investigated 
primarily from Russian language sources. 
Russian-military-terminology is'extremely precise and 
specific, ' and `it seemed ilikely'that T' (a) future war' and 
'contemporary war(fare)' were` not, merely chänce°` ., ° 'Y 
14 
combinations of words, but represented a defined concept. 
or concepts. How these concepts, if such they -were, 
fitted in to the well-known and. established intellectual 
framework of military science, military doctrine and 
military art, and to other areas of science and philosophy 
such as the theory of scientific revolutions and systems 
theory, was clearly a valid intellectual exercise. This 
is the subject of part two of this thesis. The evolution 
of Russian and Soviet ideas about future-war was 
inextricably linked with Russian and Soviet military 
thought: indeed, those ideas were its very essence. The 
effect of these ideas on political, industrial and 
military organization, equipment procurement and the 
outcome of military operations, made this an important and 
largely neglected aspect of military history. So was 
analysis of the institutional structure by which the view 
of the character of future war was conceived, validated 
and disseminated, a process which this thesis demonstrates 
to have been centred on the organization of the General 
Staff. The latter analysis is best conducted as part of a 
chronological account, taking note of changes in events, 
organization and personalities. Part three thus 
addresses these questions in such a context. Finally, 
current Soviet views on future war(fare) had obvious and 
growing relevance to current defence policy, arms control, 
and predicting how the Soviet Union was. likely to behave 
and how its armed forces were likely to evolve. During 
the course of writing this thesis,. -these questions 
acquired greater prominence and uncertainty with the 
rapidly changing world political situation, the, 
implications of which are addressed. . 
This is,; the. subject 
of part four. 
2. 
_ 
STRUCTURE OF, <THE .. THESIS 
The structure of-this thesis-, is therefore: as follows. 
Part one sets out the reasons for undertakingthe, study 
and its objectives,, -, its structure the methodology and 
15:., 
classifies the wide range of materials and sources used. 
Part two sets out the theoretical basis. It deals with 
the emergence of the idea of the future and the origins of 
forecasting and planning. It explains the terminology and 
translation problems, and the place of 'future war' in the 
intellectual framework of Soviet military science, 
doctrine and art. It then attempts to examine how much 
revolutions in military affairs have--in common-with other 
revolutions in science, and concludes with an account of 
how Soviet forecasts are classified: 'short term', 'long- 
term', and qo on. 
Part three is the historical database, from the late 
1870s to the postwar period. This falls naturally into 
five sections: the nineteenth century revolution in 
military affairs and the road to World War I; the 
assimilation of armour and the aircraft and the road to 
World War II; War at Sea; War in the Air; 'the 'Revolution 
in Military Affairs' brought about by the ballistic 
missile and the nuclear weapon and its interaction with 
conventional options up to the 1970s. The last section 
is dealt with briefly as, unlike other-period's, it has been 
accorded adequate attention by western analysts and to 
retrace their steps would not constitute an original 
contribution to knowledge. Brezhnev's Tula speech of 
197716 provides a convenient point to conclude this part, 
and to begin analysis of current developments, which have 
their origins in the 1970s. 
Part four deals with current thinking about 'future war 
and, by definition therefore, awith the future. After 
establishing where exactly the 'current' view'of future 
war began to gell, this part examines-the-recent re- 
definition of military doctrine; the institutional 
mechanism by which the view of future,: warý'isformulated 
and disseminated; with the new technologies which the 
Russians believe will provide the basis for the'continuing 
'Revolution in Military Affairs'-; with'the-growing t'°ý 
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significance of the oceans and space; and, most 
important, the gaps and anomalies. The principal gap is 
the apparent lack of any effort to examine internal and 
'low intensity' warfare, the type in which the Soviet 
Armed Forces and Internal Security troops are most likely 
to be involved. 
Thus, the thesis endeavours to form a prognoz, 17 a 
prognosis for the future based on a valid methodology, 
known facts and historical data. The structure comprising 
an introductory 'road map' followed by three large parts 
dealing with the theoretical framework, the historical 
database and the future, each subdivided into sections is 
more appropriate than division into a number of shorter 
chapters. 
3. TIME-FRAME INVESTIGATED 
The period reviewed in this thesis covers approximately 
140 years, of. which 27 years lie in the future. The first 
40 years are the era of the Russian Empire ('Russian'), 
the remaining years to date are 'Soviet', and the 
political complexion of the future is uncertain. This 
choice requires explanation. 
The historical perspective used by Russian and Soviet 
analysts is exceptionally broad and long, and to arrive at 
a valid appreciation of the concept, this study must use a 
similar perspective. As the Arab Historian-Ibn Khaldun 
noted in the fourteenth century, 'the past resembles the 
future as water resembles water'. 18 Raymond Garthoff, 
introducing his 1959 translation of General Pokrovskiy's 
prescient works on science, technology and contemporary 
war, warned his readers not to be surprised when. 
Pokrovskiy began by detailing the Carthaginians'- 
technological superiority over the Romans-in-the ancient 
world. 
19 General Kuropatkin, Russian-War. Minister from 
1900 to 1904, presented the Tsar with his-, plan-for--the 
Russian Empire's strategy for the twentieth; -century in. 
1900. He used as his database a detailed, studyof: all the 
17 
wars fought by the Russians during the previous two 
centuries (1700 to 1900). The expansiveness and coherence 
of the plan was not lost on the British translator. 'The 
forethought and care with which the possible price of 
Empire in the twentieth century was worked out by the 
Russian War Ministry is enlightening, for who has 
estimated the probable cost in blood and treasure of the 
expansion or maintenance of the British Empire during the 
next hundred years? '20 
A long historical perspective is therefore mandatory, 
and reaps dividends. Current Soviet exploration of 
conventional operations, preferably without nuclear 
weapons, arguably has more in common with the dilemmas of 
the future war thinkers of the 1930s than it does with 
those of the early decades of the nuclear age. 
Kuropatkin's recommendation that Russia should exploit her 
defensive strength and not be diverted to aggressive 
enterprises, reiterated by Svechin in the 1920s, 
21 is 
recalled in the modern doctrine of 'defensive 
sufficiency', 
21 and Soviet endeavours to develop their own 
form of 'Strategic Defence Initiative'. 
22 The validity of 
comparisons over a relatively long historical timespan is 
ensured by the remarkable consistency and continuity in 
terminology and thought processes throughout the period 
under review. Over four to five generations, between the 
end of the 1870s and now, Russian and Soviet methodology 
and terminology have retained many consistent 
characteristics. That is so, in spite of massive 
political upheaval and the ravages of war which, with the 
Civil War and World War II have seared almost all of 
Soviet territory. It has remained so in spite of enforced 
migrations and systematic attempts by foreign and 
indigenous dictators to exterminate large sections of 
society. This can only reinforce the conclusion that 
Russian and Soviet approaches to the problem of 
'future 
war' possess an extraordinary vitality and resilience. 
18 
The necessity, for., a long historical perspective is 
reinforced by the recent political, social and associated 
military changes in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
The former changes are the most radical since 1945: the 
latter, the most radical since 1917 and, with the possible 
emergence of a form of democracy, recall the events of 
1905-14. There can be no doubt that present changes have 
cut right-through the Soviet neo-cortex, stretching back 
to 1917, and that valid precedents exist from the late 
Imperial period. If we are seeking firm ground in order 
to identify historical precedents, it is necessary tot 
examine the layer below. The modern system of universal- 
military service dates from 1874: that of military 
districts from Milyutin's reforms of the 1860s. 
23 This 
places the emergence of the terms '(a) future war_' and 
'contemporary war(fare)' in the right historical context. 
The term 'future wars' appears , in French, in a letter 
from the renowned military thinker General Jomini to the 
reforming Russian War Minister Dmitriy Milyutin of 18(30) 
September, 1866. A copy of the manuscript draft of this 
letter is included as Appendix A. Jomini's Precis de 
l'Art de la Guerre had been dedicated to the Russian 
Tsar, 24 and Jomini conducted a lively correspondence with 
Milyutin and Tsar Aleksandr II during the 1860s. 
'J'ai rerju .... la lettre que Votre Excellence 
a bien voulu m'addresser en reponse ä celle 
que je lui avais ecrit6 au Sujet des 'changements, 
que les Chemins de f er opereront' sur les futures ° '' s 
guerres et Surtout dans les guerres, d'fensives'. 
25- 
k 
During the 1870s the military journal Voyennv-sbornikr! -_ü"" 
featured a number of increasingly scientific articles., on-' 
issues related to 'future war', including war games26a: and ' 
whether strategy was a, science or, an art27, but°the; first', 
use of the terms '(a) future war' and 'contemporary 
war(fare)' in their modern relationship encountered'3by-Ithe 
author appears in 1877. . 
The author of the article ,:, one: t : -. 
'N. Z. ', cannot, unfortunately, be identified, but the 
19 
subject was 'The tasks of cavalry in contemporary`wars'. 28 
On line 7, immediately below, the author asserted that 
'in future wars, without doubt, we will encounter 
the use of cavalry for reconnaissance and 
security of armies', as used by the German 
in the late Franco-German war of 1870-71'. 
9 
Although the terms 'contemporary warsi30, 'contemporary 
military operationsi31 and '''the character of contemporary 
combati32 had all been used in military-scientific writing 
during the 1870s, this was the first juxtaposition of 
'future' and 'contemporary' wars and warfare in a modern 
way. Part 2 of the thesis demonstrates that this use of 
the terms as virtual synonyms has continued almost to the 
present day. The linguistic continuity back to 1877, 
combined with the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War in 
that year and the general profusion of military-scientific 
writing from the mid-1870s, makes 1877 a convenient 
starting date for detailed consideration of the issues. 
This-choice of starting date makes possible detailed 
consideration of the accelerating revolution in armaments 
from the 1880s onwards. During the 1890s there was a 
further surge of writing on the influence of new 
technology on tactics. Writing on the influence of 
demographic changes, in particular the 'mass' or 'million- 
strong' army, the practical problems of deploying it- and 
the effect this might have on military art continued in 
parallel. 
33 In addition, the 1890s were formative` years 
for officers, some of whom would go on to shape the 
development of Soviet military thinking after'' 1917.34 
Although drawing on an earlier ten-year' background of 
research and writing in the field of Russian`-and"-Soviet 
military studies, this thesis was the specific product of 
the years 1987 to 1990. As parts 2 and 4'demonstra'te, 
recent and current Soviet'long-term, forecasts'look some 25 
to 30 and even' 35 years ahead: ' The year-: 2017 clearly- has 
some. symbolic significance : for Soviet, planners., as , the 
centenary of the Russian` Revolütiön`. - As 
=part-4 'also 
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demonstrates, it has some specific importance in the 
Soviet space programme. Although political changes may 
lessen the significance of the Revolution's centenary, 
its choice is consistent with past Soviet practice, which 
tends to emphasize anniversaries, five and ten year 
periods. Therefore, 2017 has been selected as a major and 
significant landmark on the horizon. More generally, a 
horizon some 30 years ahead appears sensible, given the 
time-span of Soviet forecasts analysed in part 2. 
4. ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES TO WHICH THIS STUDY BELONGS 
This thesis was completed in the Centre for Defence 
Studies, University-of Edinburgh, under the ultimate 
auspices of the Faculty of Social Sciences. 'Defence 
Studies' is widely acknowledged to be a multi-disciplinary 
field. Nevertheless, just as Clausewitz opined that war 
was one of the social sciences35, so too, it appears, are 
Defence Studies. 'A work in the field of 'Defence Studies' 
corresponds to the Soviet field of 'military science'. 
However, no British or US university awards the degree of 
Doktor voyennykh nauk: 'Doctor of Military Sciences', 
introduced in the Soviet Union in 1937.36 The main 
disciplines at the author's disposal are Modern History 
and Modern Languages and Literature. Given the volume of 
source material which has had to be analysed, a fluent and 
swift reading command of Russian has been a sine qua non, 
without which it would not have been possible to begin. 
Much of this thesis is inevitably historical,. 
because the Russians themselves place great emphasis on 
history, as one of the tools for predicting the future. As 
the authors of a book on the Evolution of Military Art37 
concluded, in 1988, 
'military art, in the process of its 
development, 
has trodden a road of many centuries, -'from the 
most simple, primitive forms and methods, offusing..,., 
armed forces to those, which are declared, or are 
used in practice in'contemporary', wars[sovremnennye-'' 
von here seem. to be_wars. that are; happening, wnot., 
possible wars of the near future]. It is important 
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to clarify that this process did not unfold'in`a 
chaotic fashion not in a disordered way. Its 
study and deep reflection permit one to identify 
firm laws and trends in military art and constantly 
recall them while constructing forecasts of its 
further development... Although modern conventional 
weapons have moved far ahead in effectiveness, 
range and destructiveness, the parameters for 
their use remain, all the same, within the confine 
of rational bounds. Wars employing conventional 
weapons, local wars, unfortunately, became 
widespread after the Second World War. Such wars 
are now taking place in a number of areas 
of the world. Therefore, the process of 
establishing the trends and laws of military 
art is unfinished. The [historical] analysis 
which, has been conducted only serves 
as a step in its turn along this road. '38 
Historians have tended to think that their territory 
stopped 'at the knife edge of "now"'. 39 Historians can, 
however, play an important role in predicting the future, 
and clearly do so in the Soviet Union The long lead 
times for weapons and equipment development, and the long 
periods that these items remain in service, make the study 
of fairly recent history, and the ideas which in turn 
shaped that history when it lay in the future, of direct 
relevance to predicting tomorrow. 
The study also lies within the field of futures 
studies. The history of past attempts to predict the 
future is a recognized subset of futures studies, as are 
methods of prediction. Futures, the Journal of 
Forecasting and Prediction, has provided useful guidelines 
for approaching the material from the viewpoint of this 
relatively new discipline. 40 
This study also inevitably reflects the Ru'ssians' own 
emphasis on the hard sciences, and particular disciplines 
which will affect the character of'future? war, as well as 
methods of prediction. What the Russians mean"by 
cybernetics, mathematical modelling, ' theus'e 'of queueing 
theory41 and fluid dynamics in predicting the course of 
battles, all need to be addressed, "'as wellasindividual 
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weapons technologies. Studies of the influence of new 
technology on forms of combat-appear side by side with 
more specifically technological articles on new systems 
themselves. A group of sources of particular interest are 
articles on 'cruise missiles'(inspired by the German V-1s) 
and ballistic missiles (V-2s), beginning with Pokrovskiy 
in 1944, combining observation of foreign developments 
with a long-standing Russian interest in super long range 
artillery. 42 
Whilst a reasonable understanding of science and, 
technology are critical to the present thesis, it is not a 
thesis in physics or mathematics. The author has 
attempted to explain the functioning of new generation 
weapons, for example electro-magnetic guns, the, 
constraints of orbital physics, or issues which arise in 
the mathematical modelling of conflict, in terms which 
indicate that he possesses such an understanding and which 
should be comprehensible to the intelligent layman. 
Like warfare itself, this thesis is therefore part 
'art', part 'science'. The study of the future and the 
study of the past have proved inextricable. The history 
of science has provided useful parallels, as argued in 
part 2. However, a knowledge of institutional and human 
interaction, and of military sociology and institutions, 
based on common sense and experience, is perhaps the most 
important tool, apart from command of the Russian, 
language, in a work of. this kind, and one which is often 
lacking. A prime example is the extensive work of 
Ivan 
Bliokh (Bloch), which reached its final. 
-form 
in, hisastudy 
Future War... published, in, 1898.43 As demonstrated-. in 
part 3, many commentators have-taken Bliokh! s. work in 
isolation,, taken the passages outside , 
their, proper__; 
institutional and personal: context. _t-Why>did a. Warsaw;, 
banker,, with notmilitary, experience, lcompile,: a; magnum opus 
on future war? 
-, 
As demonstrated, Bliokh came,, -tov-the,,;, 
subject, in part because hexwas involved. ýin municipalt 
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planning for the city of Warsaw, which would most likely 
be at the centre of any future major European war 
involving the Russian Empire. Contrary to popular belief, 
Bliokh was not an 'amateur' who managed to get it right 
when all the professional soldiers got it wrong: his 
study of professional military literature and debt to his 
professional consultants are clearly and explicitely 
stated. Another example is the tendency to associate 
ideas and articles too closely and personally with the 
senior officer whose name appears at the bottom. -Senior 
Soviet officers have their juniors drafting for them as 
much as their British and American equivalents, with 
implications discussed in the review of sources below. 
Lastly, this is in part a study of the Russian 
language itself. The study was in part inspired by the 
prevalence of a particular phrase in Russian: budushchaya 
voyna. The problem with the precise nuances of 
budushchaya voyna and sovremennnaya voyna has-been alluded 
to already, and is examined in part 2. So are the nuances 
of prognozirovaniye (forecasting) and predvideniye 
(foresight), and the absence in Russian of definite and 
indefinite articles. Psycholinguistic differences must 
always be borne in mind, and reaching a valid translation 
of terms fundamental to the study is an academic exercise 
in itself. The author has found his formal study of 
" scientific and technical translation and of translation 
theory a particular asset in completing this work. 44 In 
the beginning was the word. However, this is' emphatically 
not a 'content analysis'. It would no doubt have been' 
possible to take the database of'works recorded'in the 
bibliography and analyse them to establish the frequency 
of _budushchaya voyna, sovremennaya voyna, 
"-a, nd-theý'number 
of times they appeared1' in -the same' article. As °partý 2,3` 
and 4 demonstrate, the terms appear to have different 
meanings in different contexts. In the author's view, a 
'content analysis' wöuld'nöt°have been very useful. `It is 
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hoped that a sensitive, descriptive analysis of the 
Russian and Soviet view of future war will be. 
5. CLASSIFICATION AND REVIEW OF SOURCES 
The latest editions of the Soviet Military 
Encyclopedia(the relevant volume of which was published in 
1976)45 and the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary(1983- 
86)46 do not include specific entries on 'future war'. The 
reasons for this are discussed in part 2. However, the 
earlier edition of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, the 
relevant volume of which was published in 1933, does. 
47 A 
useful model of the methodology necessary to investigate 
the Russian and Soviet view of future war can be derived 
from the 1933 article: 
'Views on this [future war] do not always find 
definitive official expression. More often, they 
are expressed in the form of official remarks in 
regulations, orders, training courses and the 
pronouncements of authorities on military affairs. 
However, there were quite a few specialised works 
on the theme of future war, particularly before 
the World War of 1914 to 1918. At the moment 
[1933], there exists in bourgeois states a whole 
future war literature, comprising both theor- 
etical works and semi-literary creative writings'. 48 
The Soviet view of future war can be investigated from a 
similar spectrum of sources. In the earlier period 
covered by this study, these views are recorded in 
written, largely printed records, but in the case of the 
recent and current view of future war the spoken 
testimonial of senior Soviet officers and analysts: =is of 
unique value. During the period of study the principle of 
glasnost' gathered momentum and unprecedented discussions 
between NATO and Warsaw Pact on military doctrine and, 
deployments took place. Interviews with: Sovietx...,, -,,. - 
authorities who visited Britain, and through: academic and. 
professional colleagues, who visited the,,,. USSR have provided 
unique confirmation of somepublished-sources,, and, cast_ 
doubt on the value, of , some analysis . of others. , ,-,, , 
.. Of, _particular value were; private,, 
records of discussions 
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between US Army and Soviet General Staff Representatives 
in September, 1989,49 the testimonial of the author's 
colleague JohnýHines, visiting Moscow in December, 1989 
(particularly' discussions with Generals Larionov, - 
Chaldymov and Dr Tsygichko), 50 and a record of the CSBM 
negotiations in Vienna, January 1990.51 In the first case 
the author was involved in briefing the US delegation and 
in the first two cases, provided specific questions 
addressed to the Soviet representatives. Their responses 
can therefore be considered as responses"to the author's 
own, specific enquiries with regard to this thesis. 
Other important and unique interviews were those with Dr 
Sergey Karaganov in December 1989, and with a Soviet 
student of artificial intelligence in October, 1989.52 
The long record of contacts between Edinburgh 
University's Defence Studies Centre and the Soviet 
military and academic establishment was of obvious value, 
notably in the form of the December 1988 Edinburgh 
Conversations53 and insights culled from visiting Soviet 
academics. 
- The author was able to interview one Soviet defector, a 
former Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) officer, using 
the pseudonym Viktor Suvorov. Although sceptical about 
some of Suvorov's work, the author has full confidence-'in 
his answers to particular questions about Soviet'semantics 
and attitudes. 54 
Last, and most privileged, were the author's first 
hand encounters with senior Soviet officers in the Soviet 
Union, in May, 1990. Remarks by Chief of the'"General=Staff 
Army General Mikhail Moiseyev andýDeputyýChief`of the 
Airborne Forces Lieutenant General Vladislav`rLebedev`were 
instructive, and a private, interview'with Deputy'Minister 
for Armaments Army General°Vitaliy Shabanoväanswered` 
particular"questions. Duringý'this'. visit a researcher, 'at 
the Lenin Military-political Academy specialising in 
Chinese affairs was also interviewed. 
55 
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These contacts have helped verify or dispute x _- 
conclusions from published evidence. When dealing with 
the Soviet view of future war, it is not sufficient simply 
to catalogue quotations from printed journals and analyse 
Soviet texts in a theological fashion. For example, the 
excellent work of Mary Fitzgerald, which has not addressed 
'future war' as such but deals with some related current 
issues, appears to rely entirely on analysis of published 
speeches and documents. There has been a tendency to 
identify the beginning of the 'all-conventional' option 
with Brezhnev's Tula speech of 1977.56 Yet how is this to 
be reconciled with continuing lavish Soviet investment in 
strategic and battlefield nuclear systems? It appears 
that the General Staff continued to attempt to make the 
nuclear model work up to about 1985, and that there is 
frequently a ten year delay between the General Staff 
fully espousing political directives on the one hand, and 
between their recommendations being fully accepted by the 
political leadership on the other. 57 
Another issue which those who rely entirely on printed 
sources miss is the exact origin of ideas and their 
development within the General Staff. The author's.. 
experience in the British Ministry of Defence has inclined 
him to the view that senior officers spend the first part 
of their careers obeying their superiors, and then at some 
point begin taking most orders from their subordinates, 
certainly in terms of what they write. Fitzgerald's 
article 'Marshal Ogarkov and the new Revolution in Soviet 
Military Affairs' suggests that Ogarkov was personally 
responsible for all the ideas expressed above his, 
signature about future warfare and such memorable phrases 
as 'weapons employing new physical principles'. 
58 In 
discussions with the Soviet Major-General Kirshin, it 
emerged that Marshal Ogarkov had 'signed a lot'(podpisal), 
as opposed to 'written a lot'(pisal). 
59 According to this 
source, much of they wörkoriginated- with the'shadowy 
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figure of Colonel-General Danileyevich, about whom little 
is known. General Gareyev, on the other hand, former head 
of the Military Science Directorate, identified in part 4 
as being at the centre of 'future war' thinking, 
apparently writes all his material himself. 
The historical component of the thesis naturally relies 
almost entirely on written sources. Few archival' - 
materials are available: even in the days of glasnost', 
Soviet War, Naval and Defence Ministry internal documents 
relating to war planning and operational requirements are 
not available to the public. The Soviet General Staff is 
certainly unlikely to allow access to postwar documents 
relating to planning for future war. 
Jomini's 1866 correspondence with Milyutin is a rare 
example of an archival(manuscript) source providing 
information unavailable in other media. 
60 A particularly 
valuable archival source on the late Imperial period are 
the archives of the French Service Historique de 1'Armee 
de Terre at Vincennes, which contain the voluminous 
correspondence of French military representatives posted 
to Russia during the period of the Franco-Russian alliance 
from 1894. It is here that we are reminded that Russian 
military thinking did not evolve in isolation, -and 
encounter the first reference to the General Staff Academy 
as a 'think tank', in 1910. It was the War Minister's 
intention 
'd'arriver ainsi a 1'equite de doctrines 
et de faire de plus enýpluý, de l'acaggmie 
un centre pensant de 1 armee Russel. 
It is perhaps ironic that the first references to 'a 
future war' and to the General Staff Academy, as a 'think 
tank' encountered in this study, ' although both referring 
to Russia, are in French. 
The fact that most of the materials used äre`not hand- 
or typewritten in their final form'in-no way detracts from 
their status as primary sources or the originality of this 
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work. ' The printing press still occupies the position in 
the Soviet Union which-has been increasingly usurped by 
the word-processor and photocopying machine in the West. 
The Soviet Army and Navy effectively print most of their 
training manuals. In addition, a large volume of archival 
documentation and conference proceedings has been recorded 
in print. Obruchev's comments on-the plans for war with 
Turkey in the 1870s are an example of the subsequent 
printing of what originated as a highly sensitive internal 
document, 62 as are the.. large chunks of Kuropatkin's 1900, 
and 1901 reports to the Tsar which were subsequently 
published. 63 
References to unpublished archival documents are also 
sometimes found. For example, an article--in Voyenno- 
istoricheskiy zhurnal on 'The Birth and Development of 
Soviet Military Doctrine', contains many references to 
future war and records 'that in the 1920s a collective led 
by Tukhachevskiy compiled 'a theoretical work called i 
"Future War"(Budushchaya voyna)'. This does not, appear to 
have been published as such, although sections of it may 
have found their way into many articles, and is cited as 
being in the Central State Military History Archive 
(TsGASA). 64 The author's attempts to gain access to this 
material through the editor of the Soviet Military 
Historical Journal were, regrettably, unsuccessful. 
However, as this thesis was practically complete, the 
newly established Soviet archive service, run-by the firm 
MITEK, indicated in response to the author's enquiries 
that they had traced the documents, which they.. said. ran to' 
some 700 pages. 
65 
v-= 
However, enough informationýwas: available during. the 
period of study to confirm the author's-. conclusions about, _ 
the process of forming the 'in-house' view of-. -, the, - 
character of future war. The 1920s; study team also: 
comprised Ya., M =Zhigur, , A. N Nikonov; and Ya, wK_-Berzin, 
66,, 
- 
Zhigur -was' an expert °on chemical. warfare, 
ýiwhile««Benzin: 'r 
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(1889-1938) was at the time a member of the Red'Army 
intelligence directorate. 67 Berzin would' therefore have 
been well qualified to advise on developments in foreign 
armies: the 'threat' side of the analysis. Given the 
emphasis on chemical warfare, attested by sources as 
diverse as the foreign observer General Werner von 
Blomberg68 and Bulgakov's fictional short story The Fatal 
Eggs, 69 Zhigur's inclusion is logical. Nikonov was one of 
the authors of the 1933 Soviet Military Encyclopedia 
article on future war, attesting to a significant period 
of association with the 'future war' problem in general. 
70 
Tukhachevskiy, as an experienced operational commander, 
political idealist and military-technical visionary was 
the obvious person to head the study. Thus, this second 
hand report of an archival source tells us much about both 
the view of'future war at the time and the methodology by 
which it was formulated. 
A primary, official and originally unpublished source 
which had just become available at the time of writing 
comprised lectures delivered at the Voroshilov Academy of 
the General Staff'of the USSR Armed Forces. The lectures 
concerned were delivered between 1973 and. 1975, and were 
communicated to the west by two Afghan officers. A US 
Government and Army team undertook their translation and 
publication. 
71 These provided 'information on Soviet 
military theory and practice that in authority,. scope and 
level of detail has been unavailable previously'. 
72 Of 
particular relevance to the concept of 'future war' was 
one entitled 'Principles and Content of Military Strategy' 
" '° delivered to the entire student body, not just foreign 
students, in 1973 by Lieutenant General`Shavrov, ''oneof 
the principal authors of the-cardinal-work'The Methodology 
of Military-Scientifi\ Cognition: 
73`, ̀ This lecturYe' 
therefore underscored' the interrelationship'between' 
Military Science, Doctrine and Art'Tontthe'öne hand-and 
methods of prediction (part icularly--ofx: the` charäct"er` of 
30 
future war) on the other. The lecture did not present 
anything dramatically new or different about 'future war' 
and its relationship to Military Science, Doctrine and Art 
but rather provided highly authoritative confirmation of 




The main problem with sources, however, is not their 
scarcity but their bulk and profusion. Turning to printed 
books and articles alluding to views of future war, all of 
which must be considered primary sources, the volume of 
material is overwhelming. Few sources examine the concept 
of future war as such: Golubev's MV Frunze on the 
character of Future War (1931)75 and the 1933 Soviet 
Military Encyclopedia article are the most obvious, and 
acquire the status of key primary sources by their very 
rarity. However, evidence of Soviet views of future war 
from a given time is copious. There is a Russian and 
Soviet tradition of debate in. the open military press, 
which continues to the present day, which means that 
highly abstruse questions of military theory and policy 
have been andare discussed in journals available on 
public subscription, and in books which can be purchased 
or are available in the world's major reference libraries. 
A feel for the range of published articles and books can 
be gained from the 1936 bibliography of Russian language 
sources dealing with the lessons of World War I for, 
'future war', which contains some 1650 entries. 76 , 
The excellent international inter-library-loan system 
ensured that every Russian work identified as being of 
interest and held in the Lenin State-'Library was available 
to the author far more efficiently,,, than, would have-been, 
the case had he needed,, to spend, months,, possibly,, years, in 
Moscow. 
, 
The Lenin library'_hasý_ proved surprisingly willing 
to lend, its original treasures, with some remarkable 
results. The copy ofoneimpörtänt söurce, Martynov's 
Strategy in the Age of Napoleon"arid in öur Time (1894), 
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sent'through the system bore the book plate of General' 
Kuropatkin, War Minister from 1898 to 1904 and commander- 
in-chief in Manchuria, complete with what appear to be his 
marginal notes. A copy of some relevant pages is included 
as Annex B. 
77 
Other works have only been available as blurred copies 
of microfilm, for example the copy of Svechin's Strategy, 
and were therefore not always easy to read, with some 
passages illegible. 
78 The tendency of Soviet works to 
self-destruct after a few decades, because of highly 
acidic paper, also poses some problems. The fact that the 
Soviet Union did not become party to the copyright 
convention until 1973 has proved helpful, as there are no 
copyright restrictions on reproducing all but the last 17 
years' material, but conversely older books and articles 
may be too fragile to copy and must be transcribed by 
hand. In this regard, Tsarist works have, in the main, 
lasted far better, being printed on far superior paper. 
This compensates for the fact that Tsarist orthography is 
different from modern Russian and requires some 
acclimatisation (see the note on transliteration at the 
beginning of the thesis). 
Published articles and books on 'future war' (and, 
sometimes, 'contemporary war')as seen from the time when 
they were written are fairly frequently encountered from 
the 1890s onwards, and there is a vast number of articles 
from the 1920s and 30s. 79 The principal Imperial Russian 
journals Voyenny Sbornik(Military Review)(VSb)(founded 
1858) and Morskoy Sbornik(Naval Review)(MSb)(founded 1848) 
form a massive fund of material, amounting to a thick 
volume every two months. In'the Soviet'period: there were 
many journals, including VoyennyVestnik (Military 
Herald)(VV)80; "-the collection Vöyennäya-nauka i 
revolyutsiya- (Military=_ Scierºce aind=', the' Revolution) 
(VNiR)81; the journal: Revdlyutsiyä i`voynä'(Revolütion and 
War)(RiV) (later'Voyna°i revolyutsiyä)a'(ViR)82; "Noyennaya 
k 
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Mysl'-i Revolyutsiya (Military Thought and the Revolution) 
(VMiR); Krasnaya armiya (Red Army)(KA), Mobilizatsionny 
sbornik (Mobilisation Review) and Voyennoye delo 
(Military 
Affairs) and the newspaper Krasnaya zvezda (Red 
Star)(KZ). 83 Where articles were unavailable in the UK, 
they were obtained either from the United States (RiV/ViR) 
or the Soviet Union itself (RiV/ViR and VMiR , in the case 
of the latter graciously marked 'dar'-'gift'. 
84 
Of particular importance is Voyennaya mysl' - Military 
Thought(VM). Military Thought'has traditionally been a 
journal 'for Generals and Admirals only', analogous to a 
'restricted' journal in the west. 
85 However, most issues 
up to and including the 1960s and a large cross-section of 
later issues have been available to the author. From 1989 
VM became available on public subscription. The author's 
first copies thus appeared only as the present work was 
nearing completion, but the decision to make VM available 
also appears to have induced a more open attitude with 
regard to the release of articles from previously 
'restricted' issues. In addition, the 1989 series of 
revolutions in eastern Europe appears to have led a number 
of state libraries of the Soviet Union's former allies to 
release their copies of VM. 
86 Traditionally, Military 
Thought's articles carried slightly greater weight. than 
those in other journals, and in the period before-World 
war II, certainly, they sometimes evince a more scholarly 
and detached approach. It remains to be seen whether 
abandonment of the 'Generals and Admirals only'-, rubric 
will lead to a diminution of VM's value as a highly. 
authoritative and candid source. .,. - - 
In the post war period the ubiquitous. Mi= itary 
Historical Journal (Voyenno-istoricheskiy 
- zhurnal)(VIZh)(founded in 1939, -but-. discontinued*from 
1941- 
59) and _ Communist of the Armed ý 
Forces (Kommunis t 
Vooruzhennykh Sil)(KVS)(from 1960) are added, to,, the, swell 
of source. material. 
87:: In; recent years, VIZh; has, emerged 
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from its former sober salmon pink livery to feature fewer 
articles on military doctrine and art (see part 2), and 
more pictures and published-archival materials. It may be 
that the coverage of the old VIZh, which contained many 
valuable articles relevant to this'study, will be 
undertaken by the newly available VM. 
Communist of the Armed Forces (KVS) is particularly 
illuminating as articles on 'Contemporary War' are 
specifically and explicitely aimed at those in charge of 
political education, indicating that the 'character of 
future war' is not merely an abstraction for high level 
planning and procurement decisions, but is a concept 
communicated directly to the lowest levels of the Soviet 
military establishment: to ordinary soldiers, sailors and 
airmen. A 1962 article entitled 'The Character and 
Peculiarities of Contemporary War[fare]' revealed that 
this subject should be studied as part of 'political 
education', by extended service soldiers and sailors in 
groups for a total of six hours and by sergeants and 
starshiny (above senior sergeants but below praporshchiki 
or warrant-officers)*for eight hours. The course began 
with the Marxist-Leninist concept of war, then explored 
the ruling of the XXII Party Congress on the influence of 
modern weaponry on the character of war, and finally, 
particular problems of military operations in conditions 
where weapons of mass destruction (nuclear and chemical) 
were used. 
88 An article with the same title. in: 1969"-. _- 
revealed that most students had eight hours allocated for 
this subject, of which two should be devoted to'lectures, 
two to private study and four to'group seminars. 1 The- 
first part of 'the course was 'the same, '-the second 
'Character of wars of the modern=epoch'; -and the third 
special features, of the military faction of , sub-units and 
units in modern warfare, and the 'role öf men 
-and''mächines. 
This-is fairly conclusive evidence ythat the 'character'of- 
modern warfare', which= as pärt 2' demonstrates, '°"is , often 
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virtually synonymous with the character of'future'war, is 
a clearly defined subject for study down to all but the - 
very lowest level (the conscript) in the Soviet Armed 
Forces. 89 
Over the last three decades, VM, MSb, VIZh, KVS and KZ 
have been the most serious and reputable Soviet military- 
journals and newspaper dealing with matters covered by 
this study. Insights can sometimes also be gained from 
the Aerospace journal Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika and 
Tekhnika i Vooruzheniya(Technology and Armament). 
90 
However, the more lightweight international journal Soviet 
Military Review, now discontinued, should not be 
dismissed. Recently, it contained the unique revelation 
that Soviet troops on exercise had used weapons based on 
particle accelerators. 
91 
All these journals dealt with the Soviet Armed Forces 
and their preparation for major inter-state conflict. 
There has been remarkably little discussion of possible 
'low intensity' or guerrilla warfare, or of internal 
conflict. The reasons for this are discussed in part 4. 
When a military thinker comments on these issues, for 
example, Tukhachevskiy writing about 'Fighting against 
counter-revolutionary insurrections', 
92 or Tsiffer, about 
'War in Undeveloped Regions', 93 it is of particular 
interest. 
Therefore, the unprecedented availability from-1990 of 
the Interior Ministry (MVD) journal Sovetskaya militsiya 
(Soviet police), may be just as significant as. =the,. -- - 




focussing on the preparation of . the=Soviet ArmedxForces =° 
for a future major interstate--war, western analysts musty 
now be-acutely aware-thatýthe type of: warfare: in which-the 
Soviet `Union -is most likely to 
beinvolvedis -,, ', low 
intensity', and possibly internal-, conflict'The MVD, has-#t 
its own, large, armed. 'organization, 'quite. distinct from the 
Armed='Forces (Strategic -Missile-, Forces, Army, Air Forces, 
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Air Defence Forces, Navy)', and internal warfare is 
constitutionally their concern, and that of the'KGB. The 
MVD journal and the KGB Border Guards' journal 
Pogranichnik may become forums for discussion of such 
operations, although there has also been limited 
discussion of the Armed Forces' internal role in the Armed 
Forces' journals (see part 4). - 
In recent years certain journals other than those 
traditionally concerned with military science have become 
regular sources of discussion of military policy and 
science. The journal of World Economics and International 
Affairs (MEMO)is published by the Institute of that name 
which, along with the Institute of the USA and Canada, has 
been a home for non-General Staff analysts (see part 4). 
This has been a forum for discussion-of future operational 
forms designed to conform to the stated policy of 
'defensive sufficiency'. 95 The journal International 
Affairs published in English and Russian, has also 
featured significant articles * 
96 
A number of key articles by senior figures have 
appeared in the Communist Party journal Kommunist. 97 
Finally, the literary journal Znamya (Standard) recently 
featured a seminal article on 'Foresight' by Andrey 
Kokoshin and Army general V N"Lobov, with Aleksandr 
Svechin's views on the character of (a) future war in 
their modern context as its core. 98 The appearance of 
'the character of future war' at the centre'of_än'article 
on foresight, the reevaluation of Svechin in the modern 
context, and the issues of attack and defence made this a 
pivotal article for the key words and issues 
addressed in 
sections 2,3 and 4 of this thesis. - But it appeared 
in a 
literary journal, not a military-scientific one, further 
underlining the need 'f,: )r a-synoptic-and-eclectic` approach 
highlighted throughout this , thesis. ý Therefore, `a copy of 
the Russian original is included -as Appýendi, x 'E. ---,  
f- In , addition ýto specialized- military-'journals`, service 
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newspapers, and the journals of other, 'civilian' 
institutes involved, the national press also sometimes 
features serious articles on military scientific themes 
and lessons from past and continuing conflict. The pre- 
Revolutionary quality daily Russian Gazette, 99 Pravda 100 
and Izvestiya101 have all yielded some important source 
material. Once again, less apparently weighty sources 
should not be ignored. The humble Soviet Weekly provided 
the only confirmation that the bright red berets seen in 
film from Azerbaijan in early 1990 were the insignia of a 
specialist unit of MVD counter-terrorist advisers, a 
significant innovation with regard to the Soviet Union's 
view of the future warfare in which it might be 
engaged. 102 
Russian and other East European analyses of Military 
Doctrine, Science and Art form a large category of 
sources, and these areas of study, as noted, can 
frequently be regarded as synonymous with 'future war''103 
As noted already, only one military encyclopedia, that of 
1933 (of which only two volumes were published) contains 
direct reference to future war. However, military and 
other encyclopedias as a class of literature are 
considered by Russian and Soviet professionals to be 
important indicators of the general level of military 
scientific endeavour. 
104 Insights into the structure of 
Soviet military scientific thinking and thus thinking 
about future war are apparent from Leyer's Encyclopedia of 
Military and Naval Sciences (1883-97)105, the 1976-80, 
Soviet Military Encyclopedia and the Military 
Encyclopaedic Dictionaries of 1983 and 1986,106 and 
entries in the various editions of the Great Soviet_n 
Encyclopedia. 107 
= There are also some large published collections, of, 
military writing: articles, chapters and condensed,, _r_..., x 
sections of books. These are of. exceptional value and_are 
replete with constant reference to the problem of. future 
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war and contain useful commentary and biographical 
information. Examples are , for the pre-World War I 
period, Russian Military and Theoretical Thought of the 
19th and early 20th Centuries (1960), 
108 for the inter- 
war period Questions of Strategy and operational art in 
Soviet Military Works, 1917-1940(1965)109 and 
Tukhachevskiy's Collected Works(1964); 110 and, for the 
post war era, Problems of the Revolution in Military 
Affairs (1965)111. 
Histories of military organization frequently contain 
references to prevailing views of 'future war', for 
example The Soviet Armed Forces: A History of their 
Organization (1978)112, or the books by Losik113 and 
Anan'ev114 on tank forces. 
Published Russian and Soviet documents on war planning 
and strategic deployment are an important source. In the 
case of General Obruchev's comments on the strategic plan 
for a war against Turkey, they can reveal an astonishingly 
dynamic and futuristic view of future war. 
115 Questions of 
strategic deployment, often based on the experience of 
World War I, are particularly important in the-period- 
leading up to June, 1941.116 
Speeches by Soviet military and political leaders 
alluding to the character of future war are usually more 
general than pieces written as books or articles, but are 
an important source on prevailing doctrine. ' Speeches by 
Tukhachevskiy117, Stalin, 118, Zhukov, 119 Brezhnev, 
120 
Gorbach4v, 121 and Chief of the General Staff Moiseyev122 
all mark certain milestones in the evolution "of the == 
concept of future war. 
Russian and Soviet Field Service Regulations (PU) yield 
implicit and explicit clues about the prevailing concept 
of future war. The earlier Field Service" Regulations-(the 
Tsarist PU-12 and the Soviet{PU-18 '-are documents covering 
highly detailed questions of organization' anddeployyment. 
The latter reflected World War' 1'-lessorns, "-and-was' "-ý' 
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therefore conditioned by positional war experience while 
retaining part one on 'Manoeuvre War'. 
123 The later 
Soviet Field Service Regulations are works of broader 
scope. A comparison of PU-29 and the far sighted PU-36, 
the latter owing much to the work of"Tukhachevskiy, is 
especially instructive. 
124 The projected PU-41 is 
illuminating with regard to the shifts in views of the 
character of future operations in the immediate pre-war 
years. 125 Efforts were made during the time=of writing to 
obtain Soviet post-war PUs, believed to include some from 
the 1950s and PU-1964, but these were not available. 
126 
In all cases, general (combined arms) Field Service 
Regulations were followed by special to arm regulations 
later. 127 However, works such as Sokolovskiy's Strategy 
and Reznichenko's Taktika 128 can be considered almost as 
unclassified versions of the current regulations. A 
detailed analysis of the changes between Reznichenko's 
1966,1984 and 1987 editions of Taktika'can yield a-great 
deal that must duplicate a comparison of corresponding 
Field Service Regulations, and tell us much the same about 
views on the character of future war. For example, the 
1987 Taktika, besides being much larger (496 pp. as 
against 270 for the 1984 edition and 408. for the 1966), 
places far more stress on high technology and high 
precision weapons, suppression of enemy air defence, 
combat with helicopters and features a conclusion (there 
was none in the 1984 edition) stressing new methods of' 
troop control(involving automation and computers), 'very 
advanced technology', and changed combat support measures 
which in many cases have become part of actual combat 
(electronic warfare, for example). 
129 
At this stage the reader may begin,, tofeelthat 
Russian and Soviet"'thinking about{the character, of future 
war is and has been overwhelmingly concerned with land or, 
since the 1920s, air-land operations. Since 1945,, this i-, riý. ", . >r .ýs., t lit 
type of large scale, 'continental' warfare' has extended 
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into space and embraced the strategic nuclear balance. The 
Navy'has, it is true, been something of a Cinderella 
service in Russia and the Soviet Union, but, 
paradoxically, the relatively low standing of the Russian- 
and Soviet navies may have forced certain naval officers 
to think more imaginatively and radically about the future 
of their service. The naval journal Morskoy Sbornik 
covers a range of subjects unequalled in any of the land 
forces' journals, from the broadest strategic 
questions(embracing"sea and land) to specific 
technological ones. Considering the state of the Soviet 
Navy in 1922, the editors were acutely conscious of being 
the poor relation of the army: 
'In former [pre-revolutionary) times, Russia was 
poor in literary and scientific expertise among 
naval specialists, and the many years of war and 
revolution right up to the most recent times have 
further weakened it. The Navy has found itself 
to be many times weaker than the Army in this 
regard. At the disposal of the RSFSR [the Soviet 
Union had not yet ben formed] there are 1500 
members of the old General Staff among whom many 
are military-scientific authors 
tnauchno- 
literaturnye rabotniki]; in the Red Army there 
already exists a numerous cadre of young command 
personnel, including some dozens of young General 
Staff officers. In the Navy the number of former 
[ex-Tsarist] command personnel is a few hundred 
and people with a higher naval staff training 
are numbered in single figures. Young. Red comm- 
anders in the Navy are practically non-existent. '130 
Nevertheless, predicting future war on, over-and under 
the sea, is a subject of at least equivalent magnitude to 
continental operations. This is an area where 
technological changes have had and may continue`to have a 
more immediate and critical impact, than`on 
`land. "It 
includes certain very interesting-works, for example, 
Gorshkov's Sea Powerýof the State, undoubtedly one of the 
most expansive and formidable"fpostwar`Sovietbooks within 
the 'future war' cateory. 
131 Works about the Navy may be 
of great, "even superior value "in`=divining'Soviet `thinking 
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about future war generally. Immediately before World War 
I, Morskoy Sbornik featured major articles by three 
important figures in the general evolution of Soviet 
military thinking. The first was the prolific and eminent 
V Novitskiy, editor of the indispensable 1911-15 Military 
Encyclopedia, writing on 'The Theory of Mobilisation' 
(1910). 132 The second was N Kiado, author of 'Studies on 
Strategy'(1913-14), and the third the prominent land 
forces' theorist A Neznamov, who crossed pens with Klado 
over the views of the German theorist Schlichting. 
133 
After the war, in 1922, another important thinker, V 
Zherve, used Morskoy Sbornik to set'out a logical 
framework within which naval plans and programmes could be 
formulated, beginning with a 'general plan of preparation 
of the state for war', leading to 'plans for war with 
probable opponents', and thence to strategic missions for 
the Armed Forces and partial strategic missions for 
component parts of the Armed Forces (e. g., the Navy)134 
Returning to the very recent'past, the last book 
prefaced by Fleet Admiral. Gorshkov, published at the time 
of his death in 1988 provides'an outstanding example of 
how a book apparently about the Navy may illuminate Soviet 
views on future warfare in general and the way these-views 
are formulated. This remarkable volume is called'The 
Navy: its Role and Perspectives for Development and 
Employment. The other authors comprised ahistorian, a 
tactician and an expert on operational research-and< 
scientific prediction: a compact profile'of-the Soviet 
methodology for determining the character, of? future 
war. 
135 The book is most illuminating-with, regard'to' 
general Soviet methodology. Although noting'ýthe'=' 
peculiarities, of(osobennosti). ýof naval-development, -for 
example,, the 1988 book providesFa=concentratedtreatment'' 
of forecasting in general, - its linteraction with`, 
-- ý`ý 
technological ` change, and>the role of. £war games. `4'This=work 
is,. considered in=detail`tin, pärtý, 4. Captain 
'Skugarev;; -lone 
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of the authors of the book, also wrote one of the most 
enlightening articles on planning and prediction in the 
context of armed forces' development, which appeared in 
the naval journal Morskoy Sbornik, in 1972.136 
A Naval General Staff (as opposed to the naval main 
staff which dealt with detailed questions of personnel and 
sea training) was set up in 1911 to oversee naval 
intelligence and statistics, war plans, and mobilisation 
for war in the three main theatres: the Baltic and Black 
Seas and Pacific Ocean. It was linked to the Nicholas 
Naval Academy, and thus replicated the structure and 
functions of the older land forces' General Staff in 
preparing for 'a future war' in conjunction with the 
appropriate Military Academy. 
137 The latter played the 
central role in formulating the likely 'character' of that 
war. A work such as The Problem of the Pacific in the 
Twentieth Century, (1922) by the emigre Russian General N 
Golovin, is not at first sight 'Soviet', but it tells us 
much about the methodology which Golovin was trained to 
use, and which those who remained in Soviet service 
continued to use: the combination of geographical, 
demographic and political trends, and analysis of opposing 
forces, leading to a prediction of a naval war between 
Japan and the Anglo-Saxon powers in the Pacific. 
138 
Although this analysis was addressed at a specifically 
naval question, the methodology used also had much in 
common with that employed in preparing for future war on 
land. The same problem was addressed almost 
simultaneously on the Soviet side of the wire by B Dolivo- 
Dobrovol'skiy, (a widely published future war thinker) in 
The Pacific Problem (1924). 139 This is similarly 
illuminating with regard to methodology and sources, 
utilising 'modern strategic monographs', then histories of 
past conflicts in the area, then analysis of modern naval 
technology and organization. Once again, Japan was the 
likely aggressor, and the author correctly forecast that 
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she could seize the Philippines 'with virtual 
impunity'. 140 
Nowadays, given the ranges of modern weapons systems, 
the importance of the sea in the context of space-based 
war (if only because it occupies over two thirds of the 
surface of the planet), and the integrated nature of the 
modern Soviet Theatre Strategic Operation141, it is 
arguably no longer possible to consider warfare on and 
over land and warfare on, over and under the sea as 
separate categories. 
Memoirs of military and political figures frequently 
provide clues to the processes of forecasting and 
planning. Sources as diverse as Shtemenko's The General 
Staff in the War Years(1968) and the memoirs of Maisky, 
the Soviet ambassador in London, are instructive. 142 
Maisky, for example, recalled how in 1936 Tukhachevskiy, 
and the British Director of Military operations and 
Intelligence, General Dill, used their knowledge of 
military history in a fascinating discussion of the 
possible effect of paratroops if they had been available 
in past battles, and the lessons that could be drawn for 
the future. 143 
This completes the survey of Russian military- 
theoretical and semi-official works. A separate category 
identified by the 1933 Military Encyclopedia article 
comprises semi-literary (polubelletricheskiye) writings', 
or fiction. The general subject of future war fiction was 
addressed by IF Clarke in Voices Prophesying War(1966), 
an interesting title as the book concentrates on fiction 
and ignores military-theoretical works almost 
completely. 144 Clarke did not address Russian future war 
fiction, either, and therefore the present author's 
research in this area also breaks new ground. 
The scientific and technological revolution which 
created the idea that future conflict might be 
fundamentally different in nature and appearance from wars 
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gone by (see part 2)also stimulated an explosion of 
science fiction. 
145 The division between science fiction 
and serious predictions of, and planning for, future 
conflict is far from clear cut. 'Science fiction is 
military history, and in war, science fiction comes to 
life'. 146 The German authority who made this statement 
saw nothing incongruous about describing Count von 
Schlieffen's vision of a giant Cannae, a 'super-Sedan' 
alongside fictional works by Edward George Earle Bulwer- 
Ly. tton-(1803-73) or those ofýH G Wells. This is not 
so surprising as it*may seem at first sight. Both 
the latter authors, writing before World War I, forecast 
the advent of the Atom bomb. 147 When it finally came, the 
Great War was in many ways science fiction incarnate with 
its aeroplanes, airships and submarines recalling the 
works of Jules Verne. Imagination, even mysticism, has 
often preceded scientific discovery and technological 
innovation. Man's age old urge to fly is perhaps the most 
obvious example of this. The-fiction of the Czech Carel 
Kapek and of Isaac, Asimov provided a serious impetus to 
the development of robotics, and who can say with 
certainty that the development of laser damage and charged 
particle beam weapons owes nothing to a desire to emulate 
the 'death ray' of science fiction comics. 148 
By and large, Russian science fiction is rather 
pacific compared with that of the west. Tsiolkovskiy's 
remarkable stories of space travel, beginning with Free= 
Space (1883) and continuing almost until his death in 
1935, are distinguished by a noble vision of the peaceful 
conquest of space. He discusses the use of gunpowder and 
bullets in space, but only to illustrate basic scientific 
principles and not, apparently, with any vfeii'to their'"' 
lethal employment: 149 
The most brilliant' members of the futurist''movement' did 
not contribute directly to the formulationof'serious ,` 
plans , and policies, for future war, `` eitherVelemir 
Khlebnikov did'allow his wild' imagination to`run riot in' a 
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mystical and eschatological work, The Battles of 1915-17, 
A New Study of War, published in 1915. In this he 
propounded the theory that battles, and analogous results, 
would be repeated every so many years. 150 
There is however some evidence of fiction in Russia 
being used to influence official policy or thinking in the 
way that, for example, General Hackett's book The Third 
World War, published in 1978, was undoubtedly intended to 
apply pressure for an increase in western conventional 
armaments. 
151 This is to be expected as the Russian 
nineteenth century literary tradition had employed the 
novel as a means of raising current political issues when 
open discussion of political questions was forbidden. Not 
only was Chernyshevskiy's What is to be done? 152 an 
important discussion of current social problems, but 
Chernyshevskiy was actually one of the first editors of 
Voyenny sbornik, 153 *- and was a great supporter of the 
naval journal, Morskoy sbornik. 
154 
In the late 1880s two fictional Russian works about 
future war at sea appeared which were clearly intended to 
influence Russian official policy. One was Vice Admiral A 
Belomor's The Fatal War of 18?? (published 1889), 
translated into German as 'The Future War of 
18?? (1897). 155 The other was The Cruiser 'Russian' 
Hope ', (1887). The English translation of the latter 
assessed, no doubt correctly, that it was 'written with 
the manifest purpose of stimulating the Czar's government 
to strengthen the Imperial Navy'. 156 These predictions of 
future war at sea are described in part 3. 
It does still seem suprising that after 1917 possible 
future wars do not feature anywhere near as prominently in 
Soviet fiction as they do in that of western languages. 
Only two examples have emerged, although both are 
remarkable and written by major literary figures. The 
first is the description of the Red Army moving to do 
battle with mutant reptiles in Bulgakov's The Fatal Eggs, 
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written in 1924 and set in the close future of 1928.157 
The other is Aleksey Tolstoy's The Garin Hyperboloid 
[Death Ray](1926-27), a remarkable prediction of a laser 
weapon. 158 These are described in part 3. They do not 
appear to have been written with the aim of influencing 
official policy, although Bulgakov's description of 
'future warfare' seen from 1924 was highly accurate and 
prophetic. 
Fiction can still, however, illuminate areas where 
other sources fail: for example, Elena Sergeyevna 
Ventssel's story At the Tests, 159 published in the 
literary journalNovy mir(New World) in 1967, indicates 
when and how cybernetics began to be assimilated into 
military research. 
The works of Marx, Engels and Lenin occupy a special 
place in Soviet bibliographies. In the context of this 
study they play two roles; as indicators of views of the 
character of future war at the time, and because they are 
frequently cited in Soviet works both on military doctrine 
and on questions of forecasting and prediction. 160 
Engels' views on the military technical character of 
future war seen from the mid to late nineteenth century 
viewpoint are of obvious interest, and frequently of 
chilling accuracy. 
161 Marx , unlike Engels(who seems to 
have been interested in military matters- for their own 
sake), was principally interested in future war as a 
catalyst for revolution, but both he and Lenin had much to 
say on scientific prediction. 
162 The work of Marx, Engels 
and Lenin thus forms a special category . 
The second group of primary sources are Russian, 
Soviet and other East European works on the question of 
forecasting and prediction itself. This has its 
intellectual origins in the pre- and early Soviet periods 
in the work of AA Bogdanov (1873-1928)163 and KA 
Timiryazev (1843-1920). 164 Bogdanov made significant 
contributions in the fields of medicine, politics, 
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philosophy and literature, and he wrote two works of 
science fiction, one of which, Red Star (1908) is replete 
with suggested innovations, underlining the link between 
science fiction and scientific forecasting. 165 Bogdanov 
suggested that political, social, economic, scientific and 
technological evolution all shared similar 
characteristics, leading to an integrated science of 
control, which he called 'tectology' and which is now 
known (in the west) as cybernetics: the study of 
systems. 166 The relation of Bogdanov's work to the 
concept of future war is further examined in part 2. 
Timiryazev was similarly eclectic, making his main 
contribution in the field of biology. 167 The evolution of 
Soviet forecasting owes much to the biological sciences. 
In this context it is worth noting that VV Kuibishev, who 
strove to improve the performance of the bureaucracy in 
both day to day management and long term planning after 
the Civil War, had studied at the Academy of Military 
medicine168, and that Asimov is also a biologist. One of 
Russia's greatest scientists, DA Mendeleyev, who devised 
the periodic table of the elements, was also aware of the 
theoretical basis of predictive techniques. 169 Indeed, 
the periodic table, which enabled scientists to predict 
the possibility of new elements which did not exist in 
nature, forms a vivid model of predictive techniques, 
laying down a set of rules derived from observations which 
can then be extrapolated to predict occurrences which have 
not been, and cannot yet be, observed. 
During the Stalinist period, the study of forecasting 
as a science was neglected, in part because of the 
Stalinist personality cult, and in part because of the 
prevailing doctrine of determinism: the future was what 
the Soviet people - or its leader - chose to make it. 
170 
After Stalin's death, in 1953, a more scientific appraisal 
of the effect of new weaponry on the character of future 
war (the 'Revolution in Military Affairs')171 was 
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accompanied by more scientific examination of the 
techniques'of prediction themselves. Literature on 
forecasting in military affairs becomes more plentiful 
during the 1960s, 172 and by the late 1960s influential 
commentators were stressing the need for military 
strategy to 'generalize and analyze the laws and 
tendencies of the development of technology'173, and 'to 
foresee possible changes in the methods of conducting 
armed struggle and to spot new phenomena in time'. 
174 As 
noted, a number of works on techniques of forecasting 
themselves appeared at the turn of the 1960s and early 
1970s, by Bestuzhev-Lada, Skugarev and Konoplev. 
175 
The 1960s and 70s therefore witnessed the 
formalisation of predictive techniques, although 
intelligent commentators had applied similar methods 
instinctively for decades. 
A separate body of literature relates to. Soviet work 
on automated control systems (ASU), of particular 
importance to the-Soviet view of future warfare today. 
This range of specialised material is catalogued in part 
4, section 1. 
This completes the survey of Russian and Soviet 
materials. The next category to be considered must be 
materials from the the Russian Empire's former possession 
of Poland'and the Soviet Union's (former)Warsaw Pact 
Allies. If it would be premature to recognise the 
complete disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the events of 
late 1989 suggested that it was no longer a viable 
military alliance capable of conducting a major war in 
future, and in May 1990 the Defence Ministers of the 
Atlantic Alliance formally recognised that it had ceased 
to present a 'unified, threat'. 
176 
As the Warsaw Pact fragments, the Soviet Union's former 
allies are each likely to pursue their own defence 
policies, and indigenous style in military affairs, 
already evident before 1989, may assert itself even more 
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strongly. However, during the period 1945-89 the Soviet 
Union exercised strong influence on the military structure 
and planning of its allies and, conversely, their military 
literature reflected Soviet ideas. Polish materials, in 
particular, have proved valuable sources. Polish sources 
have played a prominent part in divining some aspects of 
recent Soviet Military Doctrine, notably the employment of 
Operational Manoeuvre Groups (OMGs) in any future war. 177 
The Poles have a superb tradition of writing about 
military science, stretching back to the 1920s and 30s and 
the Polish military journal Bellona, and strong links with 
French military thinking. In the period 1945-89 Polish 
works were often less cluttered with ideological jargon 
than Soviet ones, and were often more forthcoming. 
However, it would be wrong to think that Polish sources 
were in other respects merely reflections of Soviet 
thinking and methodology. The Polish Military-Historical 
Journal. Wojskowy Przeglgd Historyczny, has included 
articles on The Progressive Traditions of Polish Arms' 
(1966)178, on the Evolution of Military Doctrine(1970)1179 
Operational Art(1971), 180 and on Strategy(1972), 181 which 
besides their own striking originality all draw on a 
mixture of western, particularly French, and Soviet 
sources. The definition of Strategy is remarkably 
eclectic, drawing on the views of a range of foreign 
authorities and not at all a reflection of the rigid 
Soviet definition (see part 2). 182 A 1974 article on the 
Polish General Staff Academy contained a detailed 
representation of its contacts with Soviet and Polish 
military and civilian institutions, providing a partial 
model of the future war think-tank process which the 
author has not found in Soviet sources. 183 
The observations of foreign military observers and 
other foreign intelligence sources, preserved in the 
official documents of Britain, 184 and the United States185 
contain useful insights. These can be compared with 
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Soviet sources, and the comparison-may provide invaluable 
confirmation,. of both. For example, Pokrovskiy's vision of 
a rocket barrage (to compensate for inaccuracy) 
illustrated in a popular magazine in 1944 is borne out by 
secret US-Air Intelligence Reports from 1948.186 There 
can be. few. more vivid illustrations of the scope and 
radical content of the Soviet view of future war in the 
mid 1930s than the reactions of major-General Alfred Knox to the 
showing-of the first film of a massed parachute assault187, 
or the comments of Colonel ' Giffdrd "Sartel, himself- a 'future war' 
thinker of some note, on the 1936 Belorussian 
manoeuvres. 
188 More minute and detailed are the reports 
of foreign military attach4s, which help to fill in the 
picture with regard to the way detailed war and 
mobilisation plans reflected views of future war. 
189 
Turning to 'secondary' studies of the Soviet view of 
future war in western languages, only two have been 
identified. Both are primarily translations of Soviet 
articles with some editorial comment, and both deal with a 
limited timeframe -'that of the 'Revolution in Military 
affairs', when Soviet statements on the new, or evolving 
paradigm. of future war were fairly hard, toäignore. 
Raymond Garthoff's The Soviet Image-of Future War 
(1959)190 centres exclusively on the Revolution in 
Military affairs of the 1950s, and of its 137 pages, 42* 
are a direct translation-of three Soviet works, two of 
them specifically addressing Military science. Although' 
Garthoff's work is a useful pointer to various original 
source, it cannot be regarded as a work addressing the''= 
concept of future war generally, or in. any great depth'. `Its 
source base is almost entirely articlespublished~in''° 
the 1950s exploring the impact of ballistic' missiles--arid 
nuclear weaponry. on .. Military. Doctrine, ; science ; and 
`art l''It 
thus addresses, one narrow slice of the area licovered 'byý°ý ° 
this study. Even if that, were not -the 'case;; enough has' 
been written in the= Soviet Union alone'£in -the- last 'thirty 
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years, to justify a re-examination. Garthoff does however 
remark, as anyone investigating the subject must, on the 
remarkably sophisticated Soviet mechanism for analysing 
the character of future war and the vast sweep of their 
historical perspective, exemplified by Pokrovskiy's work. 
Almost contemporary with this, Arnold Horelick's Some 
Soviet Views on the Nature of a Future War and the Factors 
Determining its Course and Outcome (1958)19'1, is a 
collection of translated articles rather than an analysis. 
The only other work in a western language which 
overlaps with the present study is Dr Jacob. Kipp's study 
From Foresight to Forecasting: the Russian and Soviet 
Experience-19'2 This study has a broad, eclectic source 
base utilising, for example, creative literature, in a 
similar way to the present study. It also parallels the 
present study in beginning, absolutely rightly, with the 
Tsarist intellectual tradition. Dr Kipp's study 
concentrates more on the science of forecasting itself, 
rather than what has specifically been predicted regarding 
the character of future war. In particular, Dr Kipp's 
study chooses not to examine the impact of new technology 
on the conduct and character of war in detail. Therefore, 
this study and that of Dr Kipp are complementary. 
One of the most thorough recent compilations defining 
areas of military science and terminology is Julian 
Lider's volume in the Swedish Studies in International 
relations series, Military Theory: Concept Structure, 
Problems (1983). This is an exhaustive analysis of 
western and Soviet approaches including chapters on 
Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army (chapter 
three), Soviet Military Science (six) and 
Doctrine(nine). 193_ These draw extensively on Soviet books 
and periodicals. Lider does not list 'future war' as a 
separate and identifiable concept although the term 
naturally occurs often, especially as a component of 
Doctrine. Lider correctly defines Military Doctrine as 'an 
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expression of the scientifically based views officially 
adopted in a state concerning the political assessment of 
a future war', citing a conference on Soviet Military 
Doctrine in 1963.194 Furthermore, he provides a simple 
but essentially accurate outline of the mechanism by 
which the image of-future war is formulated and used. In 
the process of elaborating and defining Doctrine, the 
State's leaders 
'proceed from an evaluation of the political 
objectives, the economic, techno-scientific 
and military potentials of the Soviet Union and its 
probable adversary. The evaluation includes an 
assessment of the social structure of both societ- 
ies and, in this connection, of the possibilities 
of mobilizing resources for war. A comprehensive 
assessment of the character of future war, i. e., of 
its social and political essence, probable methods 
of waging war and the appropriate measures which 
need to be taken to prepare the country and its 
armed forces for it, are made on the basis of the 
conclusions and recommendations selected and pres- 
ented mi itar science. It is the latter whil-M 
ought to examine all possible means, methods 5527 
forms of conducting a future war taking into account 
the socio-political and tec no-mi itar development 
a-nc"r to present to the leadership various 
ways of solving military tasks in future wars. l' 
From here, it would be a logical step to examine 'future 
war' as a component of Military Doctrine, 'Military Science 
and Military Art, but it is not a step which Lider takes. 
His compendious work is, however, a most useful secondary 
source. 
Another of Raymond Garthoff's books, How Russia Makes 
War (1954)196 does not specifically examine 'future war', 
either. It is divided into three sections: the 
relationship between Soviet Military Doctrine and Soviet 
political Doctrine, ;a distillation of the (then) current 
Soviet principles of war; and a more detailed examination 
of -operational art and tactics. The book is however a 
useful study of Soviet military thought in its entirety 
and contains useful pointers to the existence of a 
methodology for creating and utilising a concept of future 
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war, for example the establishment of a 'Bureau for the 
Study of Modern war' in 1949 (a fact which tests the 
assertion that under Stalin all discussion of the effect 
of the Revolution in Military Affairs was stifled). 
197 
A number of other books in English have touched on 
'future war' in general investigations of Soviet military 
thought, though tangentially and briefly. Harriet and 
William Scott are unusual among western commentators in 
indexing 'future war' as a distinct subject in The Armed 
Forces of the USSR, 198 and their translation of 
Sokolovskiy'sMilitary Strategy. 199 This reflects the 
authors' awareness of the prevalence of the term in 
Russian works. Thus, they allude to Marshal Malinovskiy's 
account of Khrushchev's speech to the 20th Party Congress 
in 1960, in which Malinovskiy mentions '... the nature of 
modern war... in a future war the decisive place will 
belong to the nuclear rocket weapon... a future world 
war... the beginning period of a possible war 0"" v200 
Similarly, the Scotts report Nekrich's account in June 22, 
1941, in which he refers to the Soviet war plan of 1941 
and the 'insufficient elaboration of the character and 
contents of the initial period of the war... ', and to the 
views of Tukhachevskiy and others on future war in the 
1930s. 201 However, the Scotts do not discuss the concept 
of future war as a component of Military Doctrine and 
Science, nor its expected character except in the very 
broadest terms: that Tukhachevskiy and Uborevich expected 
it to be 'mobile', or the view prevalent between the 1950s 
and 1970s that the next war would be a nuclear rocket 
war. 202 
Peter Vigor's The Soviet View of War. Peace and 
Neutrality203 specifically eschews questions of strategy, 
operational art and tactics, concentrating on the Soviet 
classifications of wars and the objectives for which they 
might be waged. The words 'future war' occasionally crop 
up, as for example when he mentions Engels' views, 
204 but 
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the character of future war is not addressed specifically. 
Towards the end of the book Vigor mentions Soviet views on 
the influence of technology on war, and Soviet thinking 
for nuclear war, concluding with the then recent (1975) 
emergence of a non-nuclear option. 
205 
The collection of articles edited by Derek Leebaert 
under the title Soviet Military Thinking (1981)206 
contains some useful allusions to future war. It also 
acts as a warning against mirror imaging, which is a 
serious problem with western analysts' work. We have to 
try to see the concept of future war in Soviet terms and 
not interpret Soviet comments, procedures and structures 
as reflections of our own. In particular, western 
civilian analysts often assume that the same conflict 
between 'military' and 'civilian' interests exists in the 
Soviet Union as in the west. Most recently, they 
interpret the appearance of civilian analysts of military 
affairs under Mr Gorbachev as an automatic blow to the 
military, and welcome it becauses it appears to place 
people like them in analogous positions in the Soviet 
Union's Military Doctrine forming process. 207 Leebaert, 
for example, says that 'there is a need to go beyond 
either accepting Soviet military writings as blueprints of 
procedures and expectations, or dismissing them as not 
representative of civilian thinking'. 
208 The idea that 
something which is'not representative of civilian 
thinking' is to be 'dismissed' reflects western analysts' 
conditioning to think in terms of an inevitable 
contradiction between civilian and military requirements. 
The process for formulating and utilising the vision 
of future war in Russia and the Soviet Union has, the 
author believes, been characterized by considerable 
cooperation between strictly professional military and 
less directly military interests. We need only think of 
Tukhachevskiy's arguments in favour of tanks and aircraft, 
that they were almost identical to the products of 
54 
'civilian'aircraft and tractor industries, and would 
therefore be less of a drain on the economy than the 
'artillery armies' of the past. 
209 Leebaert comes close to 
outlining the methodology and structure for establishing 
and utilising the character, of future war, listing some of 
the cliches and preconceptions which need to be, examined. 
Among the latter he mentions 'the military's institutional 
chauvinism, bureaucratic inefficiency, lags in the Russian 
learning curve about the implications of new 
weaponry... i210 Whilst there is some truth in the first 
two, even a cursory examination-of Soviet work on future- 
war suggests that to talk about 'lags in the Russian 
learning curve about the implications of new weaponry' is 
well wide of the mark. Leebaert, like Lider, does suggest 
a plausible model for the formulation of the concept of 
future war, 
'Soviet views on war and deterrence are a product 
of continuous refinement by theoreticians in the 
senior service academies, the main political 
administration of the armed forces, and the 
main operations directorate of the General Staff. 
The military-technical side of doctrine is 
affected by lead times and refinements in weapon 
systems, as well as by a broad reading of the 
view of the probable enemy... Final approval 
by the party leadership follows the Defence 
Ministry's integration into finished doctrine 
of the criteria for peacetime weapon 211 acquisition and wartime force employment'* 
The description of 'theoreticians' in the senior 
service academies working, on questions of 'deterrence' has 
a decidedly western ring. The Soviet-Union has-recently 
publicly moved to greater emphasis on war prevention: 
(which, as argued in parts 2 and 4 is not the-,, same as 
deterrence), as opposed to preparation,. for. war. 
212 
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However, most of those working on such questions, -in-the 
USSR have been military men,. with practical-military.,,:, 
experience and . technical -qualifications . -, Y. 
General;,, =ý. 
Pokrovskiy, aasoldier, engineer and-nuclear physicist with 
a strong sense,. of history,.. embodies the-, unique<. combination 
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of skills and expertise required to formulate and utilise a 
view of the character of future war. In this area 
Pokrovskiy was undoubtedly convinced that the Soviet 
system created what Napoleon called, in a different 
context, a 'superior understanding'. 
213 As this thesis 
neared completion, however, a group of analysts not 
directly subordinate to the General Staff was emerging and 
beginning to make a serious contribution (see part 4). 
Some of the most useful work in English deals with the 
interaction between Military Doctrine and weapons 
procurement, the sociology of science and technology, and 
to what extent Doctrine drives technology and vice versa. 
David Holloway's contribution in this area has been 
outstanding. Holloway has challenged the simplistic view 
that whereas in the west industry and technology drive 
weapons development and then doctrine procurement, in the 
Soviet Union this process is reversed. Holloway has said 
that the relationship is one of complex interdependence, 
and has pointed out, for example, that Soviet writings 
stress how technological change forces changes in 
military Doctrine and Military Art, not the other way 
round. 214 Other useful work on the sociology of science 
and technology includes, for example, the effect of 
missile guidance technology on nuclear strategy. 215 
However, the 'military technical character' of future war 
embraces its scope, shape and pace, operational art and 
tactics and not purely technological influences. 
The literature in western languages, primarily: 
English, relating to the subject of this thesis is thus 
very fragmented. This is quite naturalýwhenwe consider 
that no western nation today has anything corresponding to 
Soviet Military Doctrine. Nor. has any western nation a 
clearly defined and laid out scheme establishing the exact 
relation between Military Science, =Military Doctrine and 
Military Art into which 'future, war'' can ' bei inserted, `°'as, ry 
has been possible -in part 2 of this study. - ' The , coherence 
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of the Soviet view, which sees military, diplomatic V, 
economic and cultural policies as interrelated parts of a 
whole, has no parallel in modern western society. The 
fragmentary and random distribution of western literature 
reflects this. 
Because of the prominence of the two world wars, and 
the impetus to study the circumstances which led up to the 
and strategic planning, Soviet and western historical 
writing does contain insights into Russian and Soviet 
views of future war. Rostunov's Russian Front in the First 
World War contains a substantial (55 page) chapter on 
Russian strategic planning, for example. 
216 Turning to 
western secondary sources, Dominic Lieven's Russia and the 
Origins of the First World War217 drew the author's 
attention to the remarkable and far sighted views of PN 
Durnovo, the Minister of the Interior who predicted, 
first, that a major war would be a long and bitter 
struggle and secondly, the strain that this would place on 
Russian society. 218 
Some theses have also proved useful secondary sources, 
especially on Soviet war industry and preparation for 
total war219, strategic planning, 
220 and even possible 
'future war' scenarios, though not from a Soviet 
viewpoint. 
221 
No examination of the Soviet view of future war would 
be complete without serious and substantial comparison 
with the way other great powers have addressed the' 
question. One may at first be surprised at the energy with 
which the Soviet Union analysed the lessons of'World War I 
and drew lessons for the future, compared with the rather 
half hearted British response which eventually' resulted in 
the Kirke Report. 222 Some-British thinkers"4`9°-like 
the 
armoured pioneer Sir"Percy Hobart; '-writing to Liddell Hart 
in 1937, expressed the need`-for' suchplan approach'. -' 
'I can 
never get anyone `to 'paint any'sört " of,, 
'definite' picture of 
what' the battle - area" might"look='- like"'- (in ° their opinion) 
in 
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the next war'. 223 Liddell Hart recommended the creation 
of a future war 'think tank' which, although he almost 
certainly did not know it at the time, bears a striking 
resemblance to what existed and, as this thesis 
demonstrates, still exists in the USSR. 
'The War Office has organs for research into weapons 
etc., but not into the conditions of future warfare 
... There are no means for the comprehensive analysis 
of past experience, and thus no synthesis of adequate- 
ly expressed data to serve as a guide in framing pol- 
icy... At present the investigation of problems 
is pushed on to officers who are occupied with 
current military business. That task ought to 
be given to a body of officers who can devote 
their whole time to exploring the data on record 
collecting it from outside, and working out the 
conclusions in a free atmosphere. Such a body 
should be composed of the best intellects in the 
Army, with a good blend of practical experience, 
and in selecting them particular attention should 
be given to originality of thought or critical 
powers. It is desirable that they should be 
supplemented by a permanent nucleus consisting 
of some first-rate university men who 224 have been trained in scientific enquiry'. 
Had Liddell Hart gone to the Soviet Union, had he been 
admitted to the Frunze and, later, the Voroshilov Academy 
of the General Staff, he would have found a body very 
much as he described here, although 'current military 
business' would always interfere to some extent. , 
The 
university training in scientific enquiry is provided, in 
part, by senior Soviet officers' possessing higher degrees 
in Military Science, which have no real parallel in 
Britain or even the United States. 
One of the most original and incisive thinkers on 
'future war' in the west was a Czech by birth, Ferdinand 
Otto Miksche. 225 Miksche's writing has some of that un- 
western quality: that ability to combine military detail 
with abstraction and intellectualisation, which is 
noticeable in Soviet military writing. It has been argued 
that the Russian/Soviet and Prussian/German armies are 
part of a common north-east European military 
58 
tradition. 226 There are striking similarities between the 
approach of Russian/Soviet and Prussian/German analysts to 
establishing the character of future war, reinforced by 
the relatively recent sharing of experience and expertise 
in the 1920s. Miksche, writing on Paratroops in 1943, 
cited the German manual of Troop Leadership: 
'War undergoes a constant evolution. New 
. weapons create new forms of combat. To foresee this technical evolution accurately, to assess 
the effect of a new weapon on the course of 
battle and to employ it before the enemy1 227 does are essential conditions of success . 
It may be more than coincidence that, this German 
statement has a distinctively Soviet 'ring' to it. As 
Miksche was aware, there is a distinctively 'central', or 
is it east, European'style' in these matters: 
'English[sic. ]and American readers must bear 
with me if they do not find the book 100 per 
cent English in the mode of its expression. 
For the continental outlook I need not apologize, 
since this ought to be a definite gain. Myself 
a middle European, I was brought up to the idea 
that military matters are in their nature dry 
and must be treated in a strictly scientific 
way. This the Germans have done, and in 
much that I have to say I shall be showing 
v228 how... we have a lot to learn from the enemy. 
This question of 'style' is an important one in 
examining the Russian and-Soviet view of the military- 
technical character of future war. It is something which 
transcends the 1917 Revolutions. Some readers may express 
surprise that the 140-year timespan of this thesis-bridges 
, 
the Revolutionary gulf. Aside from the fact that there are 
good reasons for so doing, explained'in part 1.2, the 
author is convinced that the change in Government of 1917 
did not immediately and universally' change everybody's way 
of doing business. In the long term, it was obviously more 
dramatic and far reaching than a change of government from 
Conservative to Labour might be in Britain or Republican 
to, Democrat in the United States. But there is a wealth 
of evidence that professional men, including the military, 
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carried on their work in the way they had before the 
Revolution. 
Bogdanov's work on Tectology first appeared in. 1912: 
the gap in time and experience between then and the third 
edition in 1922 was not so great. 229 The continuity is 
illustrated most vividly in the Naval journal, Morskoy 
Sbornik. It was not until June, 1919 that the editors 
changed the cover from one.. illustrating the Tsarist St 
Andrew's Cross naval ensign to a plain printed cover, 
230 
and in February 1920 the edition for the last quarter of 
1919 recorded its debt to the important Imperial Russian 
military and naval theorist Nikolay Klado, who died on 10 
July. His views on the future aims and character of the 
journal, expressed during the last three to four months of 
his life, in early 1919, well after the Bolshevik 
Revolution, were duly printed, 231, and the next 
reappraisal, expressing a debt to Klado, was published in 
1922.232 No wonder that editions of the 1930s counted the 
Soviet MSb's foundation date as 1848, and that that 
remains true today: a continuous tradition over more than 
140 years. In methods of expression and analysis, and the 
subject of the latter, and its unbroken run of 
publication, MSb represents complete continuity. 
Another example was apparent from the copy of the 
1921 edition of Neznamov's Contemporary War, from the 
Lenin State Library, consulted by the author. Published 
by the Higher Military Publishing Soviet, and complete 
with the exhortation to the world's workers to unite, the 
book bore the General Staff Library stamp which-had been 
in use in-1914, complete with Imperial Russian eagle(see 
Appendix D). 233 The fact that there had been`a revolution 
four years' previously did-not-induce the General Staff 
library to change its\, stamp The style of military--- 
scientific writing and thought,, - and, the institutions', ' 
involved, ` evince continuous evolutiön, -regardless of which 
government` happened tobe in power. 
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This in turn leads to a view of Soviet military 
thinking and writing as somehow discrete from the rest of 
society. This was confirmed most recently by Tatyana 
Zaslavskaya, special adviser to President Gorbachev. 
According to Ms Zaslavskaya, to a civilian in the Soviet 
Union, 'the minds of the military continue to be 
unknowable'. 
234 To even a Soviet civilian, 
"'it is impossible to say what is in the 
mind-of the army and security... they remain 
a closed imperial society, buttoned up. And 
their attitude to the upheaval in our 
society remains a very open question. " 
235 
The description of the modern Soviet military as 'an 
imperial society' is of particular interest. It is 
therefore the author's firm belief that one way into the 
mind of the army and other security forces (the KGB, MVD), 
is to start at the beginning, acquiring a long and deep 
perspective on modes of expression and attitudes, and 
strategic problems. That has been at the heart of this 
thesis. 
With very few exceptions, the Russian and Soviet view 
of the character of future war and its place in the 
military scientific, procurement and planning processes 
has had to be distilled from works on Military Science, 
Doctrine and Art, from regulations, policy statements, and 
discussions of particular questions of military geography, 
equipment and force structuring. Foreign reports on Soviet 
perceptions and plans at a particular time may also yield 
information. The bibliography is divided into the broad 
areas identified above: archival and limited access; 
interviews, Russian and Soviet works-- (mainly non-fiction) ; 
Russian works--, in translatior; Polish works; foreign military 
reports; and western language sources. There'has been no 
previous attempt to analyse and collate this broad source 
base from this specific point of view,. and many ofýthe=, _ 
sources have been difficult to obtain. and have not'been' 
analysed ialseWhere at all. ý_. 
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Metodolo ia voyenno-nauchnogooznan a, (Voyenizdat 
Military Press), Moscow, 1977),, p. 64 'Po svoyey suti 
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Novitskiy, 'De stvi a aviatsii`v nachal'nom periode 
voyn '('Air c ion in the Opening Period of War ')p ViR 
9, pp. 23-31; N Varfolomeyev, 'Strate iav 
akademichesko ostanovke' ('Strategy in an ca emic 
Setting ViR, 11/1929, pp. 78-93(on the Red Army 
Academy); 'K voprosu o kharaktere nachal'no o erioda 
voy ýn '('On te Question of the Character of the Opening 
Period 
of a War'), ViR, 3/1931; R Tsiffer, 
'Kharakteristika redsto ashche vo '(The 
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PART TWO. THE CONCEPT OF FUTURE WAR 
'Terror. is only , natural... we cannot, must not ,, lift `the 'veil. of *the future without dread. 
For there, behind that-veil, lie happiness and, 
sadness, life and death... ' 
Nikolay Ostrovskiy,.;, 
Even the Wise Can Err, 1868.1 
' In every, practical . affair _the questions of. the 
day, j 
are only resolved correctly. when those deciding 
them look into, the distant future. In fact, the` 
prime movers. in developing the whole affair are 
not those, who think as their contemporaries 
think, but those who think, as mankind 
will think half a century hence. '. 
A Baumgarten, 
Russian Artill ry 
Journal, 18,966. 
'The method of dialectical materialism makes 
it possible to foresee the future scientifically. ' 
Marxism-Leninism 
on War and Army, 1968.3 
1. THE IDEA OF THE FUTURE, ORIGINS AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT 
OF FORECASTING AND PREDICTION 
The idea of the future as, a state in which. different 
technological and social conditions and mental attitudes 
apply, of a different kind of. future, is relatively new. 
The 13th Century English visionary Roger Bacon,, it is 
true, had forecast that : humäri ingenuity would make' 
powered vessels, vehicles and comfortable passenger, 
aircraft possible. 
4 As far as the majority of people in 
responsible positions were concerned, however, one must 
agree with one of the founders of 'Futures Studies', IF 
Clarke, writing in 1969: 
'About 200 years ago the image of. the future 
,, , s, 1 was .a 
blank. 
, 
The centuries ahead produced 
a verdict of no: change: the windmill, the 
waterwheel and, the horse would. continue to 
provide., their entirely predictable; minimum of, 
energy; and travellers could, not hope";, f, or ¢$ ,ý 
any improvement in the two week Is , 
of rattling- by,, 
springless stage coach, 2n the journey., from , «.,, 
., 
London. to Edinburgh... 
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Within a few, years, this began to change. The 
Scientific and Intellectual Revolution of the 17th Century 
was one pre-requisite: the 18th Century provided the 
technology. 6 The first recorded manned balloon flight, on 
21 November 1783, immediately gave rise to discussion of 
its possible military applications.? During the next half 
century technological advance centred on the steam engine 
wrought enormous changes, although the impact on the 
pattern of thought appears to have been somewhat delayed. 
However, the 1860s and 1870s saw a significant increase in 
awareness that the rate of change was accelerating and 
that the great industrial nations had to learn new 
techniques of adaptation. 8 The period at the end of the 
nineteenth century and leading up to the First World War 
was particularly rich in imaginative, fictional views of 
the future, as exemplified by the work of HG Wells. 
9 
Wells' work had considerable influence in the Soviet 
Union: he corresponded with Lenin and conversed with 
Stalin, although he was apparently sceptical of Lenin's 
futuristic dreams. 10 There is much truth in the idea that 
without a capacity for imagining the future, at least in 
general terms, people would not have been able to solve 
complicated problems of a scientific, economic, political 
or military nature. 'One must cultivate this capacity in 
oneself - one must learn to dream, and so coordinate the 
work of today with the problems of tomorrow'. 
11 
The experience of the First World War and the social 
and technological changes that followed led to the 
appearanceof more scientific forms of forecasting. In the 
1920s and 1930s, official forecasting supplanted 
predictive fiction, particularly in regard to economic 
planning. 12 These methods, and the practice of 
technological forecasting could trace their origins to the 
First World War. 13 
The very idea of the future was thus in large measure 
a function of technological change, and this, as well as 
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the evident and increasing influence of technology on the 
possible conduct of war, reinforces the position of 
technological change as a key element and catalyst 
throughout this study. 
In the military sphere, there was also a long standing 
tradition of planning for future operations. Even before 
the idea of the future as a different state had 
crystallised, military commanders had to make contingency 
plans for possible future campaigns. Thus, the eminent 
seventeenth century Field Marshal Montecuccoli (1609- 
80)authored a plan for a 'Possible Campaign against the 
Turks in Hungary'14. These plans only envisaged campaigns 
in the near future: next spring, or in a year or two's 
time, though even Montecuccoli noted the technological 
superiority of his own artillery over that of the Turks as 
a factor. Whereas Machiavelli's Art of War, (1521) and 
Discourses reveal a scholastic recapitulation of classical 
authorities, Montecuccoli was drawing empirical lessons 
from recent events, and writing them down. 
15 
From these rudimentary beginnings the organised study 
disciplines of military geography and military statistics 
developed. Military geography, as a component of the 
military-scientific framework of thought in Russia was 
begun by Yazykov, who, in turn, was inspired by Jomini. 
By the 1860s, under the auspices of the enlightened War 
Minister Dmitry Milyutin, teaching at the Russian Nicholas 
Academy of the General Staff included Military Geography, 
Military Statistics and Military History, the latter 
comprising general trends over the centuries ('history of 
military art') and detailed campaign case studies 
('military history' proper). The latter, and military 
statistics , as well as military geography were utilised 
in the formulation of strategic plans. 16 The intellectual 
framework for scientific prediction and planning for 
future war was thus taking shape. Even before this, by 
the early nineteenth century, officers schooled in 
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military geography and statistics were producing highly 
sophisticated analyses of potential theatres of war and 
the deployment of potential adversaries. 17 
Understandably, it was in the realm of naval warfare 
that the influence of new technology on war asserted 
itself first and most obviously. Significantly, this was 
not in the realm of armament, but of propulsion. A very 
long time elapsed between the first voyage of a steam 
powered ship on Dalswinton Loch in 1788 and the 
application of steam power to ships of war, but by the 
1830s it was a topic of informed discussion. 
18 
The so-called 'long peace' from 1815 to 1848 and the 
breath taking experience of the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic wars also gave European land forces' staffs 
both the leisure and the incentive to undertake studies of 
the conditions likely to influence future conflict, which 
now came to include new and hitherto untried element 
which would clearly be crucial in any future conflict: the 
railway and the electric telegraph (the latter appearing 
in 1832). 19 
As with steam propulsion at sea, it was the railway, 
more than any new device in the field of weaponry, which 
first induced commentators to consider possible changes to 
the nature and pace of military operations, and thus the 
character of future war. Clausewitz had opined that 
armies of developed countries would always be on much the 
same level as regards equipment and training, and 
therefore tended to dismiss the impact of technology, 
although he acknowledged that weapons influenced tactics 
which in turn again influenced weapon design. 
20 Jomini, 
who lived longer than Clausewitz, into an era of 
accelerating technological development, was more expansive 
on the subject of weapons technology. Jomini graphically 
portrayed a future battlefield in which men and horses 
might once again have to don armour to compensate for the 
increased firepower of modern weapons. This is 
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particularly interesting as he saw technology as the 
counter to technology and not, as proved to be the case, 
the adoption of greater dispersion and new tactical forms. 
As part 1 has demonstrated, Jomini had an active influence 
on Russian military thinking through direct personal 
contact with the Tsar and reformist War Minister 
Milyutin. 21 
Logically enough, however, it was from military 
geography and statistics that the first serious attempts 
to 'lift the veil of the future' emanated, in the form of 
studies on the influence of railways on theatres of war. 
The Soviet historian Meshcheryakov has said that this was 
explored by the Russian N Neyelov (Neelov) in his Sketch 
of the Modern State of Strategy, published in two volumes 
in 1846 and 1847,22 but Neyelov makes no direct reference 
to railways, even when discussing operational and 
strategic lines. The 1840s were a period of rapid railway 
construction and expansion in Europe and first of all in 
Britain. The Russians did use the railway to transport a 
corps from Russian Poland to Moravia to effect a junction 
with the Austro-Hungarian army in 1849, (though apparently 
reluctantly and at the Austrians' suggestion), an early 
manifestation of the influence of a major technological 
change - the railway - on the pace and character of war. 
Although there was a railway, there was as yet no 
telegraph line to Moscow, so the commander on the spot had 
to take the'decision without the Tsar's approval, an 
interesting example of a temporary mismatch between new 
means of strategic mobility and new means of command, 
control and communications. 
23 
From now on, it would be necessary to take account of 
such technological changes, and the Crimean War (1853-56), 
, where 
the Russian wooden sail fleet was so manifestly 
outclassed by the iron framed (but not yet armoured)and 
steam powered combatants of Britain and France that it 
dared not even put to sea, drove the point home. The 
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Russians did, apparently, receive a submarine from a 
German inventor, but made no decisive use of it. 24 Even 
military theorists like Bogdanovich, who had believed in 
unchangeable, 'permanently operating factors', were forced 
to revise their views, in Bogdanovich's case after a 
period of tortured confusion. 25 Henceforward, images of 
the character of future war, involving the influence of 
technology first of all on strategy and logistics and, 
later, on tactics, would develop in parallel with war 
plans for specific encounters and campaigns, though not 
always at the same rate 
However, there was first of all a serious gap between 
theory and practice; between peacetime strategic planning 
and action in the theatre of military operations. 
Milyutin, appalled, noted that at a meeting of the Russian 
Army command on 6 September, 1877, no plan for future 
action was apparent. 'Discussion concentrated on the 
immediate future, that is, on the following day'. 26 
Secondly, the Russians were prevented from achieving the 
quick kill they desired, in part, because they had not 
simultaneously taken account of the effect of new weaponry 
on tactics and adjusted their procedures accordingly. 
They therefore faced unexpected and crippling delays at 
Plevna. 27 
As part 1 has demonstrated, it was at this stage that 
the terms "(a)future war' and 'contemporary war(fare)' 
appeared in Russian military writing. 
2. DEFINITION OF 'FUTURE WAR' AND OTHER TERMS ENCOUNTERED 
Within Soviet military thinking, the concept of 'future 
war' - budushchaya voyna - occupies a cardinal 
position. The translation of budushchaya voyna and its 
relation to the other term widely used, sovremennaya voyna 
('contemporary war' or 'modern war'), is fundamental to 
this study. The Russian language lacks the definite and 
indefinite articles, and this complicates any 
understanding and translation of these terms. The 
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adjective sovremenny is usually translated 'contemporary', 
since the Latin components of that word correspond to the 
Russian: so -'with', vremya -'time', but 'modern' would be 
equally acceptable. 
Budushchaya voyna and sovremennaya voyna may appear 
to be used almost interchangeably in Soviet military 
writing, at least where the near future is concerned. 
Thus, the contents of one of the standard collections of 
military works of the interwar period, Questions of 
Strategy and Operational Art in Soviet Military Works 
1917-1940, include many references to each. Using the 
provisional translation given above, the book includes 
Frunze's Front and Rear in Future War, Vatsetis' On 
Military Doctrine of the Future, Triandafillov's Character 
of the Operations of Modern Armies, Belitskiy's Strategic 
Reserves in Contemporary War, Krasil'nikov's Organization 
of Powerful All-Arms Formations of the Future, 
Kalinovskiy's What Mechanization and Motorization can do 
in Future War, Favitskiy's The Role of Mechanized Forces 
in the Contemporary Operation, and Sukhov's Tanks in 
Contemporary War. 28 The use of budushchaya voyna and 
sovremennaya voyna almost as synonyms continues closer to 
the present day: a selection of articles in the Military- 
Political Directorate's Journal Communist of the Armed 
Forces (KVS) dealing with possible war in the future 
includes 'Character and Particular Features of 
Contemporary War'(1962), 29 'On the character and types of 
Wars of the Modern Epoch(1965), 
30 Contemporary War and 
Economics'(1967), 31 'Character and Particular Features of 
Contemporary War(again)(1969), 32 'The moral factor in 
Contemporary War'(1972), 33 'Character and Particular 
Features of Modern Wars (1975). 34 
Within a given article, the various terms are also 
interposed. An article on 'Air Reconnaissance' from 1938 
begins by mentioning foreign dicussion of the character of 
future war. It then mentions 'contemporary war', 
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'contemporary armies', and concludes by referring to a 
'future enemy' and 'future war'. 35 An article from 1965 
on' Economics and War' mentions the 'character of a 
probable war', of 'contemporary war'(even in the context 
of a nuclear war), and, in quick succession, 'future war', 
'posssible variants of wars', 'future war' and 'modern 
weapons of destruction'. 36 A 1988 article on the 
deployment of rear service elements in the first period of 
the Great Patriotic War(1941-45) concluded that there 
would be absolutely no opportunity to reorganize such 
services in the 'opening period of a modern war'. 
37 The 
latter, or 'a war today' seem to be the only feasible 
translations. 
That contemporary (modern) armies and weapons, and 
contemporary(modern) strategy should be designed to fight 
future wars is logical enough. This thought is clearly 
present in the work of Aleksandr Neznamov(1872-1928), 
whose work on Contemporary War provides a firm conceptual 
and semantic grounding for present concepts. 
'Principles are eternal, but means of fighting 
change; with them, obviously, methods and forms 
must also change. The task of theory is to 
recognise these contemporary(sovremennye) 
forms and methods and even to look a little 
ahead, into the near future (v blizhaysheye 
budushche e). As an idea, this task has 
an immovable foundation in the finest precedents 
[ lit. 'images'] from all times and from all 
peoples; for the executive part it 
must make-use only of the wars of the recent 
past (blizha she o proshlogg), that is, those 
in which t ere were evidently contemporary 
factors, to which one must relate in strategy: 
railways, the telegraph and mass armies, and 
in tactics: rapid firing weapons and the 
telegraph (telephone). 
The aim of the present work is to present 
the conduct of operations in conditions of 38 contemporary warfare (sovremennoy vo n )... 
Given the specificity and precision of the Russian 
language, and military Russian in particular, it seems 
uncharacteristic that the two adjectives budushchiy and 
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sovremenniy should be used so freely. In many cases, the 
inference is that budushchaya voyna refers to a particular 
war in the future, a possible war, as an occurrence, as a 
political event, whilst sovremennaya voyna refers to 
modern warfare: the art of war in its present state, and 
as likely to be be applied in a future war. 
When Russians knowledgeable about military affairs are 
presented with the words budushchaya vyna, they certainly 
react as if you are saying 'World war III'. The author's 
discussions with Soviet military academics including a 
Professor at the Academy of Sciences specialising in War 
Economy have confirmed that today 'budushchaya voyna' has 
much the same ring as 'World war III' in English. 39 
'World War III' would, indeed, be an acceptable 
'equivalent-effectltranslation. When the author asked the 
former Soviet GRU officer calling himself Viktor Suvorov 
about budushchava voyna his reaction was immediate. 'World 
War III, you mean? ', he said. 40 
This conclusion is further supported by the statement 
made by Soviet General Staff representatives in 1989 that 
since about 1980 they had eschewed the use of 'budushchaya 
voyna' because it implied that (a) future war was 
inevitable. 41 However, as part 4 demonstrates, many 
Soviet authorities have not adopted this reasoning and 
regard that argument as pedantic. 42 This is a question 
which has arisen relatively recently and is addressed 
under 'The Soviet view of future war from the time of 
writing'. Furthermore, there appears to be no problem 
using the term budushchaya voyna retrospectively, as the 
apparently seminal recent article by Kokoshin and Lobov on 
'Foresight' illustrates by referring to Svechin's view of 
the 'Character of (a) Future War', from the 1930s. 43 
Bearing these arguments in mind, where appropriate, 
the author will henceforward adopt the convention-of 
translating sovremennaya voyna as modern warfare However, 
even this is not always appropriate. For example, in 
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Ruban's article (KVS 24/1972), cited above, which we will 
now translate 'The Moral Factor in Contemporary Warfare', 
there is mention of 'a new war being prepared by the 
reactionary forces of imperialism, of its character and 
particular features'. 
44 Izmaylov's article (KVS 6/1975), 
cited above, the title talks of contemporary (modern) 
wars, in the plural, so the translation 'warfare' is not 
appropriate, but within the text the author discusses 
'modern warfare' in the singular. 
45 
One of the Soviet Union's greatest military thinkers 
this century, Marshal Tukhachevskiy, provides a useful 
illustration of the difficulties in translating the 
nuances of meaning. His Questions of Contemporary 
Strategy, a paper given in 1926, contains aa section on 
'The Character of a Future War'. 
46 This is consistent 
with the distinction made above. However, the collection 
of papers published by the Communist Academy in 1930 
includes Tukhachevskiy's, On The Character of Contemporary 
Wars in the Light of the Decisions of the VI Comintern 
Congress. Among the 'published papers' listed at the back 
of the collection is one by Tukhachevskiy called The 
Character of 
_Future wars 
in the Light of the Decisions of 
the VI Comintern Congress. 47 Although it is possible that 
these are two slightly different papers (the author was 
unable to trace the latter, if, indeed it is a different 
paper), the issues discussed are unlikely to differ 
substantially, if at all. This therefore seems to provide 
a categoric demonstration of the use of budushchaya voyna 
(or budushchiye voyny, in the plural) and sovremennava 
voyna (or the plural) as virtual synonyms. 
There is, however, the possibility that 'contemporary 
war' and 'future war' suggest a chronological 
differentiation. Some of the references to 'future war', 
especially in articles written in the 1920s and 1930s 
suggest warfare shaped by the assimilation of technology 
which was in fact only just being introduced or even 
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envisaged. Thus, one of the Soviet visionaries, A 
Verkhovskiy, noted in a lecture to the Red Army Academy in 
1925 that in the middle ages armoured knights formed the 
advanced striking force and the billmen on foot following 
behind were only auxiliaries. This, said Verkhovskiy, 'is 
the direction in which future war is developing. This is 
what western Europe is striving towards'. 48 Verkhovskiy 
was one of those who perhaps exagerrated the significance 
of pure armoured forces; his vision was correct as far as 
the opening campaigns of World War II were concerned, 
although as the war progressed combined arms reasserted 
themselves. 49 Although western Europe was arguably moving 
in the former direction in 1925, the Red Army in 1925 
would have been utterly incapable of operating in this 
manner and would remain so for many years. More 
pertinently to this section of the thesis, Verkhovskiy was 
clearly using 'future war' as a 'concept here, and not 
talking about a specific future war. 
Conversely, the widespread use of the term contemporary 
war in the 1960s and 1970s, when talking about nuclear 
war, very obviously referred to a war which could break 
out tomorrow using weapons which already existed and were 
already targeted. 
50 
Turning once again to the very modern context the 
General Staff have stated that 'contemporary war' has a 
distinct and specific meaning: the next ten years, and 
that studies beyond that lie within the area of 'Military 
Science'. 51 However, we cannot be sure that this 
convention has been widely adopted, and it cannot be 
applied to the vast body of literature and evidence from 
before the 1980s. 
In most other cases there is no clear chronological 
distinction, and both adjectives are sometimes used to 
refer to a war or warfare in the near future: any war, in 
fact, which has not actually happened. At either end of 
the timescale, the distinction becomes more clear cut. 
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'Contemporary warfare' could also, for example, refer to 
wars actually being fought elsewhere in the world, 52 
although Soviet practice tends to identify such wars more 
precisely. They are referred to either as 'local wars', 
53 
or, for example, in the case of World War II before the 
Soviet Union became directly involved, as 'The Second 
Imperialist War''54 In the case of 'a future war' or 
'modern warfare', the terms may tend to be overused in 
order to avoid identifying the probable opponent; with 
wars that have happened or are taking place, this is not a 
problem. 
Wars which are taking place in which Russia and the 
Soviet Union are involved can be referred to as 
'nyneshnaya voyna'-'the present war'. 55 In 1915, World 
war I might also be referred to as 'nyne 
razygryvayushchayasya mirovaya voyna: 'the World War 
currently unfolding'. 56 Turning to the more distant 
future, the term budushchaya voyna becomes uniquely 
appropriate, but it seems to be used in this context 
relatively seldom. In such cases one might expect a more 
specific phrase, using the same construction, perhaps as 
'vozmozhnost' voyny v blizkom budushchem'-'the possibility 
of war in the near future', 
57 but specifying a more 
distant future. Brezhnev's 1977 Tula speech, as a final 
example, referred to the diminishing possibility 'of a new 
great War': 'novoy bol'shoy voyny'. 58 
Other terms are used for variety and dramatic effect. 
As in English, zavtra, 'tomorrow', and the adjective from 
it, far from literally meaning tomorrow, can, perversely, 
refer to a more distant and uncertain future. 
Verkhovskiy's 1925 lecture, referred to above, was 
entitled 'War of Tomorrow', in which he took a long and 
broad perspective. Within the reported section of the 
lecture there were, however, references to 'future war'. 
59 
Another term sometimes encountered throughout this 
century-is an 'impending'war - predstoyashchaya voyna - 
108 
suggesting a certain grim inevitability. 
60 
3. THE PLACE OF 'FUTURE WAR' IN SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT 
As noted in part 1, VES(1983,1986) and 5U(1976-78) 
do not include specific entries on 'future 
war'(budushchaya voyna). This may be connected with the 
problem of inevitability implied by 'budushchaya voynna_', 
mentioned above, and these reference works were published 
at about the time that one element of the General Staff 
had apparently stopped using the term. As also noted, the 
relevant volume of the 1933 SVE has a seminal entry on the 
subject. This acknowledges that attempts to analyse the 
causes, course and consequences of 'future war'(in this 
case the concept appears to be expressed in general terms 
and the translation 'a future war' is inappropriate) and 
to establish the character of its operations had been made 
throughout the history of military art. Furthermore, 
'Views on the character of future war form a most 
important part of the Military Doctrine... of 
one state or another and exercise a significant 
influg ce on its practical preparations for 
war le 
The statement that 'future war' is 'a62 most 
important part of Military Doctrine' is revealing. In 
modern Russian, the terms 'Military Science', 'Military 
Doctrine' and 'Military Art' all have precise and defined 
meanings, and these need to be understood before the 
concept of 'future war' is related to them. 
The overall study of the phenomenon of war in Marxist- 
Leninist thought is Military Science. This is defined as 
'a system of knowledge of the character and laws of war, 
preparation of armed forces and the country for war and 
means of conducting it''63 Military Science concerns the 
essence, nature and content of armed conflict, and 
investigates the laws governing it. Together with the 
other sciences, Military Science studies war as 'a complex 
socio-political problem'. Its conclusions are used to 
work out Military Doctrine. Military Science comprises a 
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number of subsets including Military Art, (arguably primus 
inter pares), Military Organization, Military Education 
and Training and the Theory of the Military Economy and 
Rear Services. 64 Military Art, as the central and pre- 
eminent part of Military Science, embraces the preparation 
for and conduct of war at the three descending levels of 
strategy, operational art and tactics. 
65 The relationship 
between Military Science and Military Art has not always 
been perceived in such clear-cut terms: the 1928 edition 
of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia saw them as 
complementary, but not as the former embracing the latter. 
The theory of Military Art disposed of a number of 
'corresponding military sciences (Strategy, Operational 
Art, Tactics), ', while the 'military sciences '(plural) 
comprised groups such as the military historical, military 
geographical and so on. 
66 
Military Doctrine, which is established by drawing on 
the conclusions of Military Science and other sciences 
(natural and social)has traditionally been defined as the 
officially expressed view of the state on the aims and 
character of a possible war. 
67 The idea of Military 
Doctrine as an officially recognized set of scientific 
principles was clearly expressed at the beginning of this 
century by Neznamov, and he was cited with approval by 
Soviet authors in the 1960s. 
68 In that decade, Military 
Doctrine was defined as 
'an expression of the scientifically based 
views officially adopted in a state, concerning 
the poliitical assessment of a future war, the 
attitudes of the state towards that war, the 
determination of the character of a future war 
and methods of waging it, of preparing the 
country for war economically and morally... 
a state adopted, sggtem of views on the basic 
problems of war ",; 
This definition changed little between the late 1920s 
and the mid-1980s. 70 The 1920s definition of Military 
Doctrine stressed, inter alia, the way that the objectives 
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of military forcesand 'the character of the military 
objectives before them' were to be resolved 'in concert 
with the class essence of the state and its productive 
capacity as determined by its level of development'. 
71 
The interplay between the character of future war and the 
level of technological and economic development, and 
between both and the overall 'level of development', in 
other words, cultural development, is of recurring 
importance. 72 
Perhaps the last and most precise attempt to define 
Military Doctrine before the current era of reform was 
made by Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov in 1982. Ogarkov set down 
the aims of Doctrine very firmly, underlining the 
'interlinked and interdependent socio-political and 
military-technical aspects': 
'What is the degree of probability of a future war 
and whom will we be fighting? 
What is the character which the war a country and 
its allies will be fighting will assume (predstoit 
vesti)? 
What aims and tasks can be assigned to Armed Forces 
in foreseeing (predvidenii) such a war and what 
Armed Forces must the country have to achieve the 
stated aims? 
Proceeding from this, how should one develop military 
organization (stroitel'stvo) and prepare the army 
and country for war. 
Finally, if a war should break out, by 
what methods(sposobami) should it be fought? i73 
It is noteworthy that Ogarkov still used the phrase 
'a future war', even though the General Staff, of which he 
was head, had supposedly stopped using it. 
Although a new definition of Military Doctrine was 
being devised during 1987 and 1988, the relationship 
between Military Science and Military Doctrine appears to 
have remained constant. This relationship was expressed 
most clearly and elegantly by Colonel- General Gareyev in 
his address to the British Royal United Services' 
Institute in October, 1988.74 Military Science, like 
Natural Science, depends upon the existence of differing 
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points of view. This accords with the Marxist-Leninist 
emphasis on the dialectic. However, said General Gareyev, 
practical work demands certain common points of view. It 
would be impossible to run any enterprise, let alone one 
as vast, complex and demanding as a military system, 
equipment procurement and planning for war, without 
certain basic shared assumptions. Therefore, at some 
point the debates which take place within the context of 
Military Science have to be evaluated and converted into 
certain accepted tenets, a 'generally accepted system of 
views'"75 The latter is Military Doctrine. 
During the post-war period other Warsaw Pact states 
adopted the Soviet definition of such terms, though not 
without a twist of indigenous variety. A Polish 
definition from 1970 confirmed the central position of 
'przysýa wojna'-'future war', a term which, in some cases, 
had acquired inverted commas, indicating that it was a 
distinct concept: 
As a result of agreement at the highest level 
and the synthesis of expectations, proposals 
and the analysis of exchanged (and also other) 
factors there is now already a concrete 
decision, relating to the general conduct of 
an (intentional, possible) future war, that is, 
a war which may be offensive; initially 
defensive, and later offensive; nuclear; limited 
or unlimited. That general decision, which 
is evened out to form a general pointer to 
the executive, we call our command doctrine. 76 
According. to sources up to 1988, then, Military Doctrine 
establishes the likely opponents in a possible conflict, 
its military, economic and political nature, and the 
objectives of the state and its armed forces. Military 
Doctrine comprises two closely linked and interdependent 
aspects: the political and the military, with the former 
playing the leading role. 'The character of (a) future 
war' is a most important and all-pervading part of 
Military Doctrine, as stated in the 1933 article and 
attested by the fact that the term has recurred constantly 
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in articles about Military Doctrine ever since. 77 The most 
recent (1986) edition of the Military Encyclopaedic 
Dictionary, for example, defined Military Doctrine as a 
system of views, 'on the essence, aims and character of a 
possible future war... i78 
Since 1988, Military Doctrine has been redefined as a 
system of views on the prevention of war. The precise 
text of the re-defined Doctrine and the implications of 
the change are addressed in part 4. However, the author 
will argue that this does not displace the view of the 
character of a possible future major war or other armed 
conflicts from its central position in Military Doctrine, 
however undesirable those wars may be. As General Gareyev 
pointed out in lively fashion, although war prevention was 
the 'primary goal' or core' of the USSR's Military 
Doctrine, if that Doctrine fails, 'we do not intend to 
give up'. 
79 This change also raised the issue of where 
'war prevention' fitted into the traditional division 
betweem the military-technical'and political segments of 
Doctrine. It was suggested that war prevention might not 
fall into either category, but exist 'as an independent 
category under the new doctrine'. 
80 As explained in part 
4, one of the author's conversations, and common sense, 
suggested that war prevention must in fact belong to both, 
although there were indications that Soviet views had not 
fully crystallised. 
This raises a second issue, also addressed in part 4, 
that Soviet thinking about possible future wars and 
warfare has concentrated overwhelmingly on a great war 
between the world systems. This thesis was completed on a 
watershed, as the structures for conducting such a war, 
particularly the Warsaw Pact, began to show distinct signs 
of breaking up, while the Soviet Union, having extricated 
itself from one guerrilla war in Afghanistan, appeared for 
a time to be getting embroiled in another one in its own 
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conflict appear to have played little part in the 
discussion of the character of future war to date. The 
lessons of local wars are considered, but only in terms of 
their lessons for a future major war: the lessons of the 
Middle East wars for tanks and anti-tank weapons, for 
example. 
81 
The alternative term 'contemporary war' is also used 
as if it forms a part of Military Doctrine, reinforcing 
the argument that the terms are to some extent 
interchangeable. Thus, at the fourth session of the USSR 
Supreme Soviet, in January, 1960, Nikita Khrushchev gave 
'a deep analysis of the character of contemporary war, 
which lay at the basis of Soviet Military Doctrine. 
82 
Under the heading of 'Doctrine', the character of future 
war is viewed from two points of view. The first is the 
political. The second is the 'military (technical)' 
viewpoint, sometimes described as the 'military-strategic 
(technical) aspect. 83 Future, war therefore faithfully 
reflects the division of Military Doctrine into political 
and military segments, further reinforcing its position as 
part of Military Doctrine. A Polish source put a slightly 
different emphasis on the idea, suggesting that Military 
doctrine lay across the boundary between strategy and 
politics, as shown in figure 2.1.84 
The 'character of war' also has a formal definition. 
A war's 'military-strategic (technical) character' is 
determined under modern conditions by the technology 
employed (nuclear or non-nuclear; the methods and forms 
of conducting military operations (war of position or war 
of manoeuvre); the scale (world war or local war); the 
participants (a coalition war or war between just two 
parties); and its duration (long or short). 85 There is 
therefore provision within the theoretical structure for 
Soviet military thinkers to shift their attention to long, 
'local' and, by implication, possibly guerrilla wars, 
should they so decide. 
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If Military Doctrine, as a state system of views on 
war and preparations for war, is elaborated and defined by 
the state leaders, it proceeds from an evaluation of the 
political objectives, the economic, scientific-technical , 
and military potentials of the Soviet Union and of its 
probable adversary. The evaluation includes an assessment 
of both societies' (including coalitions')ability_to 
mobilise resources for war. The evaluation is based on 
the conclusions and recommendations presented by Military 
Science. The job of Military Science is to examine all 
possible means, methods and forms of conducting a future 
war, taking into account socio-political and military- 
technical development. 86 
The character of future war forms part of Military 
Science as well. The 'superiority of Soviet Military 
Science' in the Great Patriotic War has thus been 
attributed to the fact that one of its 'outstanding 
characteristics' was a 'deep scientific prediction of the 
character of future war'. 
87 Marxist-Leninist teaching on 
war, and Military Science, both came to the conclusion 
that 'future war would inevitably have a prolonged 
character and require maximum exertion of the state's 
resources'. 
88 The relationship between Military Doctrine 
and Military Science is complex and reciprocal: as the 
prominent modern Soviet military writer General MM 
Kir'yan has explained, 'Military Doctrine gives Military 
Science the task of working out scientific problems, 
connected with researching the character of future war'. 
89 
He continued by repeating exactly the same formula: 
Marxist-Leninist teaching on War and Military Science had 
both come to the conclusion that 'future war would 
inevitably have a pro]onged character and require maximum 
exertion of all the state's resources'. 
9 
Military Doctrine, having weighed and evaluated the 
findings of Military Science, and other sciences drives 
Military Art. The character of future war contributes to 
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Doctrine's directives, but also forms part of Military 
Art. The highest level of Military Art is Military 
Strategy, and according to Marshal Ogarkov's article in 
the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, which must be regarded 
as definitive for its time, there is a reciprocal 
relationship between Military Doctrine and Military Art, 
the latter exercising 'a reverse influence on Doctrine'. 
91 
The character of future war can hardly form part of 
the practical side of Military Art, which is about 
fighting a war that is already happening, but it can 
arguably form part of its theoretical side. Marshal 
Sokolovskiy was in no doubt that the character of future 
war was part of the theory of Strategy. Aside from the 
fact that his book on the subject was riddled with 
references to future war(as was the previous volume on 
Strategy by Svechin), he stated categorically that 
'The next important element forming part of military 
strategy is the question about the character of 
future war. Here, strategy examines the con- 
ditions and factors which, at a given moment in 
history, determine the character of future war, 
the way military and political forces are 
distributed, the quality and quantity of material 
resources, military and economic potential, the 
probable composition and potential of opposing 
coalitions and their geographical distribution'. 
92 
The advent of the guided missile and nuclear warhead 
naturally expanded the scope of military strategy, because 
missiles were far less limited by geographical, logistic 
and demographic conditions than earlier 'strategic' 
assets. However, the view that the character of future 
war also formed part of military strategy, as well as of 
Military Doctrine and Military Science, was not a 
temporary reflection of what is now seen as Sokolovskiy's 
over-emphasis on nuclear weapons and their role-93 A 
modern commentator, Kir'yan, continued to emphasize the 
role of strategy in determining the"'military strategic 
character of future war, the degree to which nuclear 
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would be 
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Figure 2.2. Relationship of Military Science, 
and Art, the political and military-technical a 
of Doctrine, and the character of future war. 
(Author's deductions, based on a wide range of 








































used in it, and the ways in which they would be used'. 94 
The character of future war is therefore not only a 
determining factor in shaping strategy, but also part of 
it. 
The character of future war therefore affects 
Military art at all levels but, except in the case of 
strategy, it is arguable that its influence is at one 
remove. If we take a recent comment on tactics, the 
lowest level of Military Art, 
'The theory of group tactics, which met the 
requirements of the 1920s, did not corresygnd 
to the requirements of (a) future war'. 
Thus even tactics should respond to the character of 
future war, but does not itself embrace the study of its 
character. 
Having analysed the Soviet written sources, it is 
possible to represent the character of future war in 
relation to Marxist-Leninist thought diagramatically, as 
shown in figure 2.2. 'Future war' is shown intruding into 
the realm of strategy , but not into the lower levels of 
Military Art, although they are clearly shaped by it. 
'Contemporary warfare', or 'modern warfare' can be 
considered largely as a synonym for 'future war'. 
4. LIMITS OF THE CONCEPT OF THE CHARACTER OF FUTURE WAR 
The concept of the'character of future war' clearly 
extends as far as detailed-assumptions regarding the 
opening phases of hostilities and probable opponents. 
Detailed aspects of war planning and war games could 
therefore be considered as part of this study, although 
the author has chosen to address broader pictures of 
future conflict. It is far more difficult to focus on the 
'character of future war' if one does not have a 
particular opponent or opponents in mind, as the British 
Kirke Report on the Lessons of the Great War (1914-18) 
acknowledged : 'at present the enemy cannot be defined, and 
this absence of a basis to the problem adds enormously to 
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the difficulties of its solution'. 96 For the Russians, 
unlike the British and Americans who have enjoyed the 
security provided until recently by the sea, the land 
threat has always been a fairly tangible one, and this has 
perhaps sharpened their perceptions of 'future war'. 
However, one must take all the possibilities into account. 
Otherwise, the unexpected comes as an even harder blow, as 
General Kuropatkin noted after the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese 
War, 
'The theatre of war in Manchuria presented 
many peculiarities of climate, geography and 
inhabitants. It was unlike any of the other 
"probable" theatres of operations that we had 
studied and was, therefore, quite new 69 the 
troops who came from European Russia'. 
The course of military operations themselves has always 
been impossible to predict, so dependent is it on chance, 
luck and other imponderables, and in spite of the 
sophisticated computer modelling which is now available, 
it is likely to remain an unpredictable business, as 
Clausewitz and Jomini knew so well. 98 War is the 
collision of two living, thinking forces, and Russian and 
Soviet military thinkers have wisely limited their 
specific planning to the 'opening period' of any war. 
According to a recent article by Kir'yan, and the 
authoritative VES, the term 'opening period of the war' 
(nachal'ny period voyny)first appeared in literature of 
the 1920s in connexion with research into wars of the 
'imperialist epoch', in particular World War 1.99 It had 
obviously acquired particular importance with the 
appearance of 'mass armies', the rapid switch from 
peacetime to wartime footings, and the need for their 
'concentration and strategic deployment within the Theatre 
of Strategic Military Action (TVD)', 100 a process which, 
once initiated, was virtually impossible to alter. In 
fact, the term had been used, in the same context, since 
at least the, 1890s. It featured extensively in the work 
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of the late Imperial Russian Military thinker, Nikolay 
Mikhnevich (1849-1927), who was War Minister during World 
War 1.101 Mikhnevich's writing provides a useful 
guideline for the bounds of this study. He drew the 
distinction between a 'war plan' and a 'plan of 
operations'. The former included everything that could 
be done before the enemy's will entered into the equation, 
including strategic concentration and deployment and the 
'character of an impending war'. 102 As far as 'plans of 
campaign' were concerned, Mikhnevich cited Napoleon, who 
had said that he had never had one, and Suvorov who, when 
asked for his, waved a blank sheet of paper. 103 
This thesis is broadly confined to the study of the 
idea of future war up to the limits of Mikhnevich's 'war 
plan' and is not concerned with the history of military 
events once wars have started, except in three cases. One 
is where a broad understanding of what happened is 
necessary to establish the accuracy or otherwise of pre- 
war views on the likely shape, appearance, scope, scale 
and duration of military operations. The second is where 
particular past battles are cited as precedents for future 
war. A prominent example of the latter are the battles of 
Kursk(1943) and Khalkhin-Gol(1939), cited today as 
precedents for defensive strategy options two and three 
(see part 4). 
The third example is where there is evidence of lessons 
about 'future war' of a kind being drawn during a major 
conflict. As the Soviet 1936 Field Service Regulations104 
pointed out, and as the Collection of Materials for the 
Study of War Experiences, published during the Great 
Patriotic War, illustrates, armies must and do continue to 
draw lessons about future operations from their own 
battles during major war. 105 
To complete the picture, Russian and Soviet Military 
Science has continued its analysis even during the 
immediate, exhausted (and perhaps politically confused) 
12.2 
aftermath of major war. In 1919 Klado stressed that 'the 
most important task after a great war- is the validation 
of the propositions of naval science according to recent 
experience'. 106 In 1922, Novitskiy was analysing the 
'Military Experience of the World and Civil Wars of 1914- 
22 at Sea'. 107 The unflagging energy of Russian and 
Soviet analysts is impressive. 
5. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNIQUE 
Throughout the period under review, science and technology 
have occupied an increasingly dominant place in 
determining the character of future war. Indeed, as 
noted, the very idea of the character of future war as 
being something distinct and different which needed to be 
foreseen was to a large extent a function of the increase 
in the pace of technological and scientific development 
after the Napoleonic wars. As noted, Clausewitz did not 
envisage one European army enjoying any marked 
technological superiority over another. 108 This is 
somewhat surprising since, as long ago as the Seven Years' 
war, for example, the Russian General Saltykov had 
commented on the effect of the 'newly invented' Shuvalov 
howitzers at the battle of Kunersdorf. 109 Furthermore, 
even if weaponry used by the armies of the most developed 
nations develops at roughly the same rate, 'that 
development must, of itself bring about changes in the 
character of warfare, even if the change is not confined 
to one side, as Jomini was more aware. 110 
The role of science and technology is not confined to 
developments 
. 
in weaponry, signalling and modes of 
transport. It is also reflected in the increasing 
application of science and mathematics to modelling future 
phenomena and-the rate of, change. It has, according to 
General Kir'yan, become possible to model 
'the direction and tendencies in the development 
of armed forces, military technology and military 
art, both in one's own country and among the probable 
or real enemy; the character, course and outcome of 
123 
future war'. 111 
The phrase the military-technical character of future war, 
one of the two halves of the concept of future war, at 
first sight stresses the technological component of the 
equation. However, 'technical' not only refers to 
technology, but also to technique. Changes in technique 
may be associated directly or indirectly with changes in 
technology. Thus, the general adoption of indirect fire 
technique for artillery at the beginning of this century 
certainly reflected technological advances - primarily in 
the range of guns - but was not in itself a technological 
change. It was a change in procedures and attitudes 
accompanied by the simplest of mechanical devices (at 
first )- the non-optical dial sight. 
112 The phrase 
'military-technical' as used in Russian extends to cover 
'technical ' aspects of military operations: the 
integration of infantry, artillery, armour and air, how 
operations are planned and controlled. It is arguably not 
so much changes in technology itself but associated 
changes in technique, which have altered and will continue 
to alter the character of war. 
The interdependence of technology and technique was 
apparent to Stalin, who made it a central part of his 
address to the graduates of the Red Army Academy in 1935: 
'having outlived the period of famine in tech- 
nical resources, we have entered a new period, 
a period, I would say, of famine in the matter of 
people, in the matter of cadres, in the matter of 
workers capable. of harnessing technique and advancing 
it. The point is that we have factories, mills 
collective farms, Soviet farms, an army: we have 
technique for all this, but we lack people with 
sufficient experience to squeeze out of 
technique all that can be squeezed out of it. 
Formerly we used to say that "Technique 
decides everythin". This slogan helped us in 
this respect, that. we put an end to the 
famine in technical resources and created 
an extensive technical base in every 
branch of activity for the equipment of 113 
our people with first class technique'. 
124 
The Red Army Academy, the centre for thinking on the 
likely character of future warfare, was a most appropriate 
forum in which to stress the reciprocity between technical 
resources and technique. 
The military-technical character of future war is 
largely determined by the study of evolving science and 
technology and by 'generalization of the experience of 
past wars'. 
114 In the 1930s, Soviet commentators 
considered that western theorists had placed too much 
emphasis on technical factors, to the exclusion of 'moral 
political' ones(the political side of future war, and of 
Military Doctrine). In contrast, Frunze and Voroshilov 
were considered to have put forward propositions that 
would lead to the creation of a 'Marxist-Leninist theory 
of future war', in the event of capitalist aggression. 
115 
The interface between men and machines: between new 
equipment and its operators, is cardinal in considering 
the character of future war and occupies a dominant place 
in the literature. 116 
6: SYSTEMS THINKING AND FUTURE WAR 
The interaction of technology, technique and tactics is, 
however, only one element in analysing the character and 
outcome of a future war. War is a form of social 
intercourse, and a game of chance, as Clausewitz knew: 
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a 'great drama, which one should not reduce to 
mathematical calculations', as Jomini knew. 
118 Although 
it conforms to many of the principles of normal life, war 
between civilized countries is an abnormality, like 
disease to a normally healthy body. It contains elements 
of chaos. In this context, Russian and Soviet work on 
systems, on cybernetics, gives another important 
perspective on the subject. 
The task of taking thought processes from several 
widely differing areas and combining them into a single 
discipline was explored by Aleksandr Bogdanov (real name 
Malinovskiy)(1873-1928) and Nikolay Bukharin (1888- 
125 
1938). 119 Bukharin's fall from favour spelled the 
condemnation of systems thinking: when, later 
cybernetics and systems theory proved indispensable, 
history was rewritten to prove that Marx and Lenin had in 
fact invented it. 120 Bogdanov's Tectology: the Universal 
Organizing Science, first published in 1913, appeared in a 
world where the accepted system was soon to be shattered 
by an apocalyptic disturbance, World War 1.121 Bogdanov 
took part in the war as a military doctor. Whereas the 
first edition had been optimistic, Bogdanov saw the 
disorganization and chaos which resulted from a collision 
between organizations at first hand. Three years on, 
Bogdanov attempted to explain how the war had affected his 
theory. 
'What tasks has the war placed before the 
collectives which have been plunged into it? 
The tasks of organization and disorganization 
in unbroken connexion: the same tasks, which 
tectology must study, and in the same relationship. 
But on what scale hin these tasks been set? On a 
universal scale... ' 
Bogdanov analysed the differences between peace and war, 
concluding that the principal distinctions were war's 
greater seriousness, or tension (ostrota): mistakes cost 
large numbers of lives; and unpredictability - the 
constant sharp changes in the situation. There were 
crises in civilian life, also, but they tended to be 
brief. War, on the other hand, was a continually 
developing series of crises. 123 War posed an 
organizational task which was 'universal' and 'integral'. 
'An inadequacy in men can be compensated for 
by the choice of terrain which is more favourable 
for their action, by reinforcing technical means, 
by an increase in destructive weaponry and 
defensive equipment [this was written in 1916, 
the tank being an obvious example of both] 
and by an ideological "lifting of the soul" 
[improving morale]... or, most often, by a 
combination of these methods. The same 
relates to elements of a completely different 
type: gaps in technology can be made up 
by expenditure of human life, a reduction 
.,. 126 
in the army's morale by withdrawal behind 
natural obstacles, and so on. 
Of course, this relationship of exchange 
occurs during peace time. Using better 
weapons or machines, one can attain 124 given results with fewer workers... 
The comparison of increased automation in warfare and in 
industry was popular among Russian military writers in 
this period (see part 3). In the preface to the third 
edition, dated November, 1921, Russia's founder of systems 
thinking further addressed the question of the man- 
machine mix, a cardinal question in the application of 
systems thinking to the likely character of future war. 
He noted the confluence of 'historical necessity and 
scientific possibility', 125 of which the development of 
indirect fire systems(see below) and the tank might be 
considered classic examples. When a new machine was 
introduced, the organizer had the task of 'coordinating, 
that is organizing the activity of the workers with that 
of the machine, in an expedient fashion'. 
126 
The comparison between the military and industry also 
occurs in a work completed with I Stepanov, the Course in 
Political Economy. Here, the authors suggested that in 
economic life commercial considerations had limited the 
spread of automation and technical advance, but in the 
military sphere this had not occurred: 
'The only area in which self-regulating mech- 
anisms can be found is the military establishment, 
which is. the sphere of destruction rather than 
production. In it the technical task controls 
the commercial one, and automatically regulated 
underwater torpedoes, aerial bombs and 127 devices of that kind are already in use'. 
Since this was published in 1919, it is certainly true 
that military technology has in some areas advanced faster 
than civilian, due to the absence of commercial (and 
industrial relations) constraints. Particular examples 
are strategic-weapons and SDI. Bogdanov's view of the 
military sphere,. the sphere of destruction, being 
127 
technology-driven is of fundamental importance in 
understanding military science. 
The same work included some remarkable technological 
predictions. Coal was a 'limited and non-renewable' 
energy source. Instead, such 'enormous forces' as the 
tides, winds and storms might be utilised. Finally, 'work 
with energy and other phenomena... has opened up 
perspectives incomparably more magnificent than others: 
the internal energy of the atom'. Once such 'gigantic and 
cruel forces' were available to humanity, 'human 
collective control' would become inevitable. 128 The 
authors accurately predicted nuclear power and present 
attempts to harness wind and tidal power, while there are 
increasing signs of international cooperation to control 
and limit nuclear weapons and in the field of nuclear 
safety. 
The attempt to impose some system, some order on the 
chaotic phenomenon of war is evident in all military 
organizations. One reason why 'military discipline', at 
'every level, has to be so strict is that war is such a 
mess. In the Soviet Union Marxism-Leninism as a universal 
intellectual framework has played a particular role in 
seeking to systematise planning and preparation for war. 
However, the desire for organization, for a 'system' of 
views predates the Revolution: it apparent from the body 
of late Imperial writing, which flowed over into Soviet 
times. There is a certain horror of chaos, evinced by 
Zherve in 1922, writing of the chaotic political twists 
and turns of the Napoleonic Wars in view of the 




system '(bezsistemnost'), le 
and 
lack 
quality of the changing political relations 
in that era, they were determined to a 
significant degree by the geographical 
conditions.. 'Similarly, in the epoch through 
which we are living, in spite of all its 
exceptional character, geography, with a 
degree of stability, must show us those 
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enemies who, inevitably, because of their 
geographical situation, will be the most 
permanent participants in hostile 
political combinations, which Jcxiet 
Russia must prepare to fight. ' 
This brief consideration of the relevance of Russian 
systems thinking to war thus leads once again to a major 
factor guaranteeing continuity between Imperial and Soviet 
planning for future war: geography, and also to geography 
as probably the most stable factor in the system. 
7. REVOLUTIONS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS. 
The influence of technology on warfare, the interaction 
of a number of technological changes, their assimilation 
and multi-faceted effect on tactics, operational art, 
strategy and military thought, has much in common with 
revolutions in science. As Thomas Kuhn pointed out in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the history of 
science is permeated by a number of apparent leaps or 
revolutions. 
130 Kuhn argued that these were not usually 
the exclusive work of the scientist whose name is 
retrospectively associated with them (for example, the so 
called 'Copernican Revolution' in astronomy or the 
'Einsteinian Revolution' in physics. Nor were they 
changes which took place overnight. Rather, they are what 
Kuhn calls paradigms. For Kuhn, a paradigm is a 
collective scientific achievement that embodies a 
collection of interrelated theories, laws, procedures and 
practices. -The paradigm is thus the dominant theory, and 
institutionalized practice within the scientific community 
based on it. 
Kuhn's idea of the paradigm is obviously most relevant 
to changes in ideas about the character of future war and 
institutional responses to it. Military science is not 
merely recondite theory, but is concerned with the 
application of ideas about the character of future war to 
the design, manufacture and distribution of weaponry, 
communications equipment and means of transport; toforce 
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structures, to concepts of operations, to specific war 
plans, and to the way troops and their officers are 
trained, both in basic skills and the application of 
strategic. operational and tactical ideas in unfavourable, 
difficult and unexpected circumstances. 
Lest it be thought that this represents'an overly 
esoteric approach to the down-to-earth problems of coping 
with and assimilating changing technological and 
demographic conditions, it must be understood that the 
Russians approach such issues in precisely this way. As 
the second quotation opening this part shows, a journal as 
down-to-earth and preoccupied with technical detail as the 
Artillery Journal might begin an article on 'Artillery 
Questions' of the day (1896) with an astounding 
philosophical sweep: the need to look fifty years 
ahead. 
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Many commentators on military history have, perhaps 
inadvertently, described changes in military theory and 
practice in precisely Kuhnian terms. Thus, Correlli 
Barnett noted that by the outbreak of World War I, three 
new factors had 'totally altered the terms of reference of 
warfare'. 
'The first of these factors was the technological 
and military revolution represented by the 
magazine rifle, the water cooled and belt fed 
machine gun, smokeless propellants and quick 
firing artillery [the latter itself invoking a 
range of. interrelated factors]. The second 
factor was the problem of supplying and deploying 
and directing unprecedented numbers of troops, 
and this was linked with the related problem 
of making the right military use of the latest 
inventions, the telephone, wireless, the , 132 internal combustion engine, the flying machine. 
This is a classic example of a Kuhnian paradigm. This 
mid to late nineteenth century 'revolution in warfare', 
the results of which were not fully apparent until well 
into World War I, is one of the most fascinating paradigm 
changes in military science. There is evidence of early 
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Russian awareness of the paradigmatic nature of advances 
in technology and their interaction with tactics, in 
Kuropatkin's account of the Russo-Japanese War: 
'... this war was our first experience of smoke- 
less powder, of quick-firing artillery, of 
machine guns, and of all the recent developments 
in the means of destruction, and much was 
strange and unexpected. Our preconceived notions 
were upset, and we were baffled by the deadly 
nature of indirect artillery fire, by the new 
attack formations - when advancing infantry 
is rarely visible... Our troops had been 
instructed, but what they had learned varied 
according to the personal idiosyncracies of #133 this or that [Military] District commander. 
An even closer analogy with Kuhn's idea of the paradigm 
in science was the 'Revolution in Military Affairs', 
wrought by the advent of the ballistic missile and the 
nuclear warhead, in the 1950s7 which, inter alia, called 
into question such profound assumptions as the 
relationship between attack and defence. 
134 Closer 
because, unlike the nineteenth century 'revolution' which 
was subsequently identified by historians, the Revolution 
in Military Affairs had a precise and unambiguous 
significance at the time, among the scientific community 
involved - the Soviet military. 
Another example of a-paradigm in military science 
with which the Russian army was connected is the adoption 
of indirect fire technique by field artillery. The 
problems of cramming all the available guns onto the 
battlefield within visual range of the enemy, of assuring 
their survival in the face of the new long ranged and 
accurate rifles and machine guns, forced artillerymen to 
consider abandoning the old paradigm and to adopt 
concealed positions for artillery, in spite of all the 
technical (in the sense of technique) problems. Even when 
they had done. so, the paradigm had not become accepted 
within the entire community: artillerymen who adopted 
covered positions for their guns were ordered forward onto 
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ridges by generals still unaware of the possibilities of 
indirect fire. 135 Once accepted, indirect fire in turn led 
to greater emphasis on air reconnaissance, accurate and up 
to date maps and new survey techniques. It made possible 
the dispersion of guns in depth as well as in breadth; 
the concentration on a target of all guns within range, 
over distances vastly greater than the range of the human 
eye. 
Another paradigm change is of particular relevance to 
perceptions of the character of future war, from the 1920s 
to the present day. In his discussion of the change from 
the Newtonian to the Einsteinian paradigm in physics, Kuhn 
points out that for practical purposes Newtonian theory is 
still valid at low velocities. 136 In the case of physics, 
therefore, the new paradigm is affected by velocity: in 
the case of military science, it may be affected by scale. 
Thus, the Schlieffen plan for the invasion of France in 
1914 derived from a traditional paradigm: encirclement of 
all the enemy's forces round an open flank. Schlieffen 
himself described it as a 'giant Cannae', recalling the 
pincer movement executed by Hannibal against the 
Romans. 137 But the scale was quite different, and this, 
combined with extensions in the range of weapons and troop 
deployments meant that the old paradigm did not work. The 
following year, Von Falkenhayn ruled out the possibility 
of encircling the vastly extended Russian front in the 
east. Instead, he would have to break through the centre 
and encircle outwards. 
138 Thus, he created the precedent 
of the Gorlice-Tarnow operation. There were earlier 
precedents, but henceforward the new paradigm would 
dominate. As GS Isserson, one of the most prescient 
Soviet military visionaries of the interwar period put it, 
from now on, manoeuvre would not take place before the 
enemy deployment, in the sense of both time and space, as 
it usually had before World War I, 'but behind it, and in 
the enemy depth'. 
139 This paradigm is most important in 
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considering the broad Soviet perception of the character 
of future operations. It becomes apparent that Military 
Doctrine, in Soviet parlance, is the current paradigm: no 
more, no less. 
8. SOVIET DEFINITION AND CATEGORIZATION OF TYPES OF 
PREDICTION 
In the context of foreseeing the character of future war, 
the word 'prognozirovaniye' - prognosis, prognostication - 
occupies a prominent place in Soviet sources. The Russian 
definition of prognosis is a 'prediction or statement on 
the further development of something, based on known facts 
already possessed'. 140 The need for a firm factual base 
is stressed repeatedly. 
'I am not s eaking of the pipe dreams of 
a Manilov 
La 
character in Gogol's Dead 
Soul ], but of coherent thought about 
development in this or that field of 
science based on what has already been achieved. 
Scientists' dreams constitute an 
incursion into a hitherto unexplored field, 
a scientific prognosis of the future. This 
can be very bold, but it must, above 
all, have solid foundations... The most 
difficult thing for the young is to 
restrain a flight from present day actual 
possibilities. For the dream to bear 
fruit it must have firm, sound roots. 141 
Proanozirovaniye may be used to refer to 'long range 
forecasting'. 142 A second term is 'scientific foresight', 
which also has something of the flavour of 'insight' - 
nauchnoye predvideniye. 
143 It is applied to foreseeing 
the character of future war, especially if a particular 
element of prescience is involved, as in a recent article 
on Tukhachevskiy's 'predvideniya', 144 and in the article 
on Svechin's predvideniye which also suggests far- 
sightedness with regard to Svechin's understanding of the 
value of the satrategic defensive and its relevance to 
current Soviet thinking. 145 The term can also be used in 
the sense of foresight on a day-to-day basis: the 
, effective officer or manager's need to anticipate problems 
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and develop solutions before they arise. In the military 
context 'scientific foresight' therefore has two distinct 
meanings: forseeing the character of future war as a 
framework for procurement and planning, and 'foresight' in 
the immediate operational context, as part of effective 
command. 
146 One of the most prominent Soviet experts on 
this question in the 1960s and 1970s, V Konoplev, 
discussed the two variants side by side in 1966. 
'Forecasting(prognozirovaniye) in military 
affairs ... is based on the study of economic, 
moral- political, natural scientific and 
directly military factors and their interaction. 
nowadays it is impossible to command forces 
successfully without a mastery of the principles 
of physics, mathematics, and other sciences, 
without a strong knowledge of military theory 
and practice, without a deep appreciation 
of the essence of the revolution in military 
affairs and its consequences... 
The sum of knowledge necessary to produce 
a picture of future combat and of an 
operation scientifically must correspond to the 
position ofan officer, of a general, in 
the hierarchy. A junior commander establishing 
a perspective on an impending (predstoyashchiy) 
battle needs a specific knowledge of the 
technical and tactical characteristics 
of enemy weaponry, of [the organization of] 
his units and sub-units. A powerful 
commander-in-chief, resolving a task on a 
strategic scale, and even more one who is 
establishing a perspective on the course and 
outcome of the war as a whole, needs, alongside 
a knowledge of the military characteristics of 
modern weaponry, a deep knowledge and ability 
to take account of the military-economic 
potential, social-political and geographical 
characteristics of a country, of a theatre of 
military operations (: [VD)'... 
The commander, foreseeing the future picture 
of the battle, carries out his reconnaissance 
directly on the ground where the action will take 
place... In strategic foresight a logical 
methodology plays an important role. At present, 
the commander is acquiring more and more 
the opportunity to use modelling of possible 
-military actions, even the w., as a whole, 
for purposes of foresight'. 
Konoplev expanded his arguments in a book, Scientific 
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Foresight in Military Affairs, published in 1974.148 
The third main term encountered is 'scientific and 
technical progress', which embodies the whole process of 
scientific, technical and technological innovation and its 
social and economic consequences. 149 The word 
predskazaniye ('foretelling')is usually reserved for 
seers, fortune tellers, readers of tea leaves. It might 
be translated 'prophecy' or 'prediction', although it has 
occasionally been used in the context of scientific 
prediction. 150 
Chuyev and Mikhaylov's 1975 book, Forecasting 
(Prognozirovanive) in Military affairs briefly discusses 
different authors' definitions of various terms before 
establishing its own definitions. Prediction 
(predskazaniye) is 'the art of weighing the future state 
of an object, based on the subjective "weighing" of a 
large number of qualitative and quantitative factors'. 151 
In fact, this constitutes an acceptable definition of 
_predvideniye 
(foresight), also. 
Forecasting(prognozirovaniye) is a research process, 
-as a result of which probability data about the future 
state of the object being forecast is obtained. 
152 As 
with Konoplev's book of the year before, the authors also 
establish the important difference between forecasting and 
planning. Konoplev had defined a prognosis as the first 
phase, involving a scientific appreciation of perspectives 
-, of social de'velopment, and a plan as the second phase 
involving active creative work by individuals. Whereas a 
prognosis had a primarily 'cognitive' function, a plan 
regulated and directed the established relations between 
people, organizations and social systems. 
153 Konoplev 
drew on the seminal work by IV Bestuzhev-Lada, Window on 
the Future (1970)154. Bestuzhev-Lada is one of the elder 
statesmen of Soviet forecasting. Of particular interest 
is the short book If the World Disarms (1961), in which he 
examines the character of contemporary war, 
155 and then 
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options open for spending the money on other things: 
gigantic nuclear powered locomotives travelling at 200 to 
300 kilometres per hour on tracks three times as wide as 
the standard Russian/Soviet broad gauge, a network of 
tunnels and canals criss-crossing the planet. 156 These 
views are particularly interesting in the light of debates 
current at the time of writing, on conversion of military 
industry and the 'peace dividend'. 
In Window on the Future (1970), Bestuzhev-Lada 
outlines 14 types of forecasting, 
157 divided into three 
categories: negative, intermediate and positive. Negative 
types of forecasting include the 'Presentist', 'Agnostic' 
and 'Nihilist'. Intermediate forms are 'Religious', 
'Fantastic' and 'Utopian'. Positive forms of forecasting 
are the 'Intuitive', 'Philosophical', 'Prognostic', 
'Constructive' and 'Science Fiction'. He deals with the 
Scientific-Technical Revolution' and forecasting, 
focussing on the period from the late 1940s to the early 
1960s as the crucial one for the development of modern 
scientific forecasting methods. 
158 The RR Soviet 
Communist Party Congress encouraged 'Social forecasting', 
in which context the works of, inter alia, Glushkov and 
Siforov were mentioned. Bestuzhev-Lada also deals with 
military affairs, 
159 which he considers 'most closely 
linked with political forecasting', reinforcing the 
o-Y authority of Military Doctrine as divided into political 
and military-technical segments. He citel'an interesting 
prediction by Gordon. 0 Helmer (1964) which it is possible 
to test against actual developments in the last quarter 
century. Helmer predicted( and one assumes that the 
Soviet military took some note) automatic location and 
destruction of nuclear: submarines by 1975 (which did not 
occur), and development of methods for submarines to evade 
this by 1980, (not a bad prediction, as by 1980 Soviet 
submarine 'designers had paid much attention to anechoics 
and methods of making submarines very hard to detect). 
136. 
Effective laser weapons were forecast by 1989, a 
prediction which proved absolutely accurate. At the time 
of writing, laser weapons exist which are certainly 
effective against 'soft' targets, eg., optics(see part 4). 
The ability to hypnotize enemy forces over an entire zone 
of military operations is forecast by 2035, and mind- 
reading by 2045.160 Although it is difficult to confirm, 
Soviet interest in the area of 'reflexive control' 
suggests this may indeed be a long term objective. 
161 
Finally, Bestuzhev-Lada deals with space exploration: 
the exploration first of space near the earth , then the 
moon and nearer planets, the solar system as a whole, 
then extending beyond the solar system to other stars, 
galaxies and making contact with other civilizations. 
162 
Chuyev and Mikhaylov similarly differentiated between 
a prognosis, which establishes 'what may occur in the 
future and under what conditions', and planning 
(planirovaniye) which 'determines what is supposed to 
occur in the future'. 
163 The character of future war is 
primarily determined by forecasting and foresight, but 
planning for specific operations and actions must also 
determine, and be'determined by, its character. 
Prognozirovaniy, 'forecasting' or 'long range 
forecasting', has been more heavily emphasized 
recently. 
164 In the military context, it has evolved in 
two directions. The first is the operational and 
technical, involving the appraisal of new weapons systems, 
both Soviet and non-Soviet, and the optimisation of 
Soviet(and allied) force structures. The second is more 
general military-political, and environmental 
forecasting9165 In a significant article in 1976 General 
V Kulikov demanded greater effort on the latter from the 
scientific research groups in military academies and 
schools, involving the development of predictive 
techniques which would assist in military planning. 
166 
There is some confusion about the precise nuance of 
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prognozirovaniye and predvideniye, and they can be used as 
synonyms. General Cherednichenko described the former as 
a 'form of scientific foresight''167 This semantic 
problem therefore mirrors the problem of distinguishing 
between 'future' and 'contemporary' war. Even more 
recently(1987) EA Rybkin discussed Lenin's views on the 
social consequences of wars and the problems of 
forecasting them. Within this section he discussed 
predvideniye. 
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'Foresight - this is a special aspect of human 
knowledge about what exists, but which is not 
yet encompassed in our experience, which exists 
only as a possibility, and disposes of an estab- 
lished degree of probability, of being converted 
reality in a defined period of time... attempts at 
scientific foresight took place in the past 
but nevertheless it only acquired a firm base 
with the appearance of Marxist-Leninist theory 
In this, one must also, of course, not minimise 
the attainments of the hard sciences (konkretnye 
nauki)(that is, the theory of probability, 
statistical research, in revealing tend7 169 
encies in the development of events)... 
Lenin sought not only to explain the past, but also to use 
data in the context of 'fearlessly foreseeing 
; (gredvideniye) the future and 
bold practical action 
directed towards its realisation''170 Rybkin noted that 
Lenin particularly valued 'the prognoses of F. Engels on a 
future world war, its result and consequences, and on the 
nature of revolutionary crises which would arise in future 
as a result-of wars'. 
171 The three most important 
components of 'foreseeing possible future wars', according 
to Rybkin, are their social character, their cause and 
consequences. 
172 
Moving to the military-technical character of future 
war, and its influence on force structures, procurement 
and technological development, there was evidence of a 
great and growing interest in the military applications of 
forecasting in the 1970s. Planning might be conducted on 
-a. five year 
basis,, updated annually, with long term 
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forecasting reaching ahead for some 15 to 20 years. Any 
greater span required prediction about scientific progress 
in its own right. 
173 In 1972 Captain Skugarev noted 
foreign classifications of short term forecasts 
(kratkosrochny prognoz) as not exceeding five years, 
medium term forecasts (srednosrochny) as between five and 
ten and long term (dolgosrochny), exceeding ten years and 
extending to 20 years and more. 
174 In 1974, Major General 
Konoplev confirmed the definition of long term forecasts, 
while defining medium term as from three to ten years and 
short as one to two years. 175 Some Soviet forecasting 
experts have stressed the need for longer predictions, 
(sometimes defined as dal'niy -'distant')from 50 to 100 
years. 176 Short-term forecasts, for example, of the 
weather, are expected to be very precise: the longer the 
term, the more vague the forecast may be. 177 As the Soviet 
General Staff noted in 1989, Military Science forecast 10- 
20 and 20-30 years into the future, but their 'long-range 
forecasts' were 'quite vague'. 178 The 'distant' future 
appears to embrace the period from 30 years hence, and 
'distant forecasts' from 25 to 30 years hence. 179 
The use of the term 'short term forecast'(prognoz) at 
first sight contradicts the conclusion that 
prognozirovaniye should be translated 'long term 
forecasting': it reinforces the view that 
prognozirovaniye and prognoz can have a rather general 
meaning. The term 'short term forecast'(prognoz) 
reappeared in the appropriate chapter(probably also by 
Skugarev) of the book edited by Gorshkov in 1988,180 
indicating that this was not just an idiosyncratic and 
temporary slip. 
Horizons for forecasting are closely connected with 
the time it takes from the initial conception of a new 
machine to its entering service, the 'lead time'. In 
1969, a Soviet economist fixed this time, 'from the retort 
to the [disposal tank', at 12 to 15 years. He therefore 
139 
suggested that 20 year prognoses were 'inadequately firm', 
and that 12 to 15 years was the optimum. 
181 When the idea 
for a new manufactured item is conceived, this takes place 
on the basis of the level of science and technology at 
that time. So, if, the Russians are looking more than 12 
to 15 years ahead, it stands to reason that there must 
also be some forecasting of changes in the scientific and 
technological background. Therefore, a 25 year forecast 
requires a 10 to 15 year forecast of technology in various 
sectors of the community, a view confirmed by the Central 
scientific Research Institute of Patent Information. 182 
Similarly, in the context of forecasting 100 years ahead, 
20 to 30 year forecasts of general scientific and 
technological development are the minimum or, conversely, 
such 20 to 30 year forecasts enable us to predict much 
further ahead, although 100 years is 'unusually 
difficult'. 183 Forecasting the general development of 
science and technology is a specialised area of study, 
separate from but related to the specific issue of 
predicting the character of future war and the development 
of specifically military systems. 
184 
The problem of predicting the pace of scientific 
development itself acquires a particularly high profile in 
the case of naval armaments, where large surface 
combatants may be in service for 30 to 35 years, aircraft 
carriers for more than 45, and armament systems for 15 
years. 185 This necessitates 'forecasting and planning of 
the development of the fleet over a long term period, an 
integrated analysis of factors, influencing its 
development, and missions, arising from an evaluation of 
the development of the international situation, and 
the scientific-technical and economic potential of the 
state'. 
186 The method for'forecasting the development of 
armaments has its basis in historical and dialectical 
materialism, and is shown diagramatically in figure 2.3 
which is taken from Gorshkov, 
7 as is figure 2.4 which 18 
140 
Figure 2.3. 'Interrelationship and subordination of 
methods of prognosis with other methods of cognition' 
(Source, Gorshkov et al., The Navy..., p. 50. 
Methodsicl 
IMethodscall IMethodsica 
Methods of I Prognosis 
Applied methods of cognition 
(Methods of technical, economic 
and other sciences) 
General scientific methods 
(Analysis, synthesis, induction, 
etc. ) 
i 
Philosophical methods of 
dialectical and historical material : 
ism (General methods of 
cognition). 
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Figure 2.5. Basic chart establishing perspectives for the development of naval armaments 
Establishing military-political 
aims and key variants of military- 
political situations 
Tasks of the Navy 
2 
LAlternative j LVitally important; 
4 
Evaluating the complement Working out operational-strategic 
3 
and state of probable and operational-tactical models 
enemies in naval and of armed conflict in a given 
oceanic theatres (TVD) theatre 
(TVD) 
Working out mathematical models: -------- optimisation of the naval complement: 
Establishing. the real 
9 
capacity for alternative 
tasks remaining within 
the allocated resources 
after solution-, of-.. vitally 
important tasks 
Orders delivered to other 
12 
services from weapons 
assigned to the Navy 
To Other programmes 
Is IF stage: --- - ---1 
Establishing basic directions a 
for the development-of naval 
armaments: establishing the 
qualitative--complement of the 
ý- ---- -_-navy. ------------1 r ---- 2nd stage: 
-- --------] 
Establishing the forces andb 
means, for the solution of 
I individual tasks: the quantit- I 
i ative complement 
ý---- 
3rd stage: _-------ý 
5c 
( Distributing tasks between 
Armed Services and Arms of 
I Service in maritime and oceanic 
TDs. Balance between qualitative 
and qualitative complement 
L _(a system of mathematical models)! 
Assessing the cost of the required 
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armaments 
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Source: Gorshkov, ed., V'yunenko, Makeyev, Skugarev, The Navy... figure 2, pp. 68-69, translated and interpreted with the help of the more detailed explanation in the text, pp. 70 - 81. This is a more elaborate version of the diagram in Makeyev's article in MSb 4/1982, p. 28, which was also used in interpreting the later diagram. 
Box 1 would appear to coincide, more or less, with the political character of future war: boxes 2-4, with the military-technical character. Together, they form a largely self-contained system which then drives naval (and other armed forces') procurement. 
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Figure 2.6. Connection between the horizons of prognoses, 
programmes and plans 
Prognosis = correlation of forces, economics, technology, 
foreign trade 
Programme =3 parts: plan to be carried out flexibly and with 
variations, in about ten years 
Perspective = is absorbed into the programme by the fifth 
year and so it disappears 
Source: Waclaw Stankiewicz, Planowanie obronne (Defence 
'Planning), (Defence Ministry Publishing House Wy . MON , Warsaw, 1977), fig. 15. 
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Figure 2.7. Different methods of Forecasting (Source, Bestuzhev-Lada, Okno v Budushcheye, 
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1. Ogibayushchikh krivykh 
2. Sryv lavin - presumably 
'avalanche' here is used in 
the sense of an electronic 
avalanche. 
Hypothetical 
sets long term forecasts in this context at 25 to 30 
years, medium term at 15 to 20, short term at 5 to 10 and 
'current' at one to five years. Establishing the precise 
timescales covered by different types of forecasts is 
informative about Soviet views of future war, -but it is 
also necesary to understand the institutional 
relationships and the relation of naval armaments to 
perceived future tasks. Figure 2.5, which appeared in 
Gorshkov is an amended version of a diagram from Captain 
Makeyev's article of 1982.188 It shows the relationship 
between naval armament programmes and military political 
aims and the missions of the Navy, and also the 
relationship with other services. 
The character of planning'and programmes is also 
apparent from a Polish book on Defence Planning(1977). 
The process is cyclical over a five year period, as 
ilustrated in figure 2.6. In the first year the prognosis 
looks forward some twenty years from that time. 
Simultaneously, a programme, divided into three parts, 
looks forward ten, and is intended to be fulfilled with 
some flexibility and variations in that time. There is 
also a fifteen year 'plan perspective', a five year plan 
and a one year plan. During the next four years the 
prognosis is retracted to look fifteen years hence, but 
updated annually. After five years the cycle begins 
again, the prognosis looking forward 20 years from the new 
present, or five years further than the previous one. 189 
Forecasting and prediction techniques in 
a 
the Soviet 
Union now appear to be highly developed, although much has 
been garnered from foreign work on the subject. 
Bestuzhev-Lada remains the most prominent figure in the 
general field: that Soviet forecasters use a , 
highly 
synoptic approach is apparent from figure 2.7 which shows 
a broad and integrated, system of knowledge and 
methodology. 190 Since the mid-1960s there has been 
increased emphasis on mathematical modelling and increased 
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adoption of western methods. Whereas there was 'no 
indication of Soviet use of the Delphi method by 1966', 191 
it was described extensively in publications of 1969192 
and 1974,193 and it would be surprising if the'Russians 
had not drawn lessons from it. The-Programme Evaluation 
and Review Technique(PERT) method, described'as`'net 
(setevye) models of planning and control of the production 
and economic process', was also mentioned at this time. 194 
Following from this, it is clear that the character 
of future war is no mere science fiction -nauchnaya 
fantastika - but a scientific and reasoned analysis 
founded on known trends: scientific, technological, 
social, political, demographic, economic, and on 
experience of past and current conflicts. Nor is it the 
preserve of a few dreamers or self publicists. According 
to Kir'yan, 
'A superficial analysis... in modern war 
conditions will result in errors... to 
solve these problems a system of organs is 
created, which is concerned with prognosticating 
the possible character of future war and 
problems connected with it. It embraces 
General Staffs and the headquarters of the 
Armed Services, and also other military 
organizations: corporations, commissions, 
institutes, societies, centres. Various 
technical means for predicting situations 
which arise in operations have been created 
which play out the various decisions which 
may be taken in order tolgStablish the most 
expedient (optimum) one. 
The role of the'Military Academies, 196 is cardinal to 
this thesis. These are centres of higher military 
education, equivalent to 'staff' or 'War' Colleges°in 
Britain and the United States, and not institutions which 
prepare young men and women for junior officer 
appointments like the 'Academies''of"Sandhurst and West 
Point. The choice of; the name 'Academy'. was contested by 
Jomini, who-: believed that the title 'Military Academy' was 
'ordinarily4` only`given= to` establishments uniting all the 
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aspects of Military Science, and should not be applied to 
specialised schools'(as in the 'Artillery Academy', and so 
on). 197 However, he declined to get involved in this 
'guerre de mots', and the title Academy stuck, for the war 
colleges of the various arms and services as well as for 
the Frunze and General Staff Academies, which fulfil 
Jomini's criteria. 
198 
In the Soviet Union and allied states the Academies 
perform two distinct but interrelated functions. The 
first is preparing higher commanders for their duties in 
peace and war. The second is to act as what were 
described in 1986 as 'scientific centres for the research 
of military problems', 199 or, to use the fuller 1928 
definition, 
'Scientific laboratory centres moving the theory and 
practice of military affairs forward. The work of 
Red Military Academies is quite different fro 
analogous establishments in bourgeois armies'ý00 
As noted in part 1, the process of turning the General 
Staff academy into a 'think tank' concerned to a large 
degree with the character of future war was underway 
before World War 1,201 and the Red Army Academy retained 
this objective. 
The Soviet General Staff itself (before 1935, the 
Shtab RKKA: Red Army 'Staff', or Headquarters), 202 has 
also been"immersed in establishing the character of future 
war. As explained, the phrase 'Military Science' and the 
character of future war are virtually inextricable. In 
Zakharov's work on The General Staff in the Pre-War Years 
(1969, published 1989), 
203 Lenin's views on foresight are 
taken as the basic text for the chapter on strategic 
direction and military-science. Military historians, said 
Lenin, must study the experience of wars 
'not only with the thought of explaining the 
past but also of fearlessly forseeing the 
future and bold practical: activit , directed towards fulfilling this 
Lvision]. 
'204 
The General Staff's military-historical department, in 
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addition to historical research, and in connexion with it, 
'devoted unwavering attention to working out 
views and prognoses on the character of 
future armed conflict. In this regard, 
the credit (zasluga)rightly belongs to 
the General Staff, as the three volume 
, 205 History of Wars and Military Art bears witness. 
Recent conversations with the Soviet General Staff, 
underline the continued leading role of that organization, 
and its Academy, in formulating the view of the character 
of future war(see part 4). The latter appears to be a 
defined concept with a particular place in the 
intellectual framework of Soviet military thought, as this 
part of the thesis has demonstrated. It is also clear 
that a well organized and defined structure has existed, 
and exists, in Russia and the Soviet Union, for 
formulating, disseminating and utilising a vision of the 
character of future war. 
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NOTES TO PART 2 
1. Nikolay Ostrovskiy, Na vs ako o mudretsa dovol'no 
prostoty, Act III, sc. 4. The play was written from 
August to October, 1868, and first published in 
Otechestvenn e zapiski (Homeland Notes), 11/1868. AN 
Ostrovs iy, $o raniye sochineniy Collected Works), 
(Khudozhestvennaya literatura, Moscow, 1960), Vol. 5, p. 
302 and note on Vp. 527-28. 'My ne mozhem, ne dolzhny bez 
strakha podnimat naves' budus c ego... 
2. A Baum arten, 'Artilleri ski e voprosy'('Artillery 
Questions'), Artiller ysciy z urna AZ , 1/1896, pp. 1- 32, this p. 1. 
3. Marxism-Leninism on War and Army (Marksism-Leninism o 
voyne i armiyey) was published in f ive Russian language editions beginning in 1957 and ending in 1968. An earlier 
edition was nominated for the Frunze prize in 1966. The 
1968 edition was translated into English and published by 
progress Publishers, Moscow, in 1972. This is taken from 
the edition published under the auspices of the US Air 
Force, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1978, 
p. 2, Introduction to the Russian Edition. 
4. Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (Routledge, 
London, 1934), p. 58, citing Bacon's Opus ajus. 
5. IF Clarke, 'The First Forecast of the Future', 
Futures, June, 1969, p. 325. On Clarke and futures 
studies, see part 1 note 40. 
6. Mumford, Technics and Civilization, p. 59. 
7. Following the Montgolfier brothers' flight, in 1784 
Benjamin Franklin, then US ambassador in France, wrote 
'where is the prince who can afford to cover his country 
with troops for its defence [against]... 10,000 men 
descending from the clouds', an unwitting prediction of 
the surprise value of airborne forces. Clarke, 'The First 
Forecast... ', p. 329. 
8. Clarke, 'Forecasts of Future Wars, 1871-1914', p. 553. 
9. See for example, The Time Machine (1895) and The First 
Men on the Moon (1901 an dl particularly in the future war 
context, War of the Worlds (1898), War in the Air (1908), 




contrasts oür awareness of'past and future 
that social and political development might 
in just the same way as chemical 
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combinations. A more down to earth future war prediction 
occurred in three articles published in the Daily Mail, 
April 7,8 and 9,1913, reprinted as War and Common 
Sense, (London, 1913) in which Wells questioned the utility 
of vast conscript hordes and the ability of the available 
breadth of front to absorb them, thus predicting the 
stasis of World War I. The War that will end War (Frank, 
Cecil and Palmer, London, 1914) and What is coming, a 
Forecast of Things after the War (Casse , London, 1916) 
are also exemplary. In Me former, Wells forecasts 
massive Russian cavalry raids on the eastern front(p. 17), 
which were considered, and also the need for Russia to 
liberalise in order to 
technology (p. 66). In 






he begins with a chapter 
before moving on to 
10. Wells met Lenin on 6 October, 1920 and Stalin in 
1934. See the entry in Bol'sha a Sovetskaya 
Entsiklopediya, Vol. 27 192 , pp. 218-19, and Stalin- Wells talk. The verbatim Record and a discussion b- 
George Bernard Shaw, HG Wells, JM Keynes, Ernst Toller 
and others, (New Statesman and Nation, Lon on, . Lenin also wrote to Wells, who apparently called him 'the 
Kremlin's dreamer'. Gouschev and Vassiliev, Russian 
Science in the 21st Century, p. 3. 
11. Gouschev and Vassiliev, p. 8. 
12. Clarke, 'Methods of Prediction 1918-39', p. 375. 
13. Ibid., pp. 375-76. 
14. Giuseppe Grassi, compiled, corrected and edited, Opere 
di Raimondo Montecuccoli, (Stampa di Giuseppe Favale, 
Torino, 1821). Libro terzo, Aforismi applicati alla 
guerra possible col Turco in Un eria, pp. 101-21b and 
bibliographical note on pp. 301-02. The manuscript 
including these aphorisms probably dated from 1685-95, 
although a geo raphical survey of Hungary which follows 
the Aphorisms 
(p. 
219) is dated 1673. Montecuccoli's 
Aphorisms display a classic structure common to many 
'future war' predictions: Chapter I (Ca? itolo I) begins 
with 'Della guerra e del suo apparechio (How the war might 
break out - the political component ; notes on the 
organization of forces (Del soldo e delle reclute), which 
included a strong argument for standing re ular 
professional troops- un esercito perpetuo 
(p. 
115). In 
this, Montecuccoli pointed out that wars tended to last a 
long time: the war against the Turks begun in 1661 did 
not finish until 1664, and so on. The geographical survey 
which follows also forms part of the 'future war' 
assessment: the key discipline of military geography. 
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15. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Art of War, trans. of Arte 
della guerra [1521), (revise edition of the Ellis- 
Farnworth trans., introduction by Neal Wood, Bobbs- 
Merrill, Indianapolis, New York and Kansas, 1965). He 
paid great'attention to the Roman legion, whilst not 
rating artillery at all. In addition to the lessons of 
recent wars, Montecuccoli noted that the Turks' artillery 
was excessively cumbersome and that his forces, with newer 
and more mobile artillery, enjoyed a technological 
advantage(Grassi, ed., Opere, p. 101, and Capitolo I, 
Titolo II, dell'artiglieria, pp. 158-9). 
16. See for example General GA Leyer, ed. Entsiklopediya 
voyennykh i morskikh nauk (Encyclopedia of Military and 
Naval Sciences), (8 Vols., St Petersburg, 1883-1897), Vol. 
2, pp. 196-99. 'Military Geography' and 'Military 
Statistics' are classified as 'a separate branch of 
military knowledge concerned with the study of countries 
and states from a military viewpoint'(p. 196). Leyer 
lists an extensive bibliography of military geographical 
works, mainly in German and Russian, going back to 1801. 
In the first half of the 19th century Military Statistics 
was concerned only with numbers and organization of 
forces(p. 198). Colonel PA Yazykov's Opyt teorii 
voyennoy eo rafii(Experience of the theory of Military 
Geography 18 8 and the then Colonel DA Milyutin's 
Pervye opyty vo enno statistiki(First Experiences of 
Military statistics 18 are given as the earliest 
Russian endeavours in this field. Both Yazykov and 
Milyutin had been professors at the Nicholas Academy of 
the General Staff (founded 1832) 
underlining the link between this organization, the 
requirements of teaching future commanders and staff 
officers and the formulation of an image of future war. 
Milyutin's approach to Military statistics went further: 
'to research at a given moment the forces and equipment 
(sily i sredstva - the same terms as are used today)of 
states from a military viewpoint'. Thus, 'Military 
Statistics' formed the basis of assessing a state's entire 
war making potential and, by extension, the way it was 
likely to perform. These were distinct disciplines from 
Military Science which (p. 229) Leyer's Encyclopedia 
defined as divided into Tactics, Military administration, 
Artillery, Military Topography, Fortification and also, as 
a 'separate branch' (otdel'naya otrasl'), Strategy. 
17. See for example 'N neshnee chislitel'no e sosto ani e 
voysk yevropeyskikh derzhav The present numerical 
strength of European Powers'), Vo enny zhurnal, (Military 
Journal), No 1, St Petersburg, 13, p. 121, and a military 
geography of Great Britain and Ireland in Voyenny zhurnal, 
No 3(1839), p. 107. During the Crimean War, 'Military 
Statistics embraced intelligence assessments of enemy 
forces: 'Noveyshaya svedeniya o Velikobritanskoy armii' 
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('The latest information on the British Army') in the 
section 'Voyennaya statistika', Voyenny zhurnal, No. 2, 
1854, pp. 1-10, for examp e. On the develo? meet of 
intelligence assessments, see CD Bellamy, British Views 
of Russia: Russian Views of Britain', in PA Towle, ed. 
Estimating Foreign Military Power, (Croom Helm, London, 
1982, pp. 37-76. 
18. See for example Rear Admiral Bowles, Thoughts on 
National Defence (1848); General Sir John Burgoyne, 
Observations on the Possible Results of a War in France, 
(1852); Captain Robert Fitz-Roy, On the Application o 
Steam to Ships of War (1835), GV Gusta son, Observations 
on the Steam Navy of Great Britain (1847). First steam 
powered ship: exhibit by Dumfries and Galloway College of 
Technology, Glasgow, 1988. On the reluctance to take steam 
power for ships of war seriously before the 1830s, John F 
C Fuller, Machine Warfare. An Enquiry into the Influences 
of Mechanics on the Art of War, (Hutchnison, London, 
1942)9 p. 30. 
19. Colonel-General FF Gayvronskiy, Evolyutsiya 
voyennogo iskusstva: etapy, tendentsii printsipy, (The 
Evolution of Military Art: Stages, Trends, Principles), 
(Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1987), pp. 83-84. 
20. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, (Vom Kriege), ed. and 
trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton 
University Press, 1976), Bk. 2, ch. 1, p. 127. 
21. Baron Antoine Henri Jomini, Precis de 1'Art la 
Guerre, second edition (the first was addressed to the 
Russian Tsar Alexander I on 6 March, 1837), (1-ere Partie, 
Librairie pour les Arts et les Sciences, Paris, 1855). 
See also the translation by Captain GH Mendell and 
Captain WP Craighill, The Art of War, (Lippincott, 
Philadelphia and Trubner, London, 18 9), which includes 
Appendices written after the Crimean War. In particular, 
ch. 2, article 13, pp. 48-49, in which Jomini forecast the 
reappearance of armour in response to increased firepower 
and Appendix 2, p. 355, on the inevitable dissemination of 
technology. On correspondence with Milyutin, part 1, notes 
25,60, and Egerton MSS 3168, ff. 44-49, on his 
involvement in such detailed matters as the courses at the 
Russian military-educational establishments. 
22. 'Lifting the veil of the future'(perhaps a reference 
to Ostrovskiy - see note 1) in Meshcheryakov, Russkaya 
vo enna am sl' v XIX v (Russian Military thought in the 
19th Century , Nauka, Moscow, 1973), p. 120, eto byla 
erva a pop, ytka priotkryt' zaves' nad budushchim , 
referring to ND Neyelov (1800-1850), Oc er sovremennago 
sosto ani a strate ii, (Sketch of the Present State 
Strategy ,2 Vols., St Petersburg, 184 ,, 184 . Meshcheryakov 
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cites this as published in 1849 although the only edition 
traced by the author is from 1846-7. Neyelov, then a General 
Staff Captain, is extremely cautious and shows little 
originality, citing Jomini and Medem constantly. Even the 
sections on operational and strategic lines refer only to 
ordinary roads, not railways. However, an article translated 
from Journal des Sciences Militaires appears in Russian in 
1846; Secretary Turunov, trans., Vz lyad na zheleznye dorogi 
kak na vo enn ao eratsionn a lini ('A Look at Railways as 
Military-Operational Lines'), VZh, 4/1846, pp. 47-86,5/1846, 
pp. 109-71. Neyelov also wrote 0to isani a Borodinskago 
srazheni a sosto ashche o pri shtabe 6-go pekhotnago korpusa 
Attempt at a Description of the Battle of Borodino compiled in 
the Headquarters of 6th Infantry Corps) when a General Staff 
Lieutenant, (N Stepanov Press, St Petersburg, 1839). 
23. Edwin A Pratt, The Rise of Rail Power in War and-Conquest. 
1833-1914 (P S King= & Son, London, 1915) is the best work on 
the military revolution created by the railway. 1849: pp. 8-9. 
A near contemporary Russian source, 0 isani e vo enn kh 
deystvi Rossiskikh voysk protiv Ven erscic m atez ni ov v 
1849 godu (Description of the Russian Forces' Action against 
the Hun arian Rebels in 1849), (Voyennaya tipogra iya, St 
Petersburg, 1851), pp. i -, reveals that the Austrian First 
Minister, Prnce Schwartzenberg and the Commander in Chief of 
the Austrian army, General Vel'den, requested the move, a 
request with which the Russians complied as 'kazhdy chas byl 
doro'('Every hour was precious'). 'Materialy 
otnos ashchi es ak Ven ersko voyne 1849 oda'('Materials 
resting to the Hungarian War of 1849'), VSb, Vol. 235 6/1897, 
pp. 315-32 and Vol. 236 7/1897, pp. 156-82 also reveals (pp. 
325-6 of the first part$ that the Emperor was against sending 
'small detachments' such as the corps of 25,000 which the 
Austrians were preparing to receive, but that General Prince 
Paskevich did not await Imperial consent before sending a 
. 'composite division'(svodnaya diviziya)of 13,000 
infantry and 
48 guns under command of Lt Gen Panyutin. This force left 
Cracow by rail on 27 April (9 May N. S. ), 1849. This first use 
of the railway to transport troops thus appears to have owed 
nothing to pre-war Russian theory, and everything to hasty 
improvisation, with some misgivings, in an emergency at a 
foreign army's suggestion. Foreign discussion of railways as 
operational/ strategic lines had been translated into Russian 
in 1846 (see note 22), and was reviewedin the 1850s: see 
'Zhe ene doro i kak vo enn ao eratsion a linii'('Railroads 
as military operational lines'), Voyenny zhurna , No. 1,1854, 
pp. 137-42 (Review of the German of 'Pz. '(also author of 1846 
article)). 
24.. The submarine, Diable Marin, apparently arrived at 
Kronstadt in thick fog, its sinister appearance terrifying a 
sentry. Fuller, -Machine Warfare, p. 33. 
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25. Lt Colonel A Kochetkov, 'Russkiy voyenny teoretik MI 
Bogdanovic'('The Russian Military theorist MI Bogdanovich', 
Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal (Military Historical journal, 
hereafter VIZh , 8/1968, pp. /-/-84. in his earlier works, during the 1840s, Bogdanovich stressed the role of moral 
factors but later he came to recognize the dependence of 
strategy and tactics on material factors also. At the time of 
the outbreak of the Crimean War he wrote two articles, ', 0 
noveyshikh usovershenstvovaniyakh ruchnogo o nestrel'no o 
oruzhiya'('On the latest improvements in Small Arms an '0 
vliyanii na taktiku tekhnicheskoy chasti vo enno o dela'('6n 
the Influence of Military materiel on Tactics') in w is he 
stressed that technology would influence tactics. See 
especially the latter in Voyenny zhurnal (Military Journal), 
6/1854, pp. 69-94. 
26. Meshcheryakov, p. 195, citing Dnevnik DA Milyutina (The 
Diary of DA Milyutin)(4 Vols. ed. PA Zayonchkovskiy, Lenin 
State Library, Moscow, 1947-503, Vol. 2, p. 218. 
27. For detailed analysis of the reasons for failure at Plevna, 
General H Langlois, Lessons from Two Recent Wars [The Russo- 
Turkish and South African Wars . Translated for the General Staff, War Office, from te French... (Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office (HMSO), London, 1909). 
28. VoprosY strategii i operati 
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Operational Art in Soviet Military writings, 1917-1940 , 
Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1965), including: MV Frunze, (1885- 
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book also includes a short survey of important writers on 
questions of strategy and o erational art and their works not 
included in the collection (pp. 736-52). 
29. Col. D Palevich, 'Kharakter i osobennosti sovremennoy 
vo n ', KVS, 21/1962, pp. 76-82. 
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30. Maj Gen K Bochkarev, '0 kharaktere i tipakh voyn 
sovremennoy epokhi', KVS, 1-171965, pp. 8-17. 
31. Col. Yu Vlasevich, 'Sovremenna a voyna i ekonomika', 
KVS, 12/1967, pp. 27-30. Vlasevich begins by noting the 
complexity of foreseeing ( redvidet') the characteristics 
of a war 'in contemporary conditions', and in the next 
sentence mentions the character of an 'impending 
war'(predstoyashchaya voyna). 
32. Lt Col V Kozlov, 'Kharakter i osobennosti sovremennoy 
voyny', KVS, 19/1969, pp. 72-78. 
33. Captain M Ruban, 'Moral'ny faktor v sovremennoy 
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PART 3. SOME VISIONS OF FUTURE WAR, CA. 1877-1977 
1. ARMIES OF MILLIONS: THE ROAD TO WORLD WAR I 
'We must exploit time and the speed of advance... 
It is essential that an army, moving into 
Turkey, should immediately deploy beyond the 
Balkans, not a weak detachment, but fully 
adequate forces for the rapid seizure of 
Constantinople. In other words, we now need 
to deploy not one, but two armies, as it were, 
one of which would concern itself with battle 
on this side of the Danube and the other - 
immediately after crossing, move directly on 
Constantinople, which would only be some 500 
versts [kilometres] before it, a distance which 
they would endeavour to cover in five or maybe 
four weeks, not being distracted from this 
aim by any secondary considerations, by 
guarding their rear, by the attack of 
fortresses, or even by large scale oper- 
ational battles [srazheniya] on the flanks. il 
General Obruchev's comments on the Russian plan for war 
against Turkey, made in March 1877, envisaged an army of 
100,000 to 120,000 men, fully equipped to capture a 
strongly fortified position, being hurled through the 
other army and directed at one, strategic or even grand 
strategic objective: Istanbul. 
2 In fact, the Russians 
only deployed a relatively 'weak detachment'; General 
Gurko's Forward Detachment, strong enough to attain a 
limited objective, the seizure of the Shipka Pass, but too 
weak to undertake the other, strategic tasks imposed on 
it. 3 General Obruchev's dynamic vision of Russian action 
in the impending war with Turkey was not fulfilled; the 
reality was but a pale shadow of the vision. Thus, the 
period under review opens with a dramatic reminder of the 
gap between theory and practice. 
By this time, it was apparent that a revolution in 
military affairs was occurring, although Russian military 
writers never used that phrase. The previous half century 
had seen the introduction of the telegraph, the railway, 
rifled muskets, rifled artillery and, later, breech 
loading small arms and artillery. They had also seen the 
175 
development of more scientific assessments of foreign 
military power, 4 and war games. 5 They clearly recognized 
that the previous half century, a timescale often 
mentioned, had seen major changes. 6 By 1876 it was 
obvious to Skugarevskiy, one of the most prescient and 
prolific writers, that 
'We are living in an age of transformation. 
The great wars of the beginning of the century 
created forms of action which lasted almost a 
whole half century. We learned them in school, 
practised them, and suddenly, it appears, it 
is necessary to change them completely, that 
the charact r of contemporary combat is 
different . 
During the 1870s, Russian military theorists and staff 
officers understandably devoted much attention to analysis 
of the 1866 Austro-Prussian and 1870 Franco-Prussian Wars. 
The basic principles of strategy, they concluded, had not 
changed much. Writing about the influence of the Battle 
of Königgratz (1866) on tactics, in 1872, Baykov dismissed 
it as of no special strategic interest, 
'The latest accomplishments in the omnipotent 
branches of technology, which have made the 
utilisation of strategic combinations significantly 
easier, have not also been able to change the basis 
of strategy itself, in fact, have scarcely changed 
it at all, since the main force in war has always 
been, is, and will always be, manpower strength, 
and the most important-task is the skilful 
direction of this force in the decisive direction 
and at the decisive moment... The future... can 
only produce more or less insignificant changes 
in relation to the past. i8 
The prevalent image of future war, which the recent 
European conflicts and some of the campaigns of the 
American Civil War(1861-65) supported, was described by 
Staff Captain Puzyrevskiy, 9 in 1873: 
'The general character of contemporary military 
action, as is well known, consists of a series 
of rapid marches and decisive [large] battles. '10 
The dominance of the railway in determining whether 
superior force would be available in the right place at 
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the right time was well understood, in Russia and abroad. 
Foreign articles were translated and taken to heart, 
'It is essential to devote all energies to 
mobilising with all possible speed, and con- 
centrating one's own armed forces, and acquiring 
numerical superiority over one's probable enemies, 
paralysing them by stupefaction (oshelomleni e), 
that is, by delivering a blow at that time, when 
he is still in the process of completing his 
strategic movement forward, and by seizing the most 1 important border points and pieces of territory... ' 
The need to prevent the enemy deploying, to paralyse his 
mobilisation, recurred as a theme in Russian writing about 
future war, not only up to World War I, but after it, up 
to World War II. The experience of World War I further 
highlighted the need to prevent the formation of a solid 
front. Up to World War I, this requirement in turn placed 
considerable emphasis on the 'strategic' role of 
cavalry, in keeping the enemy off balance, and keeping the 
front fluid. By the 1870s the Russians seem to have 
accepted that cavalry would seldom be used to best effect 
on the batttlefield itself, in face of modern firearms, 
but would have a major 'strategic' role, as evinced in the 
American Civil War. 12 Major Russian manoeuvres in 1876, 
declaredly modelled on American practice, involved the use 
of a 'flying column' to outflank the main enemy force and 
cut the railway feeding it. 
13 From now on, the roles of 
cavalry were agreed as itemised in the 1877 article which 
featured the terms 'contemporary' and future war': masking 
one's own region of concentration and strategic 
concentration; breaking the enemy's cavalry screed and 
disrupting corresponding operations by him; covering one's 
own communications; penetrating deep into the enemy 
deployment, cutting communications by destroying railways 
and telegraph lines; and reconnaissance * 
14 
The emphasis on large scale movements crowned by 
decisive battles at the strategic level did not preclude 
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defensive, and the importance of the spade as a tool of 
war. The immediate aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War saw 
an article by AN Kuropatkin, then a staff officer, later 
War Minister (see part 1), called 'Before Plevna(The 
Practice of Trench Warfare)'. 15 The use of the term 
'trench warfare' in 1878 is of interest, as is the 
profusion of articles on the need, demonstrated by the 
war, for new infantry tactics and for more open 
formations (razsypny stroy). 16 
The experience of the Russo-Turkish War was the basis 
for the Russian 1881 Field Service Regulations. By the 
end of the 1890s, these were looking distinctly 
outdated * 
17 
The greater size of armies, and the greater dispersion 
imposed by the new, more lethal weapons, meant that 
battles spread over a larger area. This process has 
continued up to the present day, and is illustrated 
graphically in figure 3.1. As befits this thesis, all 
the examples are from Russian and Soviet military 
experience: other nations' experience would show the same 
trend. 18 Conversely, new technology made command and 
control. of these larger and more dispersed forces 
possible, the confluence of 'historical necessity and 
scientific possibility' identified by Bogdanov (see part 
2.6). At the Battle of Avliyar-Aladzha, in 1877, the 
Russians conducted a wide encircling movement to attack 
the Turkish position in the rear, but the assault on the 
Turkish position itself spread over a 15 kilometre wide 
frontage. The telegraph was used to coordinate the 
assault: previously, it had been used for strategic 
control but not for detailed control of . forces in a 
battle. 19 
This process of expansion would eventually: lead to 
recognition of a new level of war between the traditional 
areas of tactics and strategy, the operational level. 
With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the 
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prevailing belief in 'swift marches' crowned by decisve 
battles: strategic movement to a tactical fight, was 
flawed. As, the Russo-Japanese and First World Wars showed, 
armies would be locked in combat over extended frontages 
and for long periods, and this led to a new level of 
warfare,, a problem addressed by Soviet military theorists 
in the 1920s(see below). 
Although Russian war planning remained principally 
concerned with Europe, and with Germany and Austria as 
adversaries, during this period there were at least three 
interesting examples of plans for war with another major 
power: the British in India. The possibility of war with, 
Britain breaking out in Central Asia was also the basis of, 
scenarios envisioned by Russian naval theorists (section 
3.3). General Skobelev(1843-82), hero of the Akhal-Tekke 
campaign (1880), authored a plan dated 1878 for an 
invasion of India. According to Sir George Clarke, the Secretary 
of the Committee, for ". -Imperial" Defence, -Skobelev's. plan, quoted 
.. directly, would '"organise hordes of Asiatic. horsemen who, to 
a cry of blood-and plunder,, might be launched against India as 
the vanguard, thus reviving the days of Timur. "'20 =Nevertheless, 
Sir George'-argued that, 
'reading between the lines it is clear that 
the author had some conception of the diff- 
iculties involved, and that in common with 
the projectors of all schemes for the invasion 
of India... he counted heavily on assist ice 
to be received in the invaded country. 
Reliance on assistance from the native population has 
been a characteristic of Soviet doctrine, notably in 
Finland and Afghanistan, but has proved excessively 
optimistic. 
A similar scheme for an advance into Afghanistan and on 
to India was formulated by AN Kuropatkin (1848-1925), a 
key figure in strategi. planning and long-term strategic 
forecasting(see part 1.3), in 1886. the British obtained 
a copy from 'a most secret source', and it was despatched 




d'affaires in Teheran. Kuropatkin considered that the 
possibility of war existed 'beyond any doubt'. The plan 
was worked out in much more detail than Skobelev's, and 
was clearly a realistic, professional plan to be 
implemented in the event of war. Kuropatkin considered 
that it was best to begin such an offensive 'in November, 
as the weather is healthier for the men and all the 
Russian ports will be frozen. 22 
A last indication of Russian views on future war with 
British India emerges from an ostensibly historical work, 
by Lieutenant General Kishmishev, published in 1889 by 
the Staff of the Caucasian Military District.. 
Kishmishev's Nadir Shah's Expeditions to Herat, Kandahar 
and India... analysed the routes to India in detail and 
especially Nadir Shah's exemplary capture of the-Khyber 
Pass in 1738. However, it was not illustrated, as one 
might expect, with historical maps but with up to date 
Russian General Staff maps, complete with railways. 23 
There can be little doubt that Kishmishev was drawing 
detailed and specific lessons for future operations 
against British India. 
During the 1880s there was a new technological 
development: the introduction of so-called 'smokeless, 
powder', in fact not powder at all but new propellants 
akin to those used today. 
24 Besides being virtually 
smokeless, which added to the already marked superiority 
of the concealed defender over the . attacker in the open, 
the new propellants permitted smaller calibres 
('malokalibernoye oruzhiye')and, being more powerful, gave 
the bullet a flatter trajectory making it lethal over a 
longer distance. Finally, smaller rounds permitted a 
magazine carrying several rounds, and permitted-the, 
soldier to carry more of them, increasing rate-of fire and 
ammunition expenditure. The great Russian scientist, 
Dmitry Mendeleyev, produced a smokeless propellant called 
pyrocollodion between 1887 and 1891. In the latter year 
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the rifle developed by Major General SI Mosin (1849-1902) 
was introduced, which remained in service with minor 
modifications for some sixty years. 25 Of all the rifles 
in use by the major powers at the outbreak of World War I, 
the Mosin M-1891 with its 7.62 millimetre calibre and high 
muzzle velocity was, in its resemblance to later rifles, 
the most 'futuristic'. 26 The small calibre rifle using 
smokeless powder was a major subject of analysis in the 
1890s. 27 
Of the Russian authors who addressed this issue, the 
most prominent, who proved to have the greatest potential 
was General NP Mikhnevich (1849-1927). Beskrovny 
characterizes him as 'the strongest (nayboleye 
krupnny)[Russian] military theorist of the early 20th 
century'. 28 Mikhnevich's Influence of the Latest 
Technological Inventions on Forces' Tactics (first 
published 1893, also published in 1898)29 concentrates 
principally on the effects of the improved small arms, and 
rather neglected the parallel, and potentially even more 
revolutionary improvements in artillery. Mikhnevich 
forecast that fighting formations would become shallower, 
and that rifle fire would increase in importance. Smaller 
detachments would act independently in the front line, and 
there would be greater distances between them, He 
reckoned, with grim realism, that there would be 50 
percent casualties among troops in the forward units, and 
proposed that this be taken into account when calculating 
the forces necessary for a given task. Because of the 
very flat trajectory of the the new, small calibre rifles, 
the distance between advancing lines would have to be 
increased, and troops within range of enemy small arms 
would have to move at the double at all times except when 
under cover(for centuries the normal mode, except in then 
final assault, had been to walk). 30 The preparatory 
period, or 'fire'fight', would be prolonged, and the new, 
long ranged artillery would be dispersed, but would-not 
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lose its ability to concentrate its fire on a given 
target, indicating that Mikhnevich recognized the 
possibilities created by evolving systems of indirect 
fire, discussed below. However, he thought it necessary 
to push the infantry forward rapidly, to protect the 
artillery. 31 
Mikhnevich then returned to the relationship between 
the attack and defence. Noting that 'smokeless powder' 
would enable thise under cover to remain relatively 
undetected, while exposing those in the open, who would 
not be shrouded by the smoke of battle, he saw that the 
attacker would haveýto make more careful use of ground. 
However, Mikhnevich argued that similar considerations had 
always applied to attack and defence, and that more 
powerful weapons would give the more mobile attacker the 
ability to concentrate fire on the defender once the 
latter had revealed his position. Thus, Mikhnevich 
concluded that the relationship between attack and defence 
would remain much as before. 32 Mikhnevich's vision of 
future warfare dominated by accurate rifle fire and 
advance in dispersed lines was accurately reflected, for 
example, in the tactics which the British evolved during 
and after the Boer War, and used in 1914. 
Similar conclusions were reached by the French General 
Langlois, writing in 1904. Improvements to the rifle 
increased the difficulties of frontal attack by infantry 
alone and gave an increased power of resistance to field 
fortifications. The same developments enhanced the value 
of the flanking or enveloping attack: the problem which 
emerged was that-incrmsed dispersion and increased numbers 
of troops clogged up the battlefield. The greater range 
of weapons would heighten the manoeuvering power of 
artillery, and other heavy weapons (machine guns): 
because of their range, they did not have to be right 'up 
front'. Langlois did in fact recognize that battle fronts 
would increase with the increased effective range of 
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weapons. 33 
The British Field Service Regulations of 1909 similarly 
recognized the front firing lines extending and the battle 
breaking up into a 'series of distinct engagements, each 
raging around a different. locality and'each possibly 
protracted over many hours'. 334 This did in fact occur, 
contributing to the emergence of the operational level: 
the individual engagements were tactical: the scheme that 
united them was not 'strategic', since it was purely 
military and involved a continuous front. It was a 
component of a strategic aim. 
The unseen factor was the artillery, 'the hurrying 
batteries beyond the masking hills'. 35 Artillery had 
utilised methods of indirect fire, -that 
is, fire at 
targets invisible. to the guns themselves, for centuries: 
the Russians had surprised the British with it at., 
Sevastopol. 36 Indirect fire for field artillery became a 
major issue after the Franco-Prussian War, because the new 
small arms and machine guns gave infantry a temporary 
ability to kill the exposed gunners at long range, whilst 
the artillery could not use its greatly increased range to 
the full while it was limited to the range of human 
eyesight and the visible horizon. This issue, largely 
ignored by military historians, and its implications for 
the Russian Army, has been the subject of published 
monographs by the author, included as Appendix G. 37 The 
Russian artillery fully understood the possibilities of 
indirect fire, and designed the new M-1900 field gun with 
an indirect fire sight, tested from 1896 and approved from 
1898 (see Appendix). Nevetheless, the, staggering potential 
of indirect fire to completely alter the picture of the 
battlefield, the 'kartina boya' ,a 
concept 
used by 
MilyutinJ38 appears t`a have been largely absent from the 
other arms' assessments. This may in part have been due 
to the technocratic tendencies of the Russian Artillery. 
It is noteworthy that in 1896, when the indirect fire 
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debate was at its peak in the artillery-arms of all the 
major European-powers, the Russian Artillery Journal waxed 
philosophical about the difficulties of forcing 
institutional acceptance of change. 
'A new idea is always pursued by more energetic 
people than is the old order and core principles 
... by the advocates of reform. This has a simple 
cause. The majority of people are directed from 
within: they follow habit (privychka), fashion 
(moda) and the established social opinion... to 
give this thought a different direction... in 
a word, is very difficult. It is even more 
difficult because, in order to get a new idea 
through, all one's strength of conviction is 
needed to reject that which this idea must 
replace. i30* 
The idea that artillery did not have to be able to see 
the target over open sights, but could conceal iself in' 
the sinuosities of the ground and fire on mathematical 
data, plus corrections passed by flags or telephone (or, 
later radio), was probably the most difficult idea to 
convert into an overall picture of the new, extended 
battlefield. As part 2 has noted, it is key example of 
paradigm change in military science. 
This leads naturally to the Russian work on future war 
most widely known to non-Russian and Soviet military 
specialists, Ivan Bliokh's Future War in its Technical, 
Economic and Political Relations, the final version of 
which appeared in 1898.40 Like many works that are widely 
cited, it appears to be little read, and the context in 
which it appeared and the influence it had understood even 
less. Ivan Stanislavovich Bliokh (1836-1901) was an 
eminent Warsaw economist, statistician and financier, and 
certainly did not write the entire work himself: it was 
the work of a 'collective', which"Bliokh initiated and 
directed. 41 As president of the Kiev, Brest, Libau and 
Lodz railways, Bliokh had supervised a major work on 
Russia's railways, published in 1875.42 He was no 
stranger to questions of economic.. planning, to which 
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military questions were obviously related. 
By the beginning of the 1890s Bliokh had begun to 
publish on the possible economic consequences of a future 
major European war. Based in Warsaw, which lay at the 
centre of the Russian Empire's salient sticking out 
between German and Austrian territory, Russia's 'sword 
arm, as Marx described it, an image of which Bliokh was 
also aware. 
43 Bliokh could not but be acutely sensitive to 
the possible effect of war on that city. Early research 
which developed into the final work was published in the 
journal Russkiy vestnik in 1893-94, and a work on the 
Economic Difficulties of Central European Countries in the 
Event of War was published in 1894.44 In 1893, the French 
Consul in Warsaw wrote to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
describing Bliokh's work. The siege-of Paris in 1870 had 
made him conscious of what might happen to a civilised 
metropolis suddenly besieged, and-that the authorities had 
not taken prudent measures. 
'L'auteur fait connaitre au debut les circonstances 
dans lesquelles il a ltd amend a entreprendre 
cette publ'cation. La guerre de 1870 dit-il, 
aIpresentd le seul exemple contemporaine de - 
1 investissement complet, ou ä peu pros complet, 
d'une grande capitale comptant une population 
nombreuse. Maleureusement le autorit4s ont 
marche toujours au hazard... ' 
5 
As with Paris, a siege would compound existing 
grievances: the Poles had rebelled against the Russians in 
1831 and 1863 and were regarded as 'antipathetic'. 
46 
Bliokh had therefore 
'a cet effet, institue, il ya uelques annL<es, 
une commission technique charg6e de lui 
soumettre un ensemble de mesures relatives a 
l'approvisionnement de la ville. La Chambre de 
Commerce, dont M , Bloch est president a dt6c 6galement appel'e It donner son avis, 
the 
was 
at that time abroad]... il a resume ses 
appreciations dans une notice sp6ciale . 
relative a la situation &onomique daps 
laquelle la ville de Varsovie pourrait 




The work which Bliokh directed is therefore an 
illustration of the need to see articles and passages in 
Russian and Soviet writing about future war in their 
proper operational, technological, documentary, 
institutional and even personal context. Absence of this 
has been a major flaw in much of the secondary work 
surrounding Future War.... It is-quite unacceptable to 
take descriptive passages about future war in isolation. 
Western historians are rightly impressed by the similarity 
of. the future war described in the work to certain aspects 
of the First World War which began sixteen years after 
publication of the full-study. Yet they frequently view it 
out of its social and documentary context. Clarke, for 
example, described. Bliokh as an 'amateur' and opined that 
'nobody will ever know what the Russian generals made of 
the book'. 47 The work directed by Bliokh, as 
demonstrated, evolved from a personal and professional 
concern with the fate of Warsaw in a major war, and was 
written with a further specific purpose in mind: to 
elicit support for the creation of a mechanism to resolve 
disputes by peaceful means. According to the entry in the 
last Imperial Russian Military Encyclopedia, Bliokh in 
fact obtained advice from the principal foreign General 
Staffs, and the Russian General Staff. 48 Bliokh had taken 
'all imaginable pains in order to master the 
literature of warfare, especially the most recent 
treatises upon military operations and the 
handling of armies and fleets which have been 
published by the leading military authorities... 
[He was] glad to know that there is not much 
difference of opinion as to the accuracy of my 
general c $clusions as to the nature of future 
warfare'. - 
This is even apparent from WT Stead's interview with 
Bliokh which prefaces the British edition. 
50 Bliokh's 
bibliography also reveals the most assiduous attention to 
informed writing by, contemporary military professionals. 
The. Bibliography in the Polish edition of the General 
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Conclusions... contains two works by Mikhnevich, -three by 
Dragomirov, five by Puzyrevskiy and six by Leyer, 51 and 
references to them appear frequently in the text. One of 
the most vivid descriptions of future land warfare in the 
text of the. General Conclusions is taken directly from a 
French Captain, Nigote. 52 
Clarke's ignorance of 'what the Russian generals made 
of the book' is surprising. When it was published, it was 
reviewed by at least two highly influential and very well 
known officers: Puzyrevskiy (located in the Warsaw 
Military District), and Dragomirov. 53 Dragomirov's 
reaction to the work was published in the quality 
military paper Razvedchik (Scout): Puzyrevskiy wrote a 
review for the Warsaw Daily, and this was also reprinted 
in Razvedchik. 54 Dragomirov was sarcastic in the 
extreme, 
'You would like to know my opinion on your works' 
on military affairs. Forgive me for being blunt, 
but it gave me the impression of a compilation 
which was painstaking and slow, and not always 
logical... In compiling your work you have expended 
(or used up), 1) a lot of your nervous energy, 
2) a mass of pen nibs, paper, writing and 
printer's ink;. 3) expended (that is, in relation 
to yourself, destroyed)a fair sum of money. And 
thus, as in all things creation invariably 
involves destruction; without destruction, 
creation is unthinkable, in whatever field. 'S5 
Dragomirov, a great exponent of the bayonet, was 
particularly, critical of the Bliokh study's comments, on 
the diminished role of cold steel in future war. 
56 
Puzyrevskiy's review contained many of the classic 
reactions of a military professional to work by a 
'civilian analysts', it is true, which have a decidedly 
modern ring. Indeed, the similarity to the reactions of 
the Soviet military to the current efforts of analysts 
working for ostensibly non-military, institutions (see part 
4) is striking. However, reviewers respected the Bliokh 
study's handling of the technical matter.. 
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'Why should it be'necessary for the author to 
expend such effort, time and means, on the 
study of purely military questions? To what 
degree can he count on being authoritative, 
being practically completely alien to military 
matters? What is the market for this work? ... [na kakikh chitatele razschitana eta rabota] 
pursuing a completely peaceful ere, this 
could be translated as pacifist aim, - 
universal disarmament and the solution of 
international disputes by a court of arbitration, 
the author relies, not only on the usual arguments, 
brought in to support this unfruitful aim, 
but also to show that the resolution of such' 
questions by arms in the presence of modern, 
colossal, peoples' armies, technologically 
sophisticated materiel and social relationships 
is impossible [sic. -nevozmozhno]... the 
honourable author has tried conscientiously but 
unfortunately, his work is deeply tendentious'. 
Sý 
As Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Military District from 
1890 to 1900,58 Puzyrevskiy should have known very well 
why the eminent financier and economist, a pillar of 
Warsaw society, had become interested in 'purely military 
questions'. The criticism would appear to suggest an 
element of professional and personal jealousy, and the 
possibility of anti-semitism playing apart cannot be 
excluded. Puzyrevskiy challenged some of Bliokh's 
technical conclusions, citing the evidence of the 
contemporary Spanish-American War. 
59 This was not totally 
persuasive: the Spanish-American conflict was the last 
'black powder war', and Bliokh was predicting what would 
happen in the'era of smokeless powder. A major conflict, 
the second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) which began the 
following year seems to have borne out many of, 
Bliokh'spredictions. 60 Another Russian reviewer was more 
specific; Bliokh's treatment of the military-technical 
component, the influence of weapons on tactics, was'not to 
be faulted, but only the human element 
'To study the technical part is not difficult, 
to determine. this or that effect of smokeless 
powder even a "non-specialist in military 
affairs"'can do. -.. but he cannot understand'' 
the essence of the matter, the aim and basis 
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of military art... Such understanding comes " 
only from love for the military profession. i61 
Nor need there be any dispute about the extent to which, 
Bliokh's ideas percolated into the Russian Army. A 
committee headed by the'war minister, then General 
Kuropatkin, reported to the Tsar that the book was useful 
and should be required reading for members of the Russian 
General Staff. 62 The work very rapidly achieved 'great 
popularity among the forces, in spite of its colossal 
size'(! )63 Therefore, to take the descriptive passages in 
L 
the study kisolation, to portray Bliokh as the amateur who 
got (some) things right when the professionals all got it 
wrong, is misleading and inaccurate. 
The complete 1898 Russian edition of Future 
War... comprises six fat tomes, magnificently illustrated, 
with pictures of military equipment, battles, graphs and- 
diagrams. The first volume contains most of the military- 
technical information. Beginning with a section called ' 
General Remarks on Fire', it deals with the then recently 
introduced smokeless propellants and high explosive 
bursting charges for shells, small arms, artillery and 
fortifications, the significance and role of cavalry, the 
action of infantry. and artillery in combat. It uses 
photographs from French manoeuvres, and depictions of the 
battles of Plevna and includes references to Mikhnevich's 
detailed analyses. 64 Volume two is entitled The Strength 
of European Armies. Preparation for and Declaration of 
War. It includes sections on the command of armies, 'On 
the Battlefield', 'Fortress warfare', 'The State and 
Morale of Armies', and 'War Plans'. It deals with 
specific future war scenarios, once again using a mass of 
professional literature, for example some 18 German works 
on the character of a future German-Austrian-Russian 
war. 
65 Volume three covers the future of war 
at sea. Volume four deals with the economic 
difficulties which would arise in war and is accompanied 
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by a separate volume of graphs. Volume Five is entitled A 
Peaceful Way of Solving`International Disputes and covers 
socialism, anarchism and anti-militarist propaganda, 
losses, casualties and medical factors including 
photographs illustrating the effect of bullets on live 
targets. Volume six, the General Conclusions, gives a 
broad overview of how Bliokh and his associates believed 
war would be waged. The smokeless battlefield, the 
perfection of rifles, artillery and explosives would all 
influence the nature of warfare, and so would the 
employment of massed armies. 
The General Conclusions contain marginal references to 
the earlier more detailed volumes. The authors noted the 
increased size of the future battlefield and the problems 
which this would pose for command and control. Europe had 
no generals experienced in leading armies of the size now 
available, and the most agile mind would not be able to 
embrace and combine all the details, requirements and 
circumstances present on the immense battlefield. 
66 The 
same problem affected junior commanders. One French 
authority is cited, who opined that immense skill would be 
needed to command infantry on the battlefield. In no army 
would 100 officers fit to lead a company under fire be 
found in every 5000(the English edition gives 500, an 
error). 
67 The nature of the future battlefield is 
described with great accuracy, acknowleging the debt to 
the military writers consulted: 
'Sheltered behind such works [trenches] and 
in a position to devote all their energy to 
fire against the enemy, the defenders will, 
sustain comparatively light losses... the 
war of the future will consist primarily of 
a series of battles for possession of fortified 
positions. In addition to field, fortifications 
of various kinds, the attacking army will have 
to deal with auxiliary obstacles which will be 
met with in the neighbourhood of fortifications, 
that is, in the very position'where they will 
be subjected. to the greatest danger from the 
enemy's fire, obstructions formed of beams, 
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networks of wire, and pitfalls. To overcome 
-these obstacles, great sacrifices must 
be made. 
68 
The General Conclusions describe 'huge hordes' 
(gromadnye polchishcha) equipped with completely new 
explosives of terrible power, and firearms with 
incomparably greater range and lethality than before: 
69 
The general kartina boya - picture of the battlefield - 
has left an indelible mark on historiography, and it. is 
understandable that the inaccurate predictions should have 
been overshadowed by the general similarity of what is 
described to the actual appearance of World war I: 
'The huge extent of the theatre of war, the 
vastness of the battlefield, the difficulty 
of attacking trenches, various obstacles and 
fortifications, and also natural cover, which., 
soldiers are now taught to utilise and which 
will inevitably utilised in view of the terrible 
power of fire, will make massed attacks against 
one another impossible, and by the same token 
attacks with the bayonet... finally, the 
protracted nature of battles(prodolzhitel'nost' 
an , bitv), which may last for several days 
due to the impossibility of pursuit, yield 
no decisive results: all these things are 
new circumstances (obstoyatel'stva noviya). 
70 
The point about the impossibility of pursuit was 
perceptive, in view of the problem First World War armies 
found in exploiting a breakthrough. In both Russo- 
Japanese and First World Wars, armies could maul each 
other horribly but generally fell back intact 
as 
organizations, mirroring another comment from Future 
War... 'in these circumstances only a greater or lesser 
degree of mutual annihilation will take place, without 
decisive result'. 
71 Armies could fall back along 
communication still intact far faster than one which had 
achieved some success could advance over shattered terrain 
and communications. 
72 The study was also correct to 
forecast the end of massed bayonet attacks. In spite of 
the persistent, fascination with cold steel, the bayonet 
accounted for only 3 percent of Russian casualties in the 
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1877-78 Russo-Turkish War and 0.3 percent of British 
casualties on the western front in the Great War. 73 
The study also appreciated the cardinal role of 
communications and intelligence. Bicycles, carrier 
pigeons, field telegraphs and telephones, apparatus. for 
signalling by day and night, photography, watch towers and 
balloons, would 'all do away of that insufficiency of , 
information which formerly prevented united and successful 
operations' 0 
74 
Although completed only five years before the first 
flight of a heavier than air machine, there is no allusion 
to the possibility of the heavier than air aircraft, 
although dirigibles were highly developed (the problem of 
predicting the developmentof basic technology itself: see 
part 2). It was the aeroplane that proved the most 
versatile, effective and feared instrument of 
reconnaissance at the beginning of the Great War. 
75 Nor is 
there a direct suggestion that the internal combustion 
engine might be used to carry armour. In volume 1, the 
compiler(s) ask 'might we not see people going into battle 
in future war v pantsyryakh - encased in armour, like 
medieval knights'. 76 There are pictures of mobile wheeled 
shields, 
77 but their inconvenience -neudobstvo - was 
noted. There appears to have been no attempt to link 
these with the possibilities of mechanical traction, 
although the use of cars and trucks to carry men and 
supplies up'to the front is suggested. 
78 
This brings us to Future War... 's greatest omission with 
regard to the true character of the battlefield in the, 
next war: the lack of appreciation of the effect of the 
indirect fire techniques being discussed in all Europe's 
artillery journals during the 1890s (see Appendix F). In 
the section on artillery in Part 1, the compiler(s) 
alluded to Martynov's 1894 work Strategy... 79, -, =In future 
warfare, artillery would have an effect equivalent to- 
small arms fire at between 1000 and 2,400 metres, and came 
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into its own at ranges beyond that. But how was it to 
utilise this range? The compiler was aware of the 
possibility of 'the use of artificial aiming points(fire 
at targets invisible to the layer)'. 80 However, this was 
noted with concern as it would make 'fire over the heads 
of one's own troops very dangerous'. 81 
When Future War... was being written, field guns had 
maximum ranges of up to seven kilometres, permitting their 
deployment in what was considered great depth at the time, - 
but the connection that the only solution to the various 
problems would be the general adoption of indirect fire 
was not made. The compiler was aware that infantry's 
adoption of entrenchments would mean that the conduct of 
the battle would devolve on the artillery to a large 
extent, 82 and he described counter-bombardment, the 
artillery of both sides indulging in mutual 
annihilation. 83 There is, however, no suggestion as to how 
the enemy artillery (which would probably be invisible, or 
nearly so), was to be located, of the complex problems of 
mapping, target location and acquisition which the general 
adoption of indirect fire would create. Although indirect 
fire techniques are mentioned, in painting the battle 
picture, the compilers of Future War... seem to have 
envisaged only direct fire, with artillery in exposed 
positions. 
The compilers concluded that fortresses would exercise 
an 'unprecedented influence' in a future war, a view which 
the fortress engineers of the time certainly encouraged. 
84 
The debate as to the value of permanent fortifications 
raged after the fall of Port Arthur, and continued to do 
so throughout World War I. However, although some wrong 
conclusions were undoubtedly drawn, the experience of 
World War I bears out the compilers' emphasis on the 
significance of fortresses. One may cite the role of : the: 
Belgian Forts in the opening campaign in the west in 1914, 
inflicting critical delay on the Germans; the'French use 
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of their forces as a mobilisation screen; the Germans`use 
of Konigsberg to launch their offensive across the Neman, 
the Austrians' use of Cracow as a base of operations; the 
siege, capture and re-capture of Przemysl during'1914-15, 
and the 'worst' battle of the war, that which raged 
around the fortress system of Verdun. 85 The question of 
fortresses has renewed relevance today, in the light of 
Soviet declarations of a defensive strategy and the role 
of strong points (see part 4). 
The views expressed on the employment of cavalry concur 
with those of the professional military writers. Cavalry 
detachments would be launched deep into enemy country, to 
impede mobilisation and concentration, and also to destroy 
means of communication, storehouses and so on. These 
cavalry deep strikes would naturally have an impact on the 
civilian population (and possibly the government, as 
Pilsudski found with Bud6nny' deep raid in the 1920 Soviet 
Polish War). 86 
In the same year as Future War... 's final publication, 
1898, a major work on 'Cavalry in Contemporary Wars' by 
Fedor Gershel'man was published in Voyenny sbornik, which 
supported the Bliokh study's observations on cavalry and 
is of particular in terms of future war in general. Three 
principal new factors affecting warfare were identified: 
demographic - more numerous forces; the superiority of 
modern firearms making combat (the tactical battle) more 
complex; and railways. 
87 
The seminal work to which many authors turned was GA 
Leyer's Strategy. Leyer (1829-1904) had served in the 
Caucasian Wars of 1817-64( a prolonged conflict which 
contains many precedents for current'Soviet security 
concerns: see part 4), and had been a professor at the 
General Staff Academy since 1865, which he headed from 
1889 to 1898.88 Much of Leyer's work was concerned with 
the development of - the' methodology of the military 
sciences, with particular stress on the value of military 
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history, rather than painting a specific picture of what 
future war might look like. 89 
In his final work, published in three parts in 1898, 
Leyer described, Major operations , principallya treatise 
emphasizing the importance of operational lines, 
preparatory operations (Bases, concentration of forces and 
supplies) and, thirdly, special operations: steppe and 
mountain operations (an interesting distinction based on 
19th century Russian experience), and mixed operations: 
naval, coastal and riverine. He conceived in embryo the 
idea of the operation as a 'combination of separate 
manoeuvres and individual actions, linked by a general 
idea and a general aim'. This new idea did not meld easily 
with his concept of operational lines, or his emphasis on 
eternal and unchanging principles. 90 This definition 
presaged that devised by Svechin in the Soviet period (see 
below). He also developed the idea of the strategic 
reserve and the interrelationship between politics and 
strategy: as tactics were directed by strategy, so 
strategy was directed by politics-91 Leyer dominated the 
theoretical basis of Russian military thought for nearly 
half a century,, although not everyone agreed with him, - 
particularly Puzyrevskiy and Petrov. Leyer's work was 
highly esoteric, and is not as popular with Soviet 
historians as Mikhnevich and, a generation younger, 
Neznamov (1872-1928), but his Strategy... was exhaustively 
cited at the time, by-Bliokh and Gershel'man, for 
example. 
92 
In painting the general picture of future warfare on 
land, Gershel'man cited Leyer's view that there would 
probably be a million combatants (1.2 million with 
associated non-combatants), in a given theatre,, split into 
perhaps five separate"\armies of 150,000 to 200,000_each 
divided into five corps. The image of the expanding 
battlefield wasýutilised:, in Napoleonic, times, a 200,000 
strong army might advance on a 100 or 200 kilometre front; 
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by 1815, half a million men over 400 kilometres. Now, a 
million strong army (a popular image) would advance over 
an 800 to 1,000 kilometre- front (a view also cited by 
Bliokh). 93 Whereas in the 1870s the idea of swift 
marches and decisive battles (see above) had been 
dominant, Gershel'man now believed (correctly) that future 
armies would be less mobile, less flexible. This was 
'Evident in itself and fully supported by the 
experience of military history. In particular, 
the movement of armies, their concentration, will 
require [potrebuyet - perfective case] more 
time, every wrong direction, every mistake, 
will take longer to correct, in a word, there 
will be a certain slowing dow94in the development 
of all strategic operations. ' 
Armies with the new weapons would be more dependent than 
ever on supply from the rear, 95. a view repeated later with 
additional emphasis on the increased significance of 
railways, as an introduction to the potential value of 
cavalry. 96 Combat (the tactical level) would also take 
place over 'a huge extent': several tens of kilometres, a 
correct conclusion, as figure 3.1 illustrates, with the 
'hurling in' of 'gigantic masses'. 97 Direct control of 
individual operations by the commander-in-chief would be 
impossible, another point where the Bliokh study concurred 
with the professionals. 98 Gershel'man envisaged deep 
penetrating cavalry capturing senior military, officers and 
civilian officials and their subordinate staffs, linked 
with the aim'of disrupting the civil government also 
suggested in the Bliokh study. 99 A final perceptive 
general point was that large armies of short-service 
conscripts and reservists would be far more aware of 
political ideas, and the army's. morale would depend more 
and more on the morale of the populace as a whole. 100 
In the light of this overall slowing-up of operations, 
the increasingly cumbersome and lethargic movement of 
increasing masses, cavalry was seen as the arm 'best able 
to save time and space'. 101 The value of its special 
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mobility would be enhanced. Against this background, the 
author then reiterated the familiar missions of cavalry, 
unchanged since the 1870s: to cover mobilization and 
concentration in the theatre of war; to seize important 
points in frontier areas; reconnaissance, and impeding the 
enemy's mobilisation and concentration. 102 These were, 
virtually word for word, the missions enumerated in the. 
1877 article and the Bliokh study (see above). 
Nor were these views inaccurate. They were certainly 
not unreasonable for 1898. A decade later, there were 
those who considered that air reconnaissance and the 
wireless would make it easier to spot cavalry movements 
and report them, so that infantry detachments could be 
rushed by car or bicycle to head them off. 103 
Interestingly, these writers saw the aeroplane and the' 
petrol engine as, only working against the deep 
penetrating, manoeuvre force:, in fact, they would 
ultimately give it a new and more violent lease of life, 
an illustration of the danger of one-sided analysis of the 
effect of new technology on warfare. 
The cavalry missions described in'these official and 
unofficial works presage pre-emptive strikes by-mechanized 
forces against a partially deployed enemy and the 'advance 
guard, echelon' of the 1930s, (see below). Cavalry played 
an important part in the opening manoeuvre phase of World 
War I, and remained the principal arm of exploitation 
available throughout it. As late as 1917-18, it was 
believed that a decisive breakthrough of the German 
continuous front in the west would have to be 
energetically exploited by cavalry, to stop the Germans 
destroying the railways which would enable the follow-6n 
forces to advance. 104 
Gershel'man's view that armies would be less mobile 
and less flexible reflected a debate that had begun 
earlier in the 1890s. 'It was the subject of an exchange 
between A Petrov and Captain EA Martynov in 1894. 
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Martynov's book Sttegy in the Age of Napoleon I and-in our 
Time, (extracts in Appendix B) addressed this theme, which 
had occupied German theorists, notably von der Goltz, for 
some time. Martynov concluded that the mass army would 
bring about a decline in Military Art. The art of 
strategy had declined, as its 'higher, creative side' had 
become 'more and more subordinated to tehnology'. In the 
present situation, it was 'impossible to attain the 
previous artistry in operations'. 105 In an, article called 
'Tasks of Modern Strategy (with regard to Captain 
Martynov's Work "Strategy"'), Petrov compared the 
development of warfare to the development of industry. 
where fewer, but more highly skilled workers were 
employed. 106 He dismissed Martynov's conclusions about the 
effect of mass armies, citing ancient statistics numbering 
armies in hundreds of thousands (which were, it is now 
generally acknowledged, completely unreliable), 107 and the 
half million engaged on both sides, at the 'Battle of the 
Nations' at Leipzig in 1813. In comparison, the armies of 
1866 appeared quite streamlined. 108 
'Therefore, one cannot affirm that in future 
wars million-strong armies will operate, the 
more so, since such armies in the strategic 
sense will rapidly become a burden [bremya] 
for. the- commander,, because of superfluous 
mass, hindering his operations, riveting 
him to railway lines, ... creating quantity instead of quality. In opposition to that, 
one could argue, that in-future economic 
causes will lead to 'fatal necessity' reducing 
the size of armies, especially-in-peace 
time... according to all the facts, both 
strategic, and economic, masses must, 
1109 be reduced and their quality increased. 
Martynov responded with 'a few words in Explanation and 
Development' ofýhis work. Mass armies existed, and (like 
nuclear weapons at the time of writing), -could not be 
disinvented. Nations were not interested 'in the purity 
of strategic [military]ýart, 'but in military success', and 
a return to small professional armies. was, 'completely 
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impossible. '110 The same issue was explored in Britain by 
HG Wells in War and Common Sense (1913) and The War that 
will end War (1914), and remained an issue during World 
War 1.111 An article published in the quality daily 
Russian Gazette , at New Year, 1915, noted the opposing 
forces. at work in modern war: increasing mass, which 
should. logically lead to greater densities in order to 
enable the commander to retain control, and modern 
weaponry, which required more and more open formations and 
greater individual initiative. 112 The conclusion of this 
heated debate was summarised in an 1898 article by 
Mikhnevich on whether, or not million-strong armies would 
be deployed, 113 and in Mikhnevich's seminal. two volume 
Strategiya (Strategy),, published in three editions (St 
Petersburg, 1899-1911). 114 Mikhnevich made a remarkably 
bol. prediction of the appearance of future war, 
and sensed the cardinal role of technology (herein. 
and that it might restore the balance in favour of the 
commander's exercise of operational and strategic skill. 
'With the widespread use of field fortification, ' 
in connexion with long-range rapid-firing weapons 
and huge deployed masses, combat, as in the 
American war (1861-1865) will last 2 to 3 days; 
Therefore, having available in the rear a railway 
network well equipped for military movements, 
it may be possible to bring along them a 
significant mass of forces (a strategic reserve) 
to a given [selected] sector of the front, and 
with it the commander will create that evenement 
(historical event), of which Napoleon spoke... 
New, powerful factors - electricity and steam, 
which have increased the contemporary army to 
colossal dimensions, can increa the power of 
the commander correspondingly. 
115 
The full implications of these discussions can only be 
seen with hindsight: the participants cannot have had any 
idea how their words-would come true. Martynov's view of 
the deadening effect of massive armies colliding like 
rams, of the constricting dependence on railways, of 
logistics dominating strategy,, and equally, wooden 
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generalship, was certainly reflected in the much of the 
character of World War I. Petrov's view, that smaller, 
higher quality armies would evolve, corresponding to the 
evolution of industry, would become popular among military 
thinkers in the 1920s and 30s, and may at last be realised 
in the post reduction environment of the 1990s. 
Mikhnevich inadvertently described the deliberate 
selection of a portion of the front for an offensive, and 
the laborious deployment of troops and supplies for it 
which came to characterize both fronts in World war I. 
However, his instinct about technology, and its ability to 
affect both sides of the equation was perhaps vindicated 
in World War II, by the command, control, communications 
and intelligence opportunities provided by radio, radar 
and Ultra, and by renewed battlefield mobility provided by 
petrol and diesel, rather than steam. 
The 1890s certainly evinced a lively interest in 
technology. An article in Voyenny sbornik in 1900 
appeared suitably futuristic: the new French monorail 
system, and its possible use in military operations. 
116 
The events of the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War arguably 
reflected these visions"of future war. Kuropatkin, the 
Russian Commander-in-Chief, appears to have endeavoured to 
bring the Japanese to a decisive 'battle of annihilation', 
as envisaged in the 1870s, but the size of the armies 
involved and the extension of the battlefield precluded 
this. Kuropatkin's gradual withdrawal northwards, along 
the artery of the Dal'ny/Port Arthur -Telissu - Tashihchao 
-Liao Yang - Mukden railway line was a, 
perfect reflection of Martynov's image: an inflexible dead 
weight riveted to a railway line. In the Battle of 
Mukden, the battle lines extended over a front of 155 
kilometres, and the battle occupied an area 80 kilometres 
deep. Over half a million men were involved on both 
sides. Bliokh had forecast battles lasting several days: 
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Figure 3.2. Mass army on the march (Mikhnevich). 
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CC = corps cavalry 
FC = forward cavalry 
Armies are shown with Roman numerals. Each comprises five corps, 
so armies II to IV comprise corps numbers 6 to 20. 
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nearly three weeks, from 6(19)'February 1905 to 25 
February(10 March). 117 Although Marshal Oyama attempted 
an envelopment, the Russians were able to extricate 
themselves and withdraw northwards. 
The problems of handling the millioned armies of'the 
future continued'to preoccupy Russian thinkers up to 
World War I. Given the inflexibility of mass armies, it 
was essential that they coalesced in the right place-and 
at the right angle, ready to roll into'battle. This was 
seen as a development of Napoleon and Moltke's practice 
of concentrating their armies on the field of battle. 
Moltke referred to the latter as 'the highest thing which 
strategic [operational, in the modern sense] command can 
achieve. 118 Mikhnevich continued to work on the 
assumption that individual armies would comprise 150,000 
to 200,000 men, divided into five corps, reflecting 
Napoleon's view that the span of control of a commander at 
any level was limited to five subordinate levels, .a view 
still generally accepted. 119 The millionary army (army 
group) envisioned by Mikhnevich comprised five independent 
armies, and would occupy an area of 150 kilometres breadth 
and 220 kilometres depth as it moved (see figure-3.2). 120 
The critical unfolding into battle from the configuration 
used for movement was known as the 'march-manoeuvre',, 
defined by Mikhnevich as 'the grouping of Army Corps 
during movement', which depended both on the conditions in 
which movement took place and the 'desired first 
objective' (presleduyemaya blizhayshaya tsel'). 121 The 
concept of the march-manoeuvre was cardinal, and the term 
remained in use in Polish, to describe World War II 
battles, until at least the late 1950s. 122 
Aleksandr Neznamov, a Lieutenant Colonel on the Staff 
of the General Staff Academy, also devoted much attention 
to this problem. Between the Russo-Japanese and First 
World Wars, he lectured at the General Staff Academy where 
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his students included Shaposhnikov (1882-1945), who 
graduated in 1910 and later headed the Soviet General 
Staff. 123 In Contemporary War: the Action of Field Armies 
(1912), Neznamov enunciated many of the terms associated 
with modern Soviet-military writing. 
124 Having defined the 
'objective of operations' as the enemy army, Neznamov 
referred to the 'first immediate objective'. Whereas the 
aim of the first operation should be established by the 
war plan, the first immediate objective could only be 
decided by the commander on the spot. 
125 This was the 
same distinction that Mikhnevich had made between the war 
plan and the plan of campaign. Neznamov'then discussed 
the meeting operation (vstrechnoye operatsiya), and the 
movement of forces to the theatre of military operations 
(teatr voyennykh deystvii), both modern Soviet terms. He 
cited the eminent German authority, General Dr Hugo von 
Freytag-Loringhoven (who began his career in the Russian 
Army), on methods by which an army can switch its 
"direction rapidly in close proximity to the enemy. 
Neznamov was a keen student and analyst of German 
authorities, immediately before World War I, both Freytag 
and Schlichting. 
126 
Neznamov used the term srazheniye to mean a battle at 
what we would now call the. operational level (see below), 
as opposed to a tactical battle or combat (boy), exactly 
as in modern Soviet terminology. Until the appearance of 
the modern concept of the operation,, the prazhen y. 2, or 
major battle, was the principal form of action, and 
objective, of armies. 
127 Neznamov's concept'of warfare 
differed somewhat from the modern Soviet one, in that he 
saw every operation-leading to a srazheniye, whereas the 
modern operation is itself ,a continuous battle, and need 
not culminate in a separately identifiable great battle. 
Neznamov dealt with the operational meeting engagements 
(vstrechnoye srazheniye), which he defined as any 
engagement which unfolded simultaneously with deployment, 
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and the offensive against an enemy deployed in 
position. 
128 
The latter was seen in terms of the advance of several 
columns, which might be divisions within a corps or corps 
within an army. Having the advantage of position, the 
enemy could, afford to deploy fairly thinly, leaving a 
large mobile reserve to deal with outflanking movements. 
This was also envisaged in the Field Service Regulations 
of the other major European powers. 
129 Frontal assault was 
always difficult and against an enemy in a prepared 
position, was 'all the more unlikely to succeed'. 
130 
Therefore, a decision 'had to be sought on the flanks'. 131 
It is perhaps ironic that professional military 
thinkers before World War I were so convinced that frontal 
assault was futile that they did not address its conduct. 
Therefore, commanders were totally unprepared when, two 
years after Neznamov wrote, they found themselves without 
the option of doing anything else. The mass armies 
envisaged by the pre-war writers spread across the entire 
landscape, leaving commanders with no elbow room for 
manoeuvre at all. This was not as much of a problem for 
the Russians as it was in the west, but positional warfare 
nevertheless set in on the Eastern Front about a year 
after it had in the west. 
132 The solution, paradoxically, 
lay in smaller scale manoeuvre within the tactical zone: 
for example, the intricate tactical combinations, and 
especially the infantry-artillery cooperation practised 
by the Germans and Austro-Hungarians in 1915, by 
Brusilov's forces in-1916, by the Germans in March 
1918.133 The decisive level became that of tactics, and 
not of operational art. However, the assiduous work to 
restore tactical manoeuvre was not accompanied by parallel 
efforts to maintain oparational manoeuvre, so when a 
breakthrough was accomplished, attempts at exploitation 
faltered rapidly. 134 When robust and reliable armoured and 






Figure 3.3. Operational level envelopment (Neznamov) 
FF = fortified front 
MR = mobile reserve 
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level once again became the operational. 
Returning to 1912, Neznamov still envisaged the 
possibility of envelopment. Neznamov's illustration of 
his grandiose but simplified vision of the operational 
battle is reproduced in figure 3.3. This involved 
strengthening one flank of the forces engaging the enemy 
main line, in order to draw in the enemy's mobile reserve, 
and then a wide outflanking movement by the attacker's 
manoeuvre force. Even if the defender's mobile reserve 
was not completely sucked into battle', this would at least 
shorten the distance which the enveloping force had to 
cover. 135 
Neznamov's War Plan, published in 1913, contains many 
kernels of truth on which the Soviet view of future war 
would expand. The main part of the work begins with a 
quotation from the German, Bernhardi, also author of a 
work on Future War, embodying the need for a cerebral 
approach and foresight: 
'War is not only a clash of material and moral 
forces, but also of mental (umstvennye) ones. 
Apart from the mind's significance for 
employing material resources (sredstva), 
a correct evaluation of the situation and 
foresight, well thought cough. will confer 
an undoubted advantage. ' 
Neznamov cited Mikhnevich, who began his evaluation of 
war with a section on the 'character of an impending 
(predstoyashchaya) war', and then began his own section on 
the 'character of the war'. 137 All military preparations 
were directed towards one aim: 'to guarantee victory in a 
general engagement(v general'nom srazhenii'). 
138 Only the 
offensive could defeat, beat down or destroy the enemy: 
the defensive could only beat him off, and gain time. It 
was not sufficient to have a general superiority in 
numbers over the enemy; one had to be able to attain 
superiority at the decisive place (the frontier) in a 
given time (not later than the time when the enemy was 
ready to attack). 139 Neznamov's fighting talk contained 
207 
many of the characteristics of Soviet military thinking 
since. Turning to specific considerations affecting 
Russia (which would apply equally to the Soviet Union), 
Neznamov wrote, with lavish use of italics: 
'A state with huge territory, a comparatively 
weak railway network, a long land frontier and 
a variegated [multi-national] population, even 
disregarding questions about the need to deploy 
forces on several fronts, by its very scale is 
precluded from completing its mobilisation and 
deploying forces to the frontier as rapidly as 
a smaller state, with a homogeneous population. 
These states are physically incapable, as it 
were, of putting forces equal to the enemy's 
into the field in a given time. 
They are thus temporarily not read for 
decisive action. They, in the interim (poka), 
are in no position to do all tat t ey would 
like to and could do, and7or them, once again, 
temporarily, it is necesary to postpone the decision. 
Temporarily weaker in the given circumstances 
they do not shrin from the o ensive: they thirst 
for it, but, temporarily unready for it, they 
wait and take measures to merely slow down and 
limit the enemy's successes. 
This state turns to the strate is defence 
which must be reviewed, as a continuation o 
preparation for the decisive battle which as 
not been completed in peace time. LNeznamov 
refers to part 1o his Strategy-, 1909]. 
Thus, for a state, for whom the necessary 
strength sredstva bor a, is, generally 
speaking, attainable, military preparati6ns 
must have one (single) aim - victory in a decisive engagement. 
Those, who, through weakness, cannot wage war 
with the hope of defeating the enemy, either 
run to allies, or do not proceed from a wide 
political horizon and takelp8 part in the 
solution of world issues. 
Neznamov concurred with Clausewitz in viewing war as an 
extension of politics, a view manifested most literally. 
His apparent contempt for smaller states and his clinical 
view of large scale warfare as a first division contest in 
which states chose to engage, or were relegated in 
humiliating fashion to the sidelines, appears outdated, 
Darwinian, almost callous. But he was a realist, and the 
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discussion of the strategic defensive as buying time in 
order to complete preparations unfinished before the 
outbreak of war is a vivid description of the 'first 
period' of the Great Patriotic War. It is also of 
cardinal interest today, in the light of the Soviet 
Union's renewed stress on the strategic defensive. 
Neznamov's work continued with a section on sily i 
sredstva: 'forces and equipment', or men and mat4riel, a 
modern Soviet term. 141 He then addressed the strategic 
deployment of armies, including the distribution of forces 
to, and within, different theatres of war, logistics, the 
role of forces, training and so on. 142, 
Military writers like Gershel'man had understood the 
need to seize political and economic centres as well as 
destroying the enemy's armed forces. Mikhnevich understood 
the term 'strategic rear' in the widest sense, embracing. 
the entire country. 143 Although a view that a future war 
would be relatively short and fast moving seems to have 
prevailed in the rest of Europe, Mikhnevich, who was Chief 
of the Russian General Staff from 1911 and Bliokh, whose 
work was, as noted, influential, both believed that it 
might be protracted. Mikhnevich believed that more than 
one campaign would be required, each of which would 
comprise several engagements (srazheniya) and smaller 
battles. First echelon ('first, line')armies which were 
destroyed would be replaced by second echelon armies. 
144 
Protracted war would, in turn, have more of an effect on 
the country, a view enunciated by Mikhnevich and another 
Russian military professional, Gulevich. Modern mass 
armies and trained reserves would, Gulevich argued, mean 
that 
'we should expect, not the rapid conclusion of a 
future war with colossal blows on the battlefields 
but, on the contrary, -a long, bitter and prolonged struggle (dol gaya, upornaya i prodolzhitel'naya bor'ba). And 
therefore the quest on ote material resources for 
waging war for what may be a prolonged period, 
possessed by each side, now acquires especially 
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great significance'. 145 . -. 
The Bliokh study had also noted the possible reaction of 
the nation's populace as a whole. Mass conscript armies 
and heavy casualties, would mean that every family would be 
involved to some extent. Military disasters would elicit 
the protests, the groans, of the population as a"whole. In 
addition to the extent of involvement, modern Europans 
were 'much more excitable and sensitive' than their 
forefathers, something even truer today than it was in 
1914.146 The Bliokh study also noted the complex 
structure of international credit and trade, which was 
likely to make war impossibly inconvenient. This factor 
was also analysed by the British pacifist Norman 
Angell, 147 but the view was not confined to pacifists. 
The German strategist Schlieffen, the very incarnation of 
German militarism, had also believed that a prolonged war 
was impossible, because of nations' dependence on unbroken 
international trade and the development of industry. 'A 
strategy of exhaustion is unthinkable', wrote Schlieffen, 
in his famous study Cannae. 148 Therefore, you had to 
deliver the knock-out blow quickly. The same views of the 
character of future war could serve widely differing 
political and professional purposes. 
It was in its appraisal of the 'strategic rear', of the 
nation's entire war making potential, that the Bliokh 
study had taade its greatest error. An agricultural 
nation, like Russia, would, it assessed withstand the 
strain of war better than the more industrialised, 
urbanized nations. In fact, Russia cracked first. 149 
Once again, this was not an opinion peculiar to Bliokh and 
his team. It was promoted by Gulevich, in his book War 
and the Economy, published in the same year as the final 
Bliokh study, 1898. The two works were therefore in 
preparation concurrently, and Svechin believed that the 
Bliokh study had 'borrowed' or 'adopted'(zaimstvoval) this 
erroneous thought' from Gulevich. 150 
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The effect of a major war on Russian society was 
predicted more accurately by PN Durnovo, at first an 
Assistant, then an Acting Minister of the Interior, and 
finally Minister. 151 There was certainly no shortage of 
men in senior and influential positions who predicted the 
character and consequences of the coming war with 
remarkable accuracy. Durnovo had been chief of-the 
Russian State police force (the equivalent of the modern 
MVD) from 1884 to 1893 and had been responsible for 
suppressing the 1905 Revolution. 152 The interest of an 
Interior Ministry official in the likely consequences of a 
future inter-state war underlines the integrated nature of 
internal and external security questions, which is of 
particular importance today (see part 4). Svechin's 
Strategy, published in 1927, noted Durnovo's views in his 
section on 'The Plan for Preserving Internal Security'. 
According to Svechin, Durnovo, had 
'come to the completely correct conclusion, that 
internal political considerations must hold Russia 
back from the decision to enter war, as the latter 
could only result in the most extreme movements and 
in revolution, taking it to its logical conclusion. '153 
In February 1914 Durnovo presented a report to the Tsar 
discussing Russia's international position. The addition 
of Britain to the Franco-Russian alliance had, he 
believed, been a mistake. Allied only with France, Russia 
could remain on friendly terms with Germany, but the 
addition of Britain would turn Germany violently against 
her. Durnovo believed that Germany would now prefer to 
take the initiative and engage in war at the most 
favourable moment, before Russia's armed forces had been 
fully reorganized and re-equipped. That moment had now 
come. 154 This provides some support for Norman Stone's 
thesis that Germany had to go to war in 1914, before 
Russia's military reforms were completed and effective in 
about 1917.155 Svechin would have agreed. He assessed 
that Russia had been well prepared for the Great War 
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diplomatically but was unready militarily and in terms of 
its internal political situation. 'What is remarkable is 
not that we had a Revolution in 1917, but that it was 
postponed two years'. 156 
Later events fully justified Durnovo's predictions. 
Italy and Rumania would at first remain neutral, and later 
join the allies, whilst Turkey and Bulgaria would join 
Germany. No matter who won the war, Durnovo predicted 
that the immediate result would be social revolution in 
Germany and Russia, beginning in the country on the losing 
side and spreading to the victor. 
Durnovo's predictions extended to the military- 
technical character of the impending war. The Russian army 
was short of ammunition, and (although her field artillery 
was excellent), she was deficient in large-calibre guns. 
The last prediction was remarkable since even the French 
did not realise the significance of heavy artillery until 
after the onset of trench warfare. He believed that a war 
between the world's most advanced industrial states would 
produce a number of new weapons,, but that Russia would 
find it hard to compete in this field. In fact, the 
performance of Russia's war industry was remarkable, but 
that effort brought its own consequences in 1917. 
Durnovo's predictions contained only one error. He 
believed that Britain would never countenance the complete 
destruction of Germany as aworld power, but merely strive 
to annihilate her fleet and deprive her of colonies. 
Perhaps if they had taken Durnovo's advice, there would 
have been no Treaty of Versailles, no Nazi party, and no 
Hitler. 157 
This section has demonstrated that the view of the 
likely character of a future war within the'Russian army, 
disseminated through authoritative military journals, and 
at General Staff and Ministerial level, was remarkably 
accurate in many respects. The Bliokh study, itself based 
almost entirely on professional military analysis, had 
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also been widely read and assimilated. -,;. - 
In addition to the formidable-legacy of Imperial-_ 
Russian thought and writing on the subject, the views, of 
three men outside the Russian establishment would-also 
influence Soviet views on and approaches to future war.,:,, 
These were Marx; Engels and Lenin. - 
In terms of the military-technical aspects, Engels is; 
the most important. 4Engels was a highly expert-analyst of 
military affairs: Marx considered that he had 'made, the 
study of military questions his speciality'. 
158 Many of 
the articles attributed to Marx owe much. -to Engels', 
expertise. The division of interest was fairly clear cut, 
as moern-Soviet'analysts admit: Marx was mores interested 
in 'the [political]essence of wars: and their character': "-- 
Engels in 'the material basis of military- affairs, the 
nature and origins'of wars and armies... 'µ159 
The image of a decline in military art corresponding to 
the rise-of technology, enunciated by Martynov-in the- 
1890s, was at one with the view expressed in an article, 
attributed, to,. Marx, published 40 years, before, at the 
time of the siege of Sevastopol. 
'That siege is a striking proof of the fact tnat - in the same proportion as the materiel of warfare 
has by industrial progress advanced e curing the- 
long peace, in the same proportion has the art 
of war'degenerated. A Napoleon, on seeing 
the batteries before Sevastopol, bristling with 
eight and ten inch guns, would1gjrst out in a 
fit of irresistible laughter'. 
Engels recognised that future-wars-between major powers 
would be total wars, and would-depend to an unprecedented: 
degree on technology, which in turn depended on a nation's 
industrial-base. Writing-of Germany, his views could-be 
applied*equally to Russia, and-were taken-to heart by the Ä; 
Soviet 'General Staff, after'-the-first such war - 
'And-finally, ' no war-is any Alonger possible rfor .= , - Prus: sia-Gernany- except`°a world -war, and-a war-, of- 
an extension and--violence'hitherto undreamt:: of!! 
An alternative] translation might-. describe' a . war. -of 
'unprecedented scope, ' unprecedented force! , ,, inda this g :: 
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appears to be"what the Soviet General Staff are still 
planning for today (see part 4). Engels also noted the 
effect of technology, describing the very latest 
innovations in 1892: 
'From the moment warfare became a branch of 
the grande industrie (ironclad ships, rifled 
artillery, quick iring and repeating cannons [machine guns? ], repeating rifles, steel 
covered bullets,, smokeless powder, etc. ), 
la grande industrie, without which all 
t ese things cannot ý92made, became a 
political necessity. 
The enforced industrialisation of the Soviet Union in the 
1930s certainly owed much to strategic requirements, and 
therefore conformed to Engels' views very precisely. 
Nevertheless, it is Marx and Engels' stress on the link 
'between politics and war, the army and politics'163 which 
receives most attention. First, they stressed the 
preeminence of political considerations: 'diplomacy is 
higher than strategy, '(Engels). 164 Secondly, they 
recognized that warfare has its own grammar, its own 
impetus, its own momentum, but that if this runs counter 
to political conditions the results can be harmful. 
Thirdly, modern, mass warfare has a profound influence on 
society as a whole (as, Bliokh and the professional, 
military analysts also stressed). Fourthly, and - ', 
conversely, society would have an influence on the conduct 
of warfare, both by its own forces and with respect'to the 
character of the war as a whole. For example, they 
predicted 'an increase in the counter-revolutionary 
direction of bourgeois armies in future bourgeois 
wars'. 165 In fact, in Russia some elements of the army 
provided the vanguard of the revolutions. One wonders what 
Marx and Engels would have made of the role of the 
Romanian Army in the 1989 anti-communist 'revolution', 
fulfilling the letter of their prediction, if not. the 
spirit. In Germany and Britain (Ireland) after World War 
I large groups within the military did arguably side with 
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'counter-revolutionary' interests. In Russia, some°did: 
others rallied to the new government. 
Before his arrival in power in the Soviet Union,, Lenin 
cannot be said to have produced much comment on the 
military-technical character of future war. He certainly 
recognised the importance of military nuts and bolts, but 
left tinkering with them to others at this stage. In 
1905, he acknowledged that 
'No Social Democrat at all familiar with 
history... has ever doubted the tremendous 
importance of military knowledgre, of military 
technique, "of military organization as an 
instrument which the, masses of people, and 
classes of the people, use in1 gsolving 
great, historical conflicts. ' 
'However, Lenin's early writing is concerned with the 
political characterization of wars, whether they are 
'just' or 'unjust'. 167 In 1915 he devised a typology with 
three possible scenarios. Wars between-and oppressor and 
the oppressed were just for the oppressed and unjust for 
the oppressor. Whether the war was offensive or defensive 
in the military-technical sense, he considered 
unimportant. The second case was two oppressor nations 
(Rome and Carthage, Britain and Germany in World War I). 
The third was 'a much more complicated question': a system 
of nations with equal rights, as in Europe before World 
War 1.168 Lenin's views on predvideniye are, however, 
more relevant to this'thesis. he particularly valued 
Engels' prognosis for a future world war, particularly its 
outcome. 169 In commenting on Lenin's views, Dr EA 
Rybkin noted that 
'Of the three most important components in 
foreseeing (predvideniye) future wars (their 
social character, causes and consequences), 
the first is by far the simplest since the 
character of the war itself, its political 
aims and nature coalesce, are created, from 
the essence of-the politics of the given sta1 0 (or group of nations), long before the war. ' 
Once Lenin found himself in power, at the head of a 
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state'fighting a war for survival, he became much more 
involved in military-technical questions, addressed in the 
section below, covering the Soviet period and the period 
after World War 1.171 After the Revolution and Civil 
war, the writing of Marx, Engels and Lenin on future war 
and military art were codified and fused with the former 
main stream of military writing. In this context, the`1927 
volume War and Military art in the Light of Historical 
Materialism is highly significant. In addition to 
articles by military thinkers including Svechin and 
Tukhachevskiy, it featured appendices on Marx, Engels and 
Lenin's thinking. Published ten years after the 
Revolution and seven after the end of the main struggle of 
the Civil War, mthis work is one of the first to codify and 
merge Marx, Engels and Lenin with the Russian tradition of 
military thinking. 172 
Returning to the apparatus in power in Russia before 
1914, a study of Russian views of future war suggests that 
the character of World War I was foretold very accurately. 
Interior Minister Durnovo and Chief of the General Staff 
Mikhnevich had both produced remarkable descriptions of 
what it would be like. The perilous position of Poland 
was well understood: it was a salient that could provided 
a decisive advantage if Russia launched her attack first: 
a liability and trap if her enemies did so. This, plus 
the need to assist her French ally, forced the Russians to 
attack early, resulting in accusations of impetuosity. 173 
The Russian General Staff had also correctly predicted the 
constricting effect of reliance on railways, and the 
consequent need for armies to roll off their trains and 
into battle at the right angle and in the right direction. 
The decisive importance of the railway asserted itself 
early, as Hindenburg used the superior East Prussian rail 
network to move forces to destroy the Russian second Army 
under Samsonov and then move them north again to push back 
the First army, under Rennenkampf. 174 
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In terms of the 'battle picture', the kartina boya, the 
Russians had produced a fairly accurate sketch. The 
extended battlefield, breaking up into a series of 
engagements linked by a common aim, had been accurately 
predicted. A group of young staff officers at the General 
Staff Academy had been wrestling with the emerging concept 
of the operational level of war just before World war 
1.175 At this stage, large scale manoeuvre was still 
possible. In the east, unlike the west, stasis seems to 
have occurred from late 1915 not because ofa lack of 
elbow-room, but more because of exhaustion and supply 
problems. 176 
The one area where the pre-war vision was not fully 
implemented or vindicated appears to have been the 
strategic use of cavalry. Although Russia had superior 
cavalry forces to the enemy, she did not employ them to 
conduct an aggressive, deep penetrating pre-emptive and 
dislocating raid, as all the literature from the end of 
the previous century might have suggested. Plans for such 
a raid, from the Middle Vistula into East Prussia 
existed. 177 Such a raid was also, interestingly, 
predicted by HG Wells, at the outbreak of war, in 
September 1914.178 Had it taken place, it could 
conceivably have dislocated the rail system and made 
Hindenburg's rapid switch of forces, using the advantage 
of interior lines, impossible. But according to General 
Yuri Danilov, German superiority in air reconnaissance, 
armoured cars, telephone and telegraph networks would have 
made it easy to detect and counter. The Russian cavalry 
also had many other missions to perform. - Finally, the 
experience of Mishchenko's deep raid in the Russo-Japanese 
War did not bode well for such operations. 179 There were, 
however, some more limited actions by Russian cavalry on 
the 'left' (west) bank of the Vistula. 180 
The final word on the Russian view of the future war 
which finally broke out in 1914 lies with the Chief of the 
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General Staff from 1911, Mikhnevich. His definitive-work 
Strategy stressed that 
'military matters progress under the influence, 
in the main, of improvements. in technology/ . technique (tekhn' )... The sophistication and 
number of fighting machines, skilfully 
controlled (iskusno upravlyayemvkh)- will 
be the main factor in determinin outcome 
of the struggle [in a future warf . 
In 1898, in analysing the impact of 'armies of 
millions', he concluded: 
Future wars will therefore lead to more 
weighty (boleye krupym) results and, of course1182 
will have more serious historical consequences. 
In the broader sense, the Russian General Staff before 
World War I therefore appear to have got their vision of 
future war about right. 
2. MECHANIZED HORDES. THE ROAD TO WORLD WAR II 
'Now, when the reconstruction of Russia's 
[The RSFSR's] armed forces is beginning, it 
is necessary to give oneself an account of 
the character of contemporary war, without 
which individual questions relating to the 
structure of the army cannot be resolved 
correctly. The present war has still not 
finished and it is impossible to sum up 
the total, of these grandiose events but, 
from the haemorrage of four years of war 
and leaning on the experience of the Russo- 
Japanese War of 1904-1905, which has been 
studied, it is already possible to set down 
certain characteristic peculiarities of 
contemporary war ... Thus, a modern great war is characterised 
by the alternation of manoeuvre and positional 
war in time and space... 
Therefore in future it is necessary to put 
all efforts into achieving success in the 
manoeuvre war, realising the unavoidability of 
utilising positional warfare on individual 
sectors during the period of manoeuvre warfare, 
and also the postibility. of, the whole front 
going over to positional warfare, when 
, 183 manoeuvre fails to achieve decisive results. 
This was written in the confused Soviet Russia of'1918, 
as the build-up of the new Red Army began. The author, 
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Aleksey Gutor (1868-1938), had been a front commander in 
the Imperial Army and member of the Stavka. 184 This very 
senior Tsarist officer wrote for the benefit of the new 
Soviet Army with a clarity and insight befitting his rank. 
Besides its elegant presentation of many of the issues and 
terms cardinal to this thesis, this article also 
illustrates the fact that predicting the character of a 
future war had begun before the 'present' (nastoyashchaya) 
Great War had finished. Gutor paid great attention to the 
Russo-Japanese War, pointing out that it was the prolonged 
stalemate along the river Shah-Ho that had first received 
the designation 'positional warfare'. 185 
For Gutor, the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War were 
perhaps clearer than-those of the unfinished Great War, 
but even after 1918 the Russo-Japanese and Balkan (1912- 
13) wars were anlysed assiduously. With hindsight, it is 
tempting to think that they were completely overshadowed 
by World War I, but this is not the case. It would take 
time to analyse the huge database formed by World War I. 
Neznamov ublished an extensive analysis of the 'Lessons of 
the Great War' in Voyennoye delo during 1920, but his 
Contemporary Warfare, published in 1921, was a revision of 
work completed before the Great War. The second part, for 
example, incorporates his War Plan of 1913, virtually 
unchanged. The Russo-Japanese, Italo-Turkish and Balkan 
Wars still feature prominently; 186 a short paragraph, or 
even a part of a sentence is added where World War I 
offers an example of an idea previously expressed; 187 a 
footnote is added or expanded citing the invasion of 
Belgium or the tentative possibility of delivering troops' 
most important equipment by air. 188 
Gutor's stress on the need to make every effort during 
the manoeuvre period contained reflectedthe desperate need 
to prevent formation of a continuous front, which would 
mean the dreadful, bloody, costly stalemate of World War 
I. This could only be achieved by keeping the enemy off 
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balance from the beginning of the conflict, ' keeping on the 
move. The Civil War bore out Gutor's prediction of a 
mixture of manoeuvre and positional warfare. The 
relatively small numbers of men and the extent of the 
terrain resulted in a revived ability to manoeuvre, but 
sometimes, as with the attack on Perekop, on the isthmus 
leading to the Crimea in 1920, circumstances dictated a 
return to World War I models. 189 It is necessary to 
consider the lessons of the First World and Civil Wars 
together, as those serving the new Soviet regime did in 
the explosion of analysis which followed the conclusion of 
the main operations of the Civil War at the end of 
1920.190 Until then, in spite of the odd outstanding 
article, Bolsheviks and former Imperial officers alike 
were primarily concerned with winning the 'present' war. 
Despite some assertions that the Civil War represented 
an advance in military technique, for example the use of 
armoured trains to facilitate 'march-manoeuvre' 
operations, deploying from lines of march along railway 
lines, 191 and 'armoured cavalry' as the principal arm, 192 
others realised that the western front in World War I 
offered more lessons for a highly scientific and 
technological conflict, and that 
'in view of the development and superiority 
of technical weaponry in the west, that it [the European War of 1914-18] will, perhaps, 
influence preparations [for a future war] 
to a greater exte163than will our experience 
in the Civil War. 
In the immediate aftermath of World War I, Soviet, writers 
noted the growth of 'machine warfare', the best 
translation of mashinizm, for 'mechanization' refers 
specifically to the large scale introduction of cross- 
country vehicles. Mashinizm referred to the all. the 
expensive and specialised machinery of positional war, 
particularly artillery, and not to the motorisation and 




it with a sense of inferiority and great concern, because, 
if the Imperial economy had been the least equipped to 
cope with the demands of machine warfare, their own 
shattered economy was even less so. 194 
It is perhaps ironic that positional warfare resulted 
in enormous advances in artillery survey and predicted 
fire techniques, mapping, air reconnaissance, and 
consequently air warfare in general including strategic 
bombing and putative airborne forces, chemical warfare, 
long range artillery, combined arms tactics down to 
battalion level, automatic weapons, the development of the 
tank (although armoured cars were deployed on the eastern 
front at the outbreak of war), and in motor transport to 
move and supply forces. 
195 Had World War I been short and 
retained a manoeuvre character, the armies might have 
finished it as they began, rifle armed hordes with quick 
firing field guns, large cavalry forces and a few 
primitive aircraft. The former was the state of warfare 
in the west in 1918, the latter, broadly, that of warfare 
in the east in 1920. 
From the Soviet Russian viewpoint, there were three 
aspects of World War I which must not be repeated. The 
first, as noted, was a positional war of attrition. The 
second was Imperial Russia's economic and industrial 
weakness, a repeat of which would be even more disastrous 
as Soviet Russia was isolated by a ring of actually or 
potentially hostile states with superior technology and 
wealth. Soviet Russia was deliberately excluded from the 
1921 Washington Conference on the Pacific: Britain, 
France, Italy and China all delayed recognition of the 
Soviet Government until 1924 and the United States refused 
it completely. 
196 
The third realisation was that a unified military 
doctrine was needed. Gareyev recently opined that 'as a 
certain system of military views, it did exist in one form 
or another', in the Imperial Army, while Frunze himself 
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pointed out that 'doctrine, though unformulated still 
existed in the Tsarist Army'. 197 A debate on the need for 
a unified doctrine had begun just before World War I, 
involving leading Imperial army minds who would continue 
to serve the Red Army, including A Zayonchkovskiy, 
Neznamov and Svechin. 198 Nevertheless, there was no state 
accepted system of views, no 'aggregate of practical 
procedures recognised as best under present day 
conditions'. 199 
This discussion resumed after the Great War, and 
unfolded in the pages of Voyennoye Belo during 1920. 
Svechin picked up the debate where it had been left in 
1914. 
'In the area of military thought in Russia 
intellectual anarchy rules. A radical 
change in the programmes for theoretical 
military training is essential, chasing the 
elementary, purely abstract, speculative part 
out of strategy and tactics, restructuring 
these sciences into a theory of military art, 
shifting the centre of gravity to military 
history, and weakening 
Lemphasis 
on]. mathem-ý 200 atical training and sketching in the Academy . 
It was in this context that Frunze, the man today 
regarded as. the founder of the Red Army and of Soviet 
military thinking, emerges, temporarily, as the most 
important future war thinker. Frunze had studied military 
history and theory exhaustively, and after 1917 combined 
this with practice, emerging as a highly successful Civil 
War commander. 
201 In July 1921 he published a'highly 
influential, indeed, historic tract entitled 'A Unified 
Military Doctrine and the Red Army'. 202 Frunze set out 
the definition of Military Doctrine which remained in 
force until the mid-1980s, although his words were broad 
enough to embrace the redefined Military Doctrine (see 
parts 2 and 4) also: - 
'A unified military doctrine comprises the 
teachings adopted in the army of a given state, 
establishing the nature of the organizational 
development of the country's armed forces, '-the 
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methods of training forces, " and leading them 'on ' 
the basis of views prevailing in the, country on 
the on the charcter of the missions lying before 
them and the means of fulfilling them, flowing 
from. the class essence of the state and, 
determined by the level of development of the 
country's productive forces'. 203 
Frunze's demand for a unified military doctrine was 
hotly contested by the other founding father of the Red 
Army, who until recently has not been acknowledged in the 
Soviiet union, Trotskiy. Trotskiy argued that imposing a 
rigid framework on military thought and planning would 
cramp it, preventing a quick reappraisal of a changing 
situation. 204 Trotskiy was cited in an article, also 
critical of Frunze, in Military Herald in 1921, which 
cited a variety of opinions on the question. Frunze's 
view of a future great war was even challenged. Frunze 
had suggested the study of 
'... our possible future theatres of war... 
and the question of the character of a future- 
war against us itself. There are many serious 
grounds for suggesting that with the correct 
policies, Workers' and Peasants' Russia can 
scarcely conceive the possibility of big, mass 
armies being mobilised against us. Of course, 
in this regard the relationship of Japan may, 
for example, turn out to be in a more favourable 
situation than, for example, Germany. But it 
is clear, that this question requires our 
serious attention, given that the. preparation 
of our armed forces depends on the correctness 
of its solution to a large degree. Comrade 
Frunze's suggestion that working out the idea 
of a 'little war' should be made one of the 
missions of our General Staff Academy 
requires exceptional attention. But, 
moving forward, I must mention, that in 
the meantime the chair of the Civil 205 War at the Academy is still vacant'. 
It is just conceivable that the author was being 
sarcastic, but given that Frunze's belief. in the big war 
as the overriding model was well known, it could -hardly 
have served a useful purpose. Nevertheless, the, fact that 
Frunze realised the need to study 'small wars' as a 
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specialised area is of interest: his views on the future 
great war appear, however, to have become so entrenched in 
Soviet military thinking that the other options which he 
recognised as important were discarded. This is a rare 
reference to specific study of 'small wars' within the 
General Staff. Although the situation of Russia's 
contiguous neighbours in 1921 did not suggest the 
immediate threat of a large-scale continental war, their 
recovery and Russia's continued isolation during the 1920s 
made that possibility grow ever larger. In 1928, the 
small states on Russia's western borders plus Poland 
actually fielded combined armed forces qualitatively 
superior to the Red Army, a fact noted in a book called 
The Threat of War and the Western Neighbours. 206 
Frunze also established the dialectical relationship - 
the 'dialectical unity' between the 'technical' or, as he 
later called it 'military-technical' side of doctrine, and 
the political (see part 2, figure 2.2). 207 He paid 
attention to scientific and technological advances, 
writing in 1921 that, 
'The outcome of future clashes now depends to a 
much greater degree on people working in the 
area of pure science (chistoy na ki than upon 
the command. Any invention (izobreteniye) or 
discovery (otkrytiye) in the area of military 
technology can immediately crea 2 olossal 
advantages for the litigants... ' 
Frunze shared the widespread Soviet concern about the 
growing role of, mashinizm in war. He therefore realised 
that, in addition to the level of scientific development, 
'the country's productive forces' would be crucial in any 
future war. He enunciated his views in another key 
article, 'Front and Rear in Future War', in 1924.209 This 
set out the blueprint for Soviet total war preparations, 
preparations for a wai", as Engels had envisaged, of 
unnprecedented scope, unprecedented force. Because the 
most up-to-date weapons might be rendered obsolete 
overnight, it was doubly necessary to pay more attention 
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to the development of industry and the economy in general, 
a particular lesson from Russia's experience in World War 
I. World War I had also suggested that it would not be 
possible to win any war with a lightning, knockout blow. 
Wars would take on the character 'of a long and fierce 
conflict'. Thus, the bond between the fighting front and 
the industrial rear would become closer, 
'The development of military technology and 
the improvement of means of destruction are 
another factor acting in the same direction. 
The conversion of avitaion into a decisive 
military force, the improvement of means of 
chemical warfare, the possible use of germs, 210 
and so on, all upset the concept of 'front' and 'rear' in their former sense... ' 211 
Preparations for war could no longer be the exclusive 
preserve of the War Ministry. Tractors and carts, 
necessary for the development of the shambolic civilian 
economy,, should also meet military requirements. Military 
knowledge, including rifle shooting and chemical defence 
drills, should be disseminated throughout the 
population. 212 Frunze demanded little short of total 
militarization of the state and the economy. In June, 
1925, a few months before his untimely and suspicious 
death his plan became law. The text of the law paralleled 
Frunze's demands closely. 'Past experience in the 
imperialist World war and in our Civil War' had shown that 
'contemporary war is waged not by armed forces alone, but 
by the entire country'. 213 Particular attention was paid 
to the dramatic increase in the importance of air forces, 
and to the need to develop both military and civilian air 
fleets in parallel. 
Thus, by the time of Frunze's death, the foundations for 
the conduct of a future war of unprecedented scope, 
unprecedented force, had been laid. Fifteen years later, 
after the forced industrialization of the 1930s, most of 
Frunze's proposals had been adopted. During that period, 
the Soviet Union had perceived itself encircled by hostile 
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capitalist states, and the future war for which 
preparations were made was against a 'capitalist 
coalition'. 214 It is in this context that the more 
detailed considerations of the military-technical 
character of future war were examined.. 
The 1920s also featured some unusual but remarkable 
fictional views of future war, and weapons. The 
'mashinizatsiya' of war('machine warfare')1215 the 
simultaneous emphasis on chemical warfare and continued 
widespread use of horsed cavalry create an odd impression 
of a possible 'future war'. It takes a literary figure - 
Bulgakov - to encapsulate its essence, in The Fatal Eggs, 
written in 1924 and set in the close future of 1928.216 
The Red Army moves through Moscow en route to battle with 
. mutant reptiles: 
. 
'Now and then, interrupting the columns of horse- 
men with their uncovered faces came strange 
mounted figures in strange hooded helmets, with 
hoses flung over their shoulders and cylinders 
fastened to straps across their backs. Behind 
them crept huge tank trucks, with longer 
sleeves and hoses, like fire engines, and heavy 
pavement crushing caterpillar tanks, hermetically 
sealed and their narrow firing slits gleaming. 
Also interrupting the mounted columns were cars 
which rolled along solidly encased in grey armour 
with the same kind of tubes protruding and with 
white skulls painted gb their sides inscribed 
"gas" and "goodchem"'. 
Bulgakov had clearly assimilated the gist of evidence 
about the character of future war available to the 
educated public in the mid 1920s. The emphasis on cavalry 
is attested by official reports and plans of the time: 
According to the mobilisation plan for Leningrad factories 
and works of November, 1928,25 percent of the capacity of 
the Vannovskiy metal works, normally devoted to railway 
production, would be devoted in wartime to repairing 
swords, bayonets and lances. 30 percent of the capacity 
of the Sherepovets mechanical-shoe works would be turned 
over to straps, saddles and military leather goods and 20 
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percent to harness. 218 
" The story is illuminating in many ways: lenses for the 
ray which causes the mutation are imported from Germany 
and special glass from Königsberg, reflecting Russian 
respect for German engineering and dependence on German 
technical know-how'during this period. It also contains a 
chilling prophecy: just as the reptiles have all but 
surrounded Moscow, they are killed by a sudden frost. The 
similarity withthe events of the Battle of Moscow, in 
December, 1941, is striking. 
Aleksey Tolstoy's science-fiction novel Engineer 
Garin's Hyperbold d (Death-Ray) was published in the mid- 
1920s. It was set in the very recent past, as Leningrad 
(renamed 1924)is referred to as Petrograd. Tolstoy was an 
astute observer of the latest scientific and technological 
developments, and was part of the intense intellectual 
life of the city in the 1920s. 'In that monstrous and 
titanic decade, the amazing minds of scientists gleamed 
here and there like torches. i219 Tolstoy accurately 
described the structure and potential power of the atom. 
'The principle by which an atom can be forcibly 
disintegrated ought to be very'simple... We are 
getting very close to the heart of the atom, to 
its nucleus. In that nucleus lies the whole 
secret of power over matter. The future of 
mankind depends on whether or not we can master 
the atomic nucleus, a tiny fragment of material 
energy on22bundred billionth of a centimetre 
in size'. 
Using heated carbon as a compact source of radiant energy, 
and two hyperbolic mirrors, one made of a fictitious 
material called shamonite, Garin was able to construct a 
device essentially the same as a laser (see part 4). It 
was capable of producing a ray cord powerful enough to cut 
through a railway bridge in a few seconds. 221 
'Do you realise-what possibilities this offers? 
There is nothing in the whole world that can 
stand up against the power of the ray... Buildings, 
fortresses, dreadnoughts, airships, rocks, the 
earth's crust... my ray will pierce, and cut 
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through and destroy everything.,, 222 
Garin's ambition leads him into conflict`with the 
Americans, whose fleet attacks his island refuge in a 
denouement worthy of a James Bond story. With the 
hyperboloid, Garin takes on the American fleet as it 
bombards the island. 
'A dull, expanding sound came from the sea. like 
a bubble bursting in the sky. Rolling adjusted 
the pince-nez on his perspiring nose and 
looked towards the squadron. There floated 
three mushrooms of yellowish-white smoke. To 
the left of them ragged clouds welled up, 
turned blood red and grew into a fourth 
mushroom. The fourth peal of thunder rolled 
to wards the island... he stood there... and 
watched the mushrooms grow on the horizon as 
one after the other the eight. warships of . 223 the American squadron were blown into the air'. 
The image of a revolutionary weapon rendering a whole 
array of conventional systems powerless is popular in 
science fiction, from Jules Verne and Wells' War of the 
Worlds onwards. Military history in fact provides few 
examples of a new weapon conferring such a dramatic 
advantage but the use of the atomic bomb in 1945, also 
foreseen by Tolstoy, is one. Tolstoy's instinct that the 
new weapon might be deployed in a static location and be 
particularly useful against naval targets is also of 
interest in the context of modern beam weapons. 
While fiction peered far into the technological future, 
the lessons of World War I and the inexorable expansion of 
the battlefield preoccupied Red Army thinkers. The 
breaking up of the battlefield into a number of distinct 
engagements, with battles both protracted and extended, 
was probably the most significant feature leading to the 
formal recognition of the operational level of war. 
Whereas pre-industrial armies, by and large, 
manoeuvered strategically to a tactical fight, prolonged 
operations over vast frontages involved the manipulation 
of large forces in linked activities. Such actions could 
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not be described as strategic, as they were aimed only at 
contributing to the defeat of a portion of the enemy's; 
forces, but it would be absurd to call these large and 
prolonged operations 'tactics'. The evolution or assertion 
of this third level of war was, as noted above,: one of 
the problems with which the Russian 'future war' thinkers 
were wrestling immediately before World War I. It became- 
manifestly obvious during that war and the German General 
Staff began to adopt the term operativ to describe this 
level. 224 
Not all Soviet authorities agreed. The involvement of 
societies' total war-making capacity and the conduct of' 
coalition war arguably meant that 'strategy' had also 
taken on a new and higher meaning. This 'super strategy' 
was aimed at the opponent's entire society and economy, 
and at the fabric of alliances. The most famous (or 
notorious) of the Soviet Military minds of this period, 
Mikhail Tukhachevskiy (1893-1937) therefore suggested a 
division of three levels: tactics, strategy and 
polemostrateegivp -'war strategy', 'higher' or 'grand 
strategy'. 225 Such a division might be appropriate in the 
case of strategic manoeuvres crowned by decisive, pitched 
battles, as Tukhachevskiy himself had attempted in the 
Battle of Warsaw in 1920, but was less appropriate for a 
future war which, it was widely believed, would feature 
prolonged, continuous engagements like those of World war 
I. 
It was the former Tsarist Major General AA- 
Svechin(1878-1938) who most eloquently encapsulated; the 
essence of the operational level as a function of the-, 
expansion of military action in space and time for the 
Russians, in his Strategy (1926,. 1927). Svechin was 
instrumental in getting the term adopted by the Red Army 
from the late 1920s. His definition of the operation 
indicates a clear line of descent from Mikhnevich and 
Neznamov: 
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'Tactical creativity, in its turn, is regulated 
by operational art. Military action in not some- 
thing decisive in itself, but only the raw material 
from which an operation is assembled. Only in very 
rare cases can one count on achieving the decisive 
aim of military action by one act. Normally this route 
to the final aim extends over a number of operations: 
the latter are separated in time by more or less 
significant pauses, extend over separate parts of 
the territory of the theatre of war, and are especial- 
ly sharply distinguished on account of differing 
intermediate aims, to attain which the efforts of 
the forces are temporarily directed. We call an act 
of war, in the course of which forces are directed in 
a defined region of a theatre of war towards the 
attainment of an established intermediate objective 
without any break, an operation. An operation is226 
a conglomeration of very different activities... 
The Soviet Military Encyclopedia dates the adoption of 
the present division of military art from the 'late 
1920s'. 227 As figure 2.2 showed, Strategy is the highest 
level of military art, involving 'the theory and practice 
of preparing the armed forces for war, planning and 
conducting war and strategic operations using [different] 
armed services'. Operational art (operativnoye iskusstvo) 
a term until recently unfamiliar to English speakers, 
involves the conduct of linked or independent operations 
by higher formations (ob"yedineniya) of the different 
services. Tactics concerns the conduct of combat(boy) by 
subunits, units and formations (that is, usually up to and 
including brigade or division level. 228 
Svechin's disagreement with Tukhachevskiy on the above 
issue symbolised a more bitter, almost personal, 
antipathy. This might be expected between a meticulous, 
former Tsarist Major-General and a flamboyant former 
Tsarist Second Lieutenant and precocious Civil War hero 
fifteen years his junior. The author has published two 
monographs on Tukhachevskiy's career, character and 
contribution to Soviet military thought, one of which is 
included as Appendix G. 229 Svechin openly criticised 
Tukhachevskiy's conduct of the 1920 Warsaw operation, 
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criticism which was probably justified, and repeated by 
Isserson in the 1960s, but did nothing to endear him to 
Tukhachevskiy. 230 
Svechin appears to have been an abrasive, intellectually 
arrogant, though for some time indispensable, individual. 
Originally an artillery officer, he served in the Russo- 
Japanese and First World Wars, rising to command a 
division and then serving as an army Chief-of-Staff. He 
obviously felt some loyalty to the Soviet regime, but he 
had no respect for revolutionary jargon and challenged 
fashionable views. He was a student of Clausewitz, Engels 
and Lenin, and as the modern Soviet authorities Kokoshin 
and Lobov have also acknowledged, had a highly 
eclectic('rnnogovariantny') approach. 
231 In 1924, for 
example, he published an article called 'Dangerous 
Illusions', in which he defended the Russian Army's 
performance in Manchuria, on the grounds that it was 
merely an advance guard, covering a deployment which 
continued right up to the conclusion of the armistice. 
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He criticised those who relied on Russia's geographical 
position and who believed that this would compensate for 
inferior forces, contrasting this with the situation of 
Germany which had a 'dreadful (uzhasny) geographical- 
strategic position but had survived and would only 
continue to survive through military brilliance and 
constant readiness. 
233 He disagreed with the view 
expressed (though maybe sarcastically) by Petrovskiy in 
1921 that security could be assured by diplomatic means 
'... The most artful and tractable Soviet 
diplomacy cannot secure us against the 
tempests of war... Along with the illusion of 
peace we must throw out our reliance 
on geography. History has not handicapped 
us strategically. Our extent obliges us to 
scatter our energies and organizational 
ability about, makes it difficult to gather 
our forces to repel attack; but it 
protects the richest treasures, deep in 
our vitals, and to drop our guard on these 
would be a historic act of treason; they 
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include the most important political- 
strategic positions, requiring serious military forces, although [ideally] to preserve 
neutrality and to prevent our being dragged 
into war. To believe in peace, when 
political quarrels are tearing peace apart, 
when the class struggle has intensified so 
much, to believe that geography will defend 
us and rescue us, is to deliberately 
create an atmosphere where our thinking 
is poisoned by opium, and to close our eyes 
to present problems. These illusions are a 
source of great weakness., They have led 
us to many defeats. The first step to victory 
must lie in recognising, that we are not wearing 
any geographical armour, that our breast 
is open to a blow, that the enemy is not234 
sleeping, that tomorrow becomes today. ' 
The editors of Military Thought and the Revolution 
published the article, but warned that it was 'one sided', 
written from a geographical perspective. 235 Yet Svechin's 
geographical sense made his predictions of a future war 
highly astute. In 1926, he'concluded that in a future war 
Germany's first victim would be Poland. He stressed the 
need to take Strategy into account in the industrial 
development of the Soviet Union. He recommended 
concentrating industry in the Urals, as the least 
vulnerable area in a future war, while criticising . 
further 
expansion of Leningrad's industry and population. 236 
Svechin's views on the strategic defensive have led to 
a revival of interest in his work in the Soviet 
Union at the time of writing (see also part 4). Svechin 
believed that the Red Army would be technologically weak 
in a future war, a view based, significantly, on his 
extrapolation from Soviet industrial progress in the late 
1920s. In fact, Soviet industrialization proceeded more 
rapidly than he believed possible, a reminder of the need 
for predictions of technological. and industrial, 
development as a, basis for further predictions. 
In contrast to many contemporaries, for example, 
another former member of the Tsarist 'military 
intelligentsia', AM Zayonchkovskiy, who believed that a 
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future war should be fought on the other side's 
territory, Svechin recognized the benefit which could 
accrue from sacrificing some territory. His understanding 
of the, nature of the defensive concurred with that of 
Clausewitz, 'time which is allowed to past unused 
accumulates to the credit of the defender'. 237 The 
offensive required the expenditure of huge resources: 
using natural obstacles and the depth of-the theatre, -the 
defender could wear the attacker down. - But space was not 
unlimited: it was an asset and, like any other military 
asset, or resource, should not just be thrown away, but be- 
used to maximum effect. He criticised those who relied on' 
the fredom conferred by an 'ocean of land'. Modern armies 
were like 'a giant broom', occupying the entire breadth of 
the Theatre of Operations (TVD). Furthermore, 'the 
telegraph, radio, aviation, motor vehicles, all modern 
technology - are great devourers of space. '238 
However, the well conducted strategic defensive would 
buy time to launch a devastating and decisive-counter- 
offensive. As Svechin observed, 
'The effectiveness of the strategic counter-attack- 
(sic. -kontrataka) in the majority of cases exceeds 
the initial offensive of the attacker in scale 
to a significant degree. Have we not seen 
the fundamental accuracy of these views of 
Clausewitz underlined during the course of 
the World war? Was his thinking not fully 
justified by Foch's strategic counter-attack239 
in July 1918, or the Poles in August 1920? 
These were expounded more fully in Svechin's Strategy. 
Although some in the Red Army believed that a future war 
could be won by a series of swift operations, Svechin 
believed that this 'strategy of annililation' 
(sokrusheniye) was not feasible. 'The aims of Strategy 
become simpler', ' he wrote, 'if we or the enemy aim to 
conclude the war with a single, annihilating blow, 
according to the example of Napoleon or Moltke'. 240 In 
modern conditions the slowing down of operations and'the 
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less decisive character of individual battles, which some 
late 19th century theorists had predicted, was even more 
marked. Conflict, including armed conflict, would become 
more varied in character, more diverse. Svechin 
emphasized a strategy of exhaustion (izmor). He 
emphasized that this did not mean that destruction of the 
enemy's armed forces was no longer the aim of an 
operation: just that many such operations would be needed. 
The strategy of exhaustion had military and political aims 
just as decisive as a strategy of destruction. 241 
War was not, as some had regarded it, a 'medicine for 
a state's internal illness, but a serious examination of 
the health of its internal politics'. 242 Countries like 
Britain and the United States, with weak armies in peace 
time, had taken years to mobilise fully. The general 
parity between the overall strength of major powers 
militated against rapid wars of annihilation, and he 
believed, correctly, that 'in future we will, probably, 
have wars which are, in the main, prolonged'. 
243 His 
treatment of the effect on the internal workings of the 
state, all of which, like Mikhnevich, he considered 
synonymous with the 'rear' forms a grim prophecy of World 
War II, which bears not a little resemblance to Orwell's 
Nineteen Eighty-Four. 
'The Department of Internal Affairs must have 
its own mobilisation plan, which must take the 
steps necessary to maintain firm order in the 
national territory during the period when huge 
masses are torn away from their work in the 
country and proceed to collection points to 
flesh out the armies, and the population of the 
towns doubles, to meet the requirements of war 
industry. The crisis, created by these 
population movements will be compounded by 
enemy propaganda, sharpened by the activities 
of enemies of the existing system, by the hopes, 
which individual national and class groups will 
have as the ruling class grows weary under the 
impositions of war. It is essential to think 
through the measures necessary to maintain order 
along lines of communications most thoroughly, to 
take account of all dubious elements, to combat 
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desertion, to combat enemy counter-intelligence [sic. - surely intelligence is meant] and 
propaganda, measures for censorship, and so on, 
and also, if necessary, to substitute special 
formations composed of reliable elements for 
military units leaving for the front, or 
to strengthen the police... Aviation, the 
wireless, the need for an unbroken flow of huge 
masses of troops to the front, supplying them 
with munitions, home leave from the active army 
which was previously unknown - all these factors 
now merge the front and the rear. Success in 
war is now only possible with a high state of 
discipline in the rear. Now, the army, like a 
sensitive seismograph, reacts to the slightest 
economic, social and political movements in the 
rear. Maintenance of discipline in the army in 
based, in the first place, on the awareness of 
the soldier, on the professional core (kadry) 
of the army - its command personnel. Maintenance- 
of discipline in the rear = is a matter for the 
people's cadres, the organs of the civil power'. 
244 
Between them Frunze and Svechin had framed and 
accurately portrayed the overall character of the USSR's 
war effort. The USSR was undoubtedly the'most militarized 
economy and society in World War II, even more so than 
that of Britain. 245vechin's views on the reliability of 
national minorities were well taken by Stalin, and are of 
renewed interest today. 
Shortly afterwards, Svechin was subjected to a 
persecution instigated by Tukhachevskiy, and his views to 
vicious and jesuitical criticism. This intellectual 
/CCLSkist; C Af 
crucifixion was conducted with characteristic ingenuity 
and barbarism: M Tukhachevskiy railed against Svechin's 
strategic views, K Bocharov against his military- 
historical views, I Slutskin against his methodology, A 
Sedyakin against his 'Operational Views', P Suslov on 'The 
Character of Future War according to Svechin', I 
Duplitskiy on 'The Role of Naval Forces according to 
Svechin', I Fendel' on his political views, V Dunayevskiy 
on his theory of permanent mobilisation. 
246 Svechin was 
imprisoned, then released to work again. In 1938 he was 
arrested. His subsequent fate is the subject of 
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'contradictory accounts': he may have been executed, or 
may have died from privations in the GULag. 247 His 
Strategiya is a formidably impressive work, which should 
be translated into English and used, not just as an 
insight into Soviet military thinking, but as a great work 
of 20th century military thought in general. It remained 
in use as the standard work on the subject in the higher 
military Academies of the Soviet Army through the Great 
Patriotic War and theýpost war nuclear and missile 
revolution, until the appearance of Sokolovskiy's book in 
the 1960s, and interest in it, as noted, has recently 
revived in the Soviet Union. 248 
In spite of the apparent animosity between 
Tukhachevskiy and Svechin, there can have been little real 
disagreement on matters of strategy, in its Soviet sense 
of the higher and overall conduct of war. Svechin's war 
plan involved mobilising or spying on every aspect of the 
state. In 1928 Tukhachevskiy had presented a plan in 
similar spirit for the development of the economy which 
Stalin and Voroshilov rejected because it would have 
'mil'itarised the entire economy'. 249 His pamphlet 
'Questions of Contemporary Strategy'(1926) had stressed, 
first of all, the coalition aspects of the Great War, 
likely to be repeated in a future war, and the fact that 
in the end the members of the losing coalition had been 
liquidated, which was consistent with his emphasis on the 
need for a super-strategy. 
250 He then turned to the 
'Character of (a) future war', a phrase which occurs most 
frequently during this period. Tukhachevskiy's remarks on 
the subject were right to the point. 
'To answer the question what character will any 
future war (vsya budushchaya voyna)have is 
impossible, since, as a result of its development, 
any war will change its form. its character 
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and one may not foresee(predugadat') these 
in advance. For example, in the period of 
large manoeuvre battles in 1914 and even in 
1915, nobody could say what form attack and 
defence would finally assume by 1918. ' 
We can predict, foresee the forms of a future 
war for its first period only, on the. basis of 
the character of the development of armed forces, 
the preparation and militarization of the 
industry of countries entering the war, and 
so on. We can, on the basis of constant study 
of these basic factors come to a conclusion, 
give an approximate photograph of the character 
of the first period of the war. But there is 
no doubt that the forms of warfare in its 
subsequent phases will, d2Nyloping and reacting 
with each other, change. ' 
Tukhachevskiy was right about both World Wars, and his 
remarks highlight the common-sense behind the constant 
attention to the 'opening period' of a future war (see 
also part 2). 
During the 1920s Tukhachevskiy presided over the 
official study entitled Future War with Zhigur, Nikonov 
and Berzin (see part 1). 252 The study envisaged a, 
massive, coordinated attack on the Soviet Union by a 
capitalist coalition, a view which history has proved to 
be somewhat pessimistic, but which explains the 
extraordinary efforts made to build up, the Soviet economy 
and war industry during this period, for example, the 
construction of the colossal Magnitogorsk'Metallurgical 
combine, authorized on 15 January 1929.253 If this was 
over-pessimistic, it was balanced by the over-optimism of 
hoping for revolution and civil war in the capitalist 
aggressor states. However, these would 'hardly attain 
large dimensions immediately'. Future War continued by 
warning that 
'Without serious exertion and victories by the 
Red Army, the demoralization of our opponents 
cannot attain the dimensions necessary to 
ensure that the war of the imperialists 
against the Soviet Union will be, ýg2verted 
into civil war, into revolution. 
Several variants of the possible attack on the Soviet 
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Union by a coalition of imperialist states were 
identified. 
In 1928, the Red Army Staff divided all the principal 
nations into four groups: those clearly hostile to the 
USSR, forming an anti-Soviet front; those which might-join 
this front; those not interested in war with the Soviet 
union for geographical, economic or political reasons; and 
those friendly to the USSR. In 1929 the last category 
would have been very small. Germany, for all its military 
cooperation, was still a potential enemy: Mongolia was the 
only real ally 0255 
The western nations were seen as the most dangerous and 
in addition to the extremely rapid development of Soviet 
defences, the doctrines and methods 'of the most probable 
enemies in the west' were studied. So were the probable 
theatres of military operations (TVDs), with most stress 
being placed on the western frontier. 
'From this point of view, the course [narezka - 
literally thread or rifling] of TVD boundaries 
was established. Calculations about the capacity 
of strategic and operational directions were done. 
The strength of higher formations, the breadth of 
defensive belts and the subsequent offensive, 
the depth of operations, the length of the war 
and other operational-strategic and operational- 
tactical indicators (pokazateli) were drawn up. 
Tukhachevskiy's views were generally compatible with those 
of the other major Soviet thinkers of his time. One 
important issue in the inter-war period was the widespread 
western view, analogous to the 1890s debate described 
above, that quality and quantity were incompatible. From 
the massed machine warfare of 1914-18, mechanization would 
lead to small, elite, highly trained forces, a view 
propounded by the British theorist JohnF C Fuller and by 
Charles de Gaulle. Verkhovskiy had, it is true, 
a 
tentatively introduced this idea in the more tolerant 
1920s, suggesting that armoured forces, ' like medieval 
knights, would form an 4lite shock force. 
257 But now 
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Tukhachevskiy and his contemporaries Triandafillov"(1894- 
1931) and Isserson (1898-196? ) continually' stressed that 
mass and mechanization were not incompatible. 
Triandafillov actually quoted Svechin on the subject: 'War 
requires forces of high quality and in sufficient 
numbers'. 258 This was one of the main issues in 
Tukhachevskiy's preface to the 1931 translation of 
Fuller's 1923 book The Reformation of War, 259 and has been 
further explored by the author in the published monograph 
at Appendix H. Another of Tukhachevskiy's colleagues, one 
of the editors of the unfinished 1933 Soviet Military 
Encyclopedia, R Eydeman, also dismissed the 'little army' 
advocated by Fuller in Britain and Seekt in Germany: 
'At the basis of this theory lies 'massophobia' 
(masssoboyazn'), fear of the growth of revolution- 
ary fighting, a recognition of the fact that a 
nation-state, having created mass armies, will 
be torn apart by class contradictions. The 
theory of little, fascist-ized (fashizirovannye) 
armies cannot be regarded as a product of the 
present day development of military technology, 
as a new word"in military art, but as a product 
of thee dead end in which the capitalist world 
has put it sýf In (a) future war the side which 
will come out on top will be the side which disposes 
of masses - masses at the front and masses in the 
rear. On the basis of the new - on the Soviet 
model - on the basis of the revolutionary alliance 
of the proletariat and the working masses in the 
country a new mass army is being created. This 
is why the theory-Of little armies is a theory 
which does not and will not find any response 
in our military-scientiific thought. Aviation, 
motor-mechanization, cavalry - this little army 
is obliged, during the opening period of a war 
to prepare and guarantee the entry into action 
of armed masses, which, as before, ensure decis- 
ive successes in war and reinforce this success. 260 
Eydeman had in broad terms forecast the arrangement which 
the Red Army would adopt during the Great Patriotic, War of 
1941-45. The ideal of a high quality, high-technology 
mass army proved impossible to achieve in practice at this 
stage. Tanks and motor vehicles were still in short 
supply, as were men with the skills to operate them and 
239 
other higher-technology equipment. Therefore, Red Army 
formations tended to fall into two categories; the Elite, 
mobile formations (tank and mechanized corps and, later, 
tank armies), plus other elite or semi elite formations 
(Reconnaissance formations(OMSBONs)'261 those designated 
'Guards'), on the one hand, and the mass army on the 
other. The use of armoured spearheads to initiate and 
accelerate all major offensives from 1942 onwards was a 
manifestation of the model described by Eydeman. 262 
Tukhachevskiy's views on the overall character of a 
future war are apparent from his 16 July 1930 paper to the 
Communist Academy (Komakad , which included one of his 
vicious attacks on Svechin. In fact, he appears to have 
agreed with, or lifted, many of Svechin's ideas. As in 
the 1931 preface to Fuller, he dismissed the idea of 
'little wars', as he and his colleagues had dismissed the 
idea of 'little armies'. 'On the contrary', he wrote, 
'grandiose wars are inevitable, as long as a large part of 
the world is not socialist'; 263 'the scale (razmakh) of a 
future war will be grandiose3264 Industrial mobilisation 
had been a notable feature of World War I: 'in a future 
war, the mobilization of industry will, first of all, take 
place in a much shorter time than before and, secondly, in 
this short time industry will produce much more military 
hardware, than in the past war'. 
265 He repeated his 
emphasis on the coalition character of modern wars, and 
then made a statement which concurs with Svechin almost 
word-for-word: 
'The future (gryadushchaya) world imperialist 
war will not on yI be a mechanized (sic. - 
mekhanizirovannaya) war, during which huge 
material-resources will be used up, but together 
with this, it will be a war which will embrace 
multi-million strong masses and the majority of 
the population of the combatant nations. The 
frontiers between the front and the rear will 
be rubbed out (budut stirat'sya) more and more'. 
266 
Svechin's comment that the 'front and rear' would 'merge' 
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(sblizhaet) was almost identical. 267 
Tukhachevskiy then made a surprising comment, which led 
into his prime disagreement with Svechin: what Soviet 
industry, and industrialization could achieve: 
'I would say, that the scale of our military- 
theoretical thou ht is lower than the pre- [World] war [One] level. Carrying on the Civil 
War in conditions of ruined transportation and 
industry, in conditions where the Civil War 
fronts tore gaps in our economy, - this has been reflected in the thinking of many of 
our theoreticians in such a way, that they 
say that the Red Army will have to fight in 
future wars on a reduced technological and 
economic base. Such a proposition goes 
against the achievements of present day 
industry and conflicts even more with the 
Five Year Plan for the development of our 268 economy and the whole General Party Line'. 
Svechin and Verkhovskiy were singled out for criticism 
as conservative and opportunist, Verkhovskiy suffering 
especially because of his belief in 'armoured 
knights'(bronirovannye rytsarey) of the future, while 
Triandafillov, Nikonov and Zhigur were approved of as 
'progressive'. 269 Triandafillov's most recent book, The 
Character of Operations of Contemporary Armies, first 
published in 1929, won all the prizes. 'An extraordinarily 
interesting book', enthused Tukhachevskiy, 'reflecting the 
general line of our party. It is a progressive book, 
setting out in the widest sense missions for employing our 
growing technology'. 270 There were a few things wrong 
with it, said Tukhachevskiy, but these 'did not; I diminish 
its huge progressive significance'. 271 
Triandafillov had attacked Fuller, Seekt and Verkhovskiy 
in the section dealing with the 'possible numerical 
strength of mobilised armies'. The idea that one could 
'overcome a modern state with a small, albeit motorized 
army' was 'naive'. 272 Triandafillov made the definitive 
statement leading to the high technology mass army which 
would be the Soviet ideal for the'next sixty years. Only 
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at the time of writing has his view been seriously 
challenged: 
'Guaranteein the best conditions for free 
manoeuvre, or wideL-rangin&IJ tactics and 
operational art will be attained not by 
returning, by going ac to the small armies 
of 'cabinet' wars, but by raising the mobility 
of modern million-strong armies to the same 
degree, improving transport tec no 0 
using motor transport, six-wheeled vehicles, 
wider railway development, etc. ) The country, 
which is forced by political circumstances, 
out of lack of faith in the masses, to return 
to small armies of professionals, cannot273 
count on being able to wage a great war'* 
This view on the necessity for mass and mobility, total 
rejection of the idea of a professional army, and armed 
forces, became so deeply ingrained that it'was still 
evident sixty years later, in spite of strong demographic 
and training arguments in favour of a smaller, 
professional force. (see part 4). 
Triandafillov began his work with a thorough analysis 
of post World War I weapons developments. Both he and 
Tukhachevskiy noted the potential of automatic weapons. 
Tukhachevskiy had noted a 'transfer to automatic fire in 
place of rifle fire' as a characteristic of the Great 
War. 274 Triandafillov noted the potential of the model 
1923 Thompson sub-machine gun (of Chicago gangster fame). 
Although no army had gone over to automatic rifles in 
1929, Triandafillov believed that in a future war 'we 
should expect partial or complete rearmament of the 
infantry with automatic weapons'. 
275 The marked Soviet 
emphasis on automatic weapons, noted by observers during 
and after World War 11,276 can be traced in part to these 
two influential officers. 
Tukhachevskiy and Triandafillov also concurred on 
tanks. 'Nobody doubts the powerful tactical significance 
of tanks in a future war', said Triandafillov. 
277 
Although the caterpillar-tracked tank was originally 
designed to overcome the mud and barbed wire of, the 
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immediate First World War battlefield, its potential as a 
weapon of exploitation was quickly recognised. As early 
as 1916, before tanks had even appeared on the Russian 
front, a Russian artillery officer guessed at their future 
role correctly, another example of 'future war' prediction 
beginning before the previous war had finished. 
'We do not know for sure what tank tactics will be 
like but they will probably not be used individually, 
but in whole groups at wide intervals. It could be 
that they will be given the mission, not to stop at 
forward defences, but to move immediately into the 
area of reserves, [artillery] batteries, 
X278 headquarters, road junctions, bridges, etc. 
Deep penetration by tanks might be countered by anti- 
aircraft guns, which would already be in place at road, 
junctions, bridges and headquarters. The use of anti- 
aircraft guns in the anti-tank mode was another accurate 
1916 prediction of World War II. 
In Triandafillov's view, the inter-war period saw the 
conversion of the tank from a tactical to an operational 
asset. 
'This tank must participate not only in a compar- 
atively brief attack, to accompany infantry into 
battle, but also in all phases of pursuit, outside 
the battlefield. The tank will fulfil these new 
missions as part of new (motorized)units, based 
on automobiles. In addition, [tank] builders 
were given the task of giving the tank such power 
that, undeterred by artillery fire, it could 
clear the way for lighter(boleye melkiy) tanks. 2ý9 
In 1929, Triahdafillov still envisaged tanks 
cooperating with 'strategic cavalry' in reconnaissance. 
The likelihood that the light tank would probably usurp 
cavalry's role underlay Triandafillov's comments, 
including references to 'mechanical cavalry', 280 although 
he realised that this would. not take place in. the Red Army 
just yet. However, 
'In such countries as Britain, America and France, 
a whole range of independent motorized formations (motorized brigades) may be`formed in the near 
future, which may fulfil .a significant number of the tasks formerly allocated to strategic 
cavalry. In less wealthy countries motorized 
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units will be less widespread. The first stage [in the development] of such formations will be 
the creation of special motorized detachments in' 
divisions and corps, for tactical reconnaissance 
missions. The next stage will be motorization 
of corps, division and army signals units; 
motorization of whole machine-gun battalions; 
moving field artilleý 8cver to mechanical traction, and so on. ' 
In spite of the tank's high profile and appeal, 
Triandafillov stated categorically that 'a future war will 
be conducted in the main by infantry and artillery'. 282 He 
was referring here to war on the ground, for he placed 
enormous stress on the role of aircraft (see 3.4, below), 
although 'in east European armies it will play an 
auxiliary role'. 
283 Although tanks and aircraft appeared 
prominent in the invasion of Poland ten years later, the 
bulk of the German effort arguably still centred around 
men and horses. 
Triandafillov devoted much attention to chemical 
weapons, but simple calculations as to the volume of agent 
required to be effective led him to the conclusion that 
chemical warfare was only likely in positional warfare, or 
when a stable front formed for some time. 
284 Chemical 
attacks delivered by aircraft were also likely against 
headquarters and communications. Chemical warfare 
preparations would need to be so thorough that 'armies 
and the most important centres could continue normal work 
even when in a contaminated atmosphere for a long 
period. '285 
Triandafillov's section on 'The operations of 
contemporary armies' began with careful calculations of 
the size of the theatre of war and the coverage of modern 
formations. Of the Soviet Union's 3,000 kilometre. western 
border, 1500 faced Finland;, 380 faced Estonia and Latvia; 
800 faced Poland and 320 faced Rumania. This attention to 
spatial criteria is characteristic of the Russian and 
286 Soviet approach to future war planning. His 
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consideration of the major, and most likely hostile powers 
reflected the military-political situation at the end of 
the 1930s, not that of five or ten years later. His 
consideration of the foremost air forces led him to list 
France, Britain, Italy, the USA and Poland. 287 
Although it contained futuristic elements, 
Triandafillov's work was securely anchored in contemporary 
realities. His csection on 'movement to the battlefield', 
including diuscussion of operational deployment and the 
meeting operation, contains clear echoes of Mikhnevich and 
Neznamov, writing twenty years before. The extra space in 
the east would be of benefit here: 
'The wider the front, the, smaller the columns 
into which the march order can be organized, 
the faster the march-maoeuvre can flow, the 
easier it is to hide from air observation less tAt 
inconvenient it will be to spread out for-rest 
periods, the more provisions and especially 
forage will remain and, consequently, the less 
will need to be brought up from the rear. 
Moving on a wide front gives more opportunities 
to attacký(okhvat) 058§o right. round (obkhod) 
the enemy's*- Zanks. 
Triandafillov's careful comments about the continued 
dominance of infantry and artillery presaged the attitude 
of many German generals as late as 1940.289 Dismissing 
the small, glite armies advocated in the west as 'naive', 
Triandafillov retained a necessary grip on common sense. 
'The million-strong army is formed from a calculation 
based on men of average talents and average 
qualities. The modern mass army cannot count 
on a complement of one hundred percent heroes'. 290 
Triandafillov's early death in an air accident leaving 
Moscow on 12 July 1931 robbed the Soviet Union of one who 
might have become a still greater military thinker. 
However, his work was continued by the Chief of Red army 
Staff AI Yegorov and the Operational Directorate' under I 
P Obysov. Papers entitled Red Army Tactics and Operational 
Art in a New Era were read in April and May, 1932, and 
these formed the basis for regulations for the 
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organization of deep battle (see Appendix H), officially 
approved in February the following year. 291 
Tukhachevskiy was also very aware of the need to 
consider the human element. In 'New questions of 
war'(1931-32), he noted the inadequacy of training 
methods, and that 'the cinema has still, even now, not 
been properly. introduced into training... the use of film, 
radio and working models must enliven and expand all 
aspects of field formations' training'. 292 Tukhachevskiy 
loved gadgets, and his creative mind revelled in 
considering the construction and use of future weapons. 
The tank, as noted, had originally been designed with a 
very specific and limited purpose. Being able to overcome 
barbed wire and mud if required was not always'consistent 
with fast, economical movement across dry open country or 
even roads. This created the 'problem of operational 
mobility on tracks'. Tukhachevskiy believed that this was 
best overcome using half-tracks -a vehicle with tracks 
and wheels. Although these were used by the Americans in 
world war II2 they never acquired the dominance which 
Tukhachevskiy seems to have thought they would. Experience 
did not bear out his view that 'a tank with a combined 
wheeled and tracked running gear has the advantage over 
one with just tracks'. 
293 He was right in advocating 
'artillery tanks', tanks with a gun of at least 76mm 
calibre (as fitted to, the T-34) which could take on enemy 
artillery, a massive gun by the standards of tanks of the 
time and even the tanks used by the Germans at the start 
of the war. 
294 He still saw a place for tanks armed only 
with machine guns, which proved wrong although armoured 
personnel carriers arguably filled this role. 
295 
Tukhachevskiy also proved correct in stressing that 
amphibious tanks had an advantage. His view that tanks 
must share a common chassis with the country's tractor 
fleet showed great common sense and awareness of economic 
considerations. 296 
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Figure 3.4. Front offensive operation as envisaged in Soviet 
Field Service Regulations (PU)-1936 
1 
Aso 
1= Army boundary (Soviet symbol) 
2= Front boundary 
3 =Fortified area 
4= Armour 
5= Parachute assaults 
6= Air attacks 
A= Army 
A(FR) = Army (front reserve) 
AC = airborne corps 
I0 = immediate objective 
MG = mobile group 
FA = front subordianted aviation 
RC = reserve corps 
SA = shock army 
SO = subsequent objective 
Source: SVE, Vol. 2 (1976), p. 577 
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Perhaps his most futuristic vision was of the 
advantages accruing from using remotely controlled tanks, 
especially against enemy anti-tank guns. These could 
withstand a far greater number of direct hits without 
ceasing to function. 297 The value of remotely controlled 
or robot vehicles against particularly dangerous targets 
has been underlined by the British Army's use of such 
vehicles to defuze bombs in Northern Ireland. He was a 
great advocate of radio and remote control, for firing 
explosive charges (the effectiveness of which the IRA 
have also demonstrated), controlling tanks, aircraft, and 
so on. He believed that these would facilitate 'the 
further deepening of the combat zone, ensuring that the 
future battlefield will be characterized by its depth'. 
298 
Tukhachevskiy's views on future war in the air and 
the integrated air-land battle were perhaps the most 
radical and futuristic of all (see part 3.4). The use of 
aircraft and 'flying tanks', whether tanks with wings or 
tanks carried in transport aircraft, were at the heart of 
Tukhachevskiy's vision of the 'deep operation'. 
299 Using 
the opportunities created by the emerging technology of 
the time, Tukhachevskiy and his colleagues endeavoured to 
develop the 'consecutive operations' which had evolved 
during World War I- in effect, a series of hammer blows, 
into a single, continuous 'deep operation'. 
300 This 
concept underlay the 1936 Field service Regulations (PU- 
36), and recent Soviet analysis has portrayed it 
graphically, as shown in figure 3.4.301 'Deep battle', 
confined to the tactical zone - the first 20 kilometres of 
the enemy dispositions - relied principally on armour and 
artillery to conduct near simultaneous engagement of 
enemy forces. This had been described by Triandafillov 
before his death, 'the possibility of simultaneous attack 
of the enemy throughout the entire depth of his tactical 
deployment'. 302 The much larger 'deep operation' had to 
involve considerable air power. 
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Although many of the most prominent future war 
thinkers perished in the purges from 1937, Soviet officers 
went on thinking and writing. GS Isserson, Chief of the 
Operational Faculty at the Frunze Academy and then 
Professor of operational art at the General Staff Academy, 
survived into the 1960s. Isserson noted operations in 
depth as the key 'characteristic of future war'. 303 This 
had been the subject of a large report by Yegorov in 1931, 
then called, somewhat less precisely, The Spatial 
(prostranstvenny) Operation. Isserson also noted that all 
this discussion took place at the operational level. 
'Questions of military strategy, in terms of the armed 
struggle on the level of the war as a whole, we could not 
get involved in'. 304 
Discussion of the operational meeting engagement and 
'March-manoeuvre'also continued, noting the indecisiveness 
of the World War I clashes and still drawing examples from 
the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese and 1912 Balkan wars. 305 
Yegorov was also a perceptive analyst of more 
detailed military-technical issues affecting future war. 
Mobility, he argued in a 1940 article, could depend on the 
most minute considerations. He advocated the adoption of a 
calibre of less than 6mm for small arms so as to lighten 
both the weapon and the ammunition carried. Only 
relatively recently have NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
adopted 5.56mm and 5.45mm calibre small arms, 
respectively. These replaced the 7.62 which was based on 
the 0.3 inch 'small calibre' rifles introduced with 
'smokeless powder' at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Against the background of the Soviet pioneering work with 
paratroops in the mid 1930s and their successful 
employment by the Germans in 1940, he also discussed 
'pkruzheniye po vertikal'nomy napravleniyu'-'vertical 
envelopment', in the context of a 'great contemporary 
war'. 306 
Zhukov's operation at Khalkhin-Gol in August 1939 
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evinced some of the ideas put forward in PU-36, notably 
the successful use of armour for encirclement. In some 
ways, Zhukov undoubtedly glimpsed the shape of future war, 
as it would occur shortly afterwards in France and 
Poland and develop in the later Soviet offensives of the 
Great Patriotic War. 307 However, this operation took place 
almost in isolation, and therefore lacked the crucial 
quality of the operational level as identified by Svechin, 
namely that i't involved a combination of many different 
tactical acti vities,, and contributed with other 
operations to a strategic aim. 
The 1939 Soviet Finnish War, though badly handled by 
the Red Army initially, also revealed some surprisingly 
futuristic developments on the technological side. Most 
notable was the employment of recoil-less guns, in which 
the Soviet Union appears to have led the world at this 
time. 308 
From early 1940 the Soviet military press was filled 
with analysis of their own experience in Finland and of 
the war in the west. Analysis of the lessons of the 
Norwegian campaign naturally focussed on sea and air 
questions (see parts 3.3 and 3.4). 
309 An anonymous article 
on 'Artillery in Contemporary war' analysed the 
breakthrough of the Mannerheim line in great detail, 
concluding that artillery remained the 'God of 
contemporary war' much as it had in World War 1,310 but 
the quite different lessons of the brief Polish-German war 
of 1939 were also presented. 
'Thus, the basic idea for using tanks involves 
their penetrating into the depth of the enemy's 
deployment as rapidly'as the conditions allow, 
deploying there, forming powerful (though 
sometimes incomplete) mobile groups, which 
disorganize the system of defence, cut the 
communications o is main elements, unwind 
it from within'. 1 
It was the Red Army's own PU-36 in action, and clearly 
recognized as such. 
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V Melikov's book Strategic De loyment, 'published in 
1940, reflected the continuing preoccupation with the 
critical opening phases of a war. 312 The interrelationship 
of the economy, defensive strength and 'culture', . 
referring to expertise and`, relevant skills, was 
continually stressed. 313 By 1941, it had become clear that 
in spite of initial German successes, natural resources, 
especially oil, 314 and productive capacity would be 
critical, as 'military action extended more widely and 
became more protracted'. 315 
It did not, admittedly, take a genius to recognize that 
by March 1941 the 'second Imperialist war', as it wat 
still being called, was 'A war of motors and reserves'. 
Nevertheless, an article with that-title identified the 
link between raw materials, productive capacity and 
evolving military technology and technique most 
succinctly. During World War I the mechanical energy per 
combatant in a front line army had increased from a tenth 
of a horsepower to between 1.5 and 2. By 1941 the figure 
was. 5 or 6 horsepower per soldier on the ground and if air 
forces were included, the figure rose to 10: a 
hundredfold increase since 1914. A 1918 tank had a6 
horsepower engine, a 1940 tank 15 to 20. The Soviet love 
of figures and percentage increases brought a fresh 
perspective to analysis of the character of the foreign 
war which was soon to embrace the Soviet Union. 316 
Another striking aspect of the Soviet analysis is the 
attention paid to the United States, even though it was 
not a direct combatant at this stage. Soviet analysts 
were naturally aware of the huge American contribution to 
the British Empire's war effort, but they lumped US 
resources squarely with those of the latter as if they 
formed a military alliance . BritishýEmpire and US steel 
production, for example, was assessed as double that of 
Germany, Italy and Japan. 317 The Russians were also 
extremely aware of the American lead in aircraft 
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production, both in quality and quantity. 318 
Hindsight obviously affects our reading of Soviet 
analysis just before the German invasion in June 1941 and 
the US entry into the war in December. Nevertheless, the 
attention paid to the military and economic power of the 
US and Army General. Zhukov's comments in a speech 
entitled, with prophetic familiarity, 'The Year of 
perestroika', suggest that the form of the war as it would 
develop was already known. 
'Even the USA, formally not a combatant, in fact 
exercises a powerful influence on the war in 
Europe and Asia [he was not referring to the 
far eastern war: Japan had not yet attacked Britain 
or the US]. The second Imperialist War 
has in fact become a World War. Judging by data 
in the Swiss newspaper Nazionale Zeitung, the 
population of the countries involved in the war 
is 1,526 million. Only the Soviet Union, as usual, 
(poprezhnemu) stands outside the war... 
Around Soviet frontiers the flame of the 
Second Imperialist War burns ever more fiercely., 
"The whole population [says Stalin] must wait 
in a state of mobilisation readiness before the 
danger of a military attack, so that no "accident" 
and no trick by ogf9external enemies can take 
us by surprise ". 
The Soviet view of future war in the 1920s and 30s as 
likely to involve an attack on the USSR by a capitalist 
coalition, and Marxist-Leninist emphasis on economic 
factors may have exercised some influence on Soviet 
perceptions. The USA was the greatest capitalist power: 
therefore, it ought to be involved, even though military 
events at that stage were taking a different course. 
Meanwhile, manoeuvres and war games proceeded to 
determine Soviet conduct of military operations if that 
became necessary. According to the recently published 
testimony of MV Zakharov, who had become an assistant to 
the Chief of the General Staff in 1938, a new plan for 
strategic deployment was adopted at the end of 1940, which 
required the mobilisation plan to be re-worked. 
320 
Zakharov confirms that by spring 1941 it was 'quite clear' 
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to the Central Committee and Soviet Government, as well as 
the General Staff that Germany was preparing to. attack 
the Soviet Union. 321 
In January 1941 the Operational directorate of the 
General Staff ran two operational-strategic war games. 32 
officers and generals took part, with a staff of 55 
assisting in running the game. Zakharov recounts the 
course of the first war game in great detail, and it was 
clearly highly significant. 'The scenario, created for the 
war game, abounded with dramatic episodes for the eastern 
(Soviet] side; they resembled the events which unfurled on 
our frontiers-in June 1941 in many ways'. 322 
The game was set seven months hence, in July 1941. The 
choice of predicted timescale was undoubtedly based on the 
best intelligence available, and may in part account for 
the surprise achieved by the Germans when they attacked on 
22 June. The 'western'(German) side were to begin their 
main thrust south of Brest, with 60 divisions in the first 
echelon, on 15 July. The initial objective was the line 
Baranovichi-Dvinsk-Riga, to be reached by 15 August. 323 
The main objectives of this, as of any comparable war 
game, were 'to work out and master the principles of 
modern, defensive and offensive combat'; to practise 
commanders in organising and planning front, and army 
operations and cooperation between different arms 
(including the fleet). Specific questions included 
'The defence of the state frontier during 
an attack by superior enemy forces; withdrawal 
to a prepared defensive belt; conducting limited 
operations to defeat the enemy in operational 
battles near the frontiers; overcoming forward 
defensive positions; capturing fortified regions; 
breaking through field defences; organizing 
pursuit and assault river crossings by a, 324 cavalry-mechanized army, and also mountain passes s 
Although concentrating on the centre of the western 
frontier, the game would also study the Baltic and South- 
Western theatres. 
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The second war game took place from 8 to 11 January. 
This studied the same problems but whereas the first had 
been confined to a relatively limited, marshy and heavily 
wooded region, the second covered a far greater area 
including mountain and steppe and many water obstacles. 
325 
As in the first game, there was great emphasis on 
fortifications. With hindsight, it is easy to forget that 
at the beginning of World War II permanent fortifications 
had reached the highest stage of development in their 
history, spurred on by the experience of the First World 
and Spanish Civil Wars. Although well aware that the 
Germans had been able to outflank the Maginot line, the 
Red Army had been unable to outflank the Mannerheim line 
porotecting Finland and, not unnaturally, attached great 
importance to such operations. This emerges clearly from 
the contemporary sources. 326 
There are certain inconsistencies in Zakharov's 
account, 327 but it seems likely that the war game did 
'overestimate our [the Red Army's] defensive abilities 
somewhat', and therefore 'did not provide realistic 
propositions about the character of actions by forces in 
the opening period of [a] war'. 328 
Zakharov suggests that an influential body of opinion 
was wedded to the experience of the First World War as the 
source of all knowledge relating to the mobilisation, 
deployment and concentration of forces, which would 
certainly reflect the large volume of analysis during the 
1930s. However, 
'In the new conditions of war: of a war of motors 
and various types of powerful military technology, 
a high standard of training was required above 
all, a whole system of properly worked out 
methods and resources to repel massed offensives 
by powerful forces of mobile formations 
with powerful air and artillery support. 329 
But there were also 'positive sides'. The war games 
supported the general move back towards large mobile 
formations, which had been broken up at the end of 1939 
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after a bad showing in Poland, but then reintroduced with 
a vengeance in mid-1940 after the German triumph in 
France, though without the necessary equipment or trained 
personnel. Most importantly, 
'Higher commanders had significant experience 
in controlling powerful front-level higher 
formations in the complicated circumstances 
of manoeuvre action in the opening period of 
a war, over large territorial expanses. Already 
it had become clear, that in future front 
operations would form a component part in 330 larger-scale operations by groups of fronts . 
From this time on, the author is arguably dealing with 
immediate plans and preparations for imminent hostilities 
rather than visions of future war as understood for the 
purposes of this thesis. However, in the light of new 
evidence which emerged shortly before this study was 
completed, it would not be improper to allude to the, plan 
for a limited pre-emptive strike against Germany signed by 
Army General Zhukov on 15 May, 1941. 
Communist of the Armed Forces confirmed that Zhukov 
approved and signed a plan to launch 150 Soviet divisions 
against the 100 German divisions which were stationed in 
the territory of the former state of Poland and preparing 
to attack the USSR. The plan aimed to split the Germans 
from their southern allies and encircle the main German 
group of forces , as shown in figure 3.5. The second phase 
of the operation aimed to occupy all the territory of the 
former Polish state, and east Prussia. 331 It appears to 
be a reasonable and workable plan, although, given the 
German superiority in experience, efficiency and training, 
it still posed considerable risks. The Soviet author of 
the article, who claims to have seen the plan, appears to 
be in no doubt that such an action would have crippled 
Germany and made a su4cessful assault on the Soviet Union 
impossible. Reputable sources indicate that on 15 May the 
Kremlin received information from Richard Sorge, the 
Soviet agent in Tokyo, that a German attack was definitely 
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scheduled from about 20 May. This may have provided 
Zhukov with the firm information he needed to present the 
plan to the political leadership. 332 
By 1941, the Soviet view of the next war in which the 
Soviet state would be involved therefore comprised a war 
'of reserves and motors'. This conviction was at the core 
of the great industrialisation of the 1930s, and had grown 
out of the experience and study of World War I. Besides an 
awareness of technological development itself, it 
reflected the understanding that in war, technological 
innovations were only decisive if utilised en masse, and 
the singular Soviet view that masss and quality had to be 
combined. S Vishnev was a regular contributor to military 
journals on the spiralling implications of mass 
rearmament. While ostensibly analysing 'problems of the 
rearmament of foreign armies', he described this process 
in 1932: 
'Numerous examples from the experience of previous 
(minuvshikh)wars underline this rule: super long 
range bombardment of Paris in 1918, tanks, chem- 
ical weapons, air bombardment - all these in- 
novations (noviki) of military technology have 
not given the necessary results because of the 
inadequacy of their mass effect at the time of 
their appearance. On t Fe of er hand the old, well 
known military means (for example, machine guns, 
artillery), used in unexpectedly large 
quantities and in a concentrated fashion, 
often created a qualitatively different, 
incomparably more powerful effect. There is 
every cause to think, that in the future types 
of weaponry will give serious results only in 
conditions of their mass employment. However 
does any army have the ability to fully equip 
itself with the very lates ypes of weaponry 
in sufficient quantities? '3 
Vishnev's analysis set out the blueprint for what became 
the Soviet evolutionary philosophy, with particular stress 
on variants of standard equipment. 334 His comments were 
vindicated with the relative ineffectiveness of German 
secret weapons against allied forces using relatively 
conventional means in unprecedented numbers. The former , 
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deployed or planned, included Vis, V2s, the planned super 
long range gun, jet aircraft, surface to air, air to air 
and air to surface missiles, The latter were of good 
quality, though not at the absolute cutting edge of 
innovation, as were the products of German genius. The 
technological innovations that had a decisive effect were 
employed en masse but in secret, for example radar. This 
highlights the particular and different character of the 
nuclear weapon. At first sight, dropping one of only a 
couple in existence on Hiroshima would appear to violate 
Vishnev's prescription. But it embodied so much 'mass' in 
its very character that it worked. Nonetheless, it was a 
gamble: had the Japanese not been on the point of 
surrendering anyway, and had they known that the Americans 
did not have many such bombs, the result might have been 
different. 
The Soviet writers therefore forecast a war in which 
industrial strength and natural resources would be 
paramount; a war involving the whole of society, with 
draconian, unprecedented control and exploitation of every 
man, woman and child. It would not be a 'little war'. Yet 
it would be a war in which the opening period was, once 
again, crucial. If this phase were badly managed, disaster 
could ensue, as happened in the case of Poland, Norway, 
France, Belgium Holland. At best, geographical situation, 
natural resources and overall strength might enable a 
nation defeated in the 'opening period' to claw back its 
position, but at great cost, as happened with Britain and 
the USSR. In addition to technology itself, the expertise 
to use it, and overall 'culture' would also be crucial. 
The economic, technological and demographic resources of 
the United States would be decisive. 
Even more than World War I, it would be a 'serious 
examination', to quote Svechin, of the entire national 
organism. It would be a war of huge actions at the 
operational-strategic level, by groups of fronts, with 
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massive armoured formations employed to strike deep and 
exploit breakthroughs in immensely strong fortified 
fronts. The Soviet commentators appear to have agreed in 
general, if not always in absolute detail. The military 
put forward plans to preempt a possible attack, which 
could arguably have worked. They were terrified of being 
taken by surprise. 
Once again, the Soviet General Staff, the staff of the 
Military Academies, other informed writers and the 
occasional litterateur had got their view of the next land 
war about right. 
3.3. FUTURE WAR AT SEA, CA. 1880-1945 
'Naval power is assembled with great care, 
according to the traditions of the past and 
the requirements of the present, but, without 
forseeing the future, it will come to total 
bankruptcy. ' 
Admiral Ob in Morskoy Sbornik, 1886, 
cited in the fic iona future war 
novel The Cruiser "Russian Hope", 1887.335 
During the 1860s, the Russians paid great attention to 
the lessons of the American Civil War. On the one hand, 
the disproportionate damage inflicted by the Alabama and 
other Confederate cruisers demonstrated the possibilities 
of 'Kreyserskaya voyna'- 'cruiser warfare' by a weaker 
naval power against the commerce and trade of a stronger. 
On the other, the United States, though an advanced 
industrial power, occupied a naval position not unlike 
that of Russia in relation to Britain and France. 
Furthermore, before the writing of Mahan at the end of the 
century, United States naval thinking emphasized commerce 
destruction and coast defence. It was thus thoroughly 
understandable to the Russians. During the 1860s, Morskoy 
sbornik contained many articles on American naval 
technology, and when the Naval Ministry began an intensive 
study of mine warfare in 1864, it began by using American 
reports. 
The lessons of the Crimean War, particularly the Baltic 
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where British and French warships with their deep draught 
had been unable to get to grips with the shallow-draught 
gunboats used by the Russians, also reinforced Russian 
interest in Monitors. These were named after the USS 
Monitor, the low, turreted ironclad which engaged the 
Merrimack in the first battle between such ships. Ten were 
launched in 1864. They were similar to'the American Civil 
war Monitors, except that the Russians preferred smaller 
and lighter guns, as they were more easily handled. this 
preference for lighter and handier artillery permeates 
Russian and Soviet naval (and to some extent also land) 
thinking. 336 
Mention must be made of the two extraordinary Popovkas, 
the circular ships designed by Admiral Popov in 1873-75, 
some of the most extraordinary ships ever built. Designed 
to provide a stable platform for their heavy guns, and 
carrying heavy side armour, they proved utter failures, 
whirling helplessly in the currents of the Dnieper. They 
were one of the more extravagant Russian 'future war' 
fantasies. 
More significant was a growing interest in fast 
commerce-raiding ironclads to roam the high seas. Eight 
small ironclads carrying 6-inch guns were built during the 
1870s, but these had somewhat limited range and in about 
1870 Admiral Popov was asked to draw up plans for ocean- 
going cruisers, of Which two were built. 
During the later 19th century a major naval revolution 
occurred less than every ten years. The British and French 
composite battleships of the Crimean War were replaced by 
the revolutionary ironclad Warrior, and another generation 
separated this from the Devastation of 1873, which had 
multiple turrets, no sails, and looked like a recognisably 
modern warship. The British led every one of these' 
revolutions. Russia had no way of matching these 
developments. Yet Britain was her most probable enemy, as 
the two empires drew closer in Asia. The Russians wisely 
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declined to take on the British on their own terms, and 
continued their interest in mines. During the Crimean war 
the British ships Merlin and Firefly-were badly damaged 
off Kronshtadt after striking mines, where the impact 
broke a glass tube inside releasing acid which detonated 
the main charge. The Russians also developed a much more 
powerful mine placed on the sea-bed and fired electrically 
from shore. A school of mine warfare was established in 
1875, and the Nikolayev Academy began courses in mine 
warfare in 1877.337 
At the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877, 
Russia was infinitely stronger-on sea than on land. The 
Turks, however, did not capitalise on their naval 
superiority. But the Russians employed all the weapons 
available to them: coastal batteries, mines and primitive 
torpedo craft. In spite of the unreliable torpedoes 
available, the torpedo attacks were daring and relatively 
successful. There was also a plan, formulated by Admiral 
Popov, to lay mines to shut the British out of the Black 
Sea. In the event, a study by Engineer-General Count 
Eduard Totleben (1818-84), the famous fortress engineer, 
determined that it was too late to lay the mines before 
the British could intervene, and that the Russian 
minelayers would be excessively vulnerable to Turkish 
shore batteries. Reluctantly, the Russians abandoned yet 
another promising foretaste of future war. Before the 
Congress of Berlin reached a settlement,. the Russians 
deployed 22 cruisers worldwide, to positions where they 
could attack British commerce. 338 
Commerce raiding provided the main. scenario for the 
fictional but expert future war novel The Cruiser "Russian 
Hope"(1887), by 'A. K. '. Vice Admiral AK Belomor. was the 
author of the other notable future war naval fiction work 
of this period, and it seems plausible that he may have 
authored The Cruiser "Russian Hope" also. - 
The Russian Hope is despatched from Kronshtadt before 
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the outbreak of war with Britain, which begins in Central 
Asia. The Captain has sealed orders to be opened when the 
cruiser reaches 440 N, 0310 E. The writer alludes to the 
Alabama incident which, he says, proved to the Russian 
Admiralty 'the terrible power of. cruisers in a war with a 
naval and commercial nation'. 339 The cruiser itself is 
described, although it is 'far inferior to the one, 
projected by Morsoy Sbornik, by the anonymous author of 
the article "Future Men of War"' 0 
340 
The Russians proceed to sink large quantities of 
British trade. although with a scrupulous regard for 
international law. Most intriguing is-the capture of the 
City of Birmingham which is carrying 50 collapsible 
torpedo boats which the dastardly British plan to carry 
overland from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea. They 
then plan to launch them to wreak havoc on the flank of 
Russian forces in Central Asia. One can only, admire the 
ingenuity of the Russian author, a senior officer 'A. K. ', 
which may have exceeded that of the British themselves. 
The Russians win the war, as the attacks on the nerve 
system of the British empire have a disproportionate 
effect. Ireland and almost all India rise in revolt; 
Australia experiences displeasure at Britain's inability 
to protect it; the Russian Army reaches the Indus and the 
Navy sets fire to Bombay harbour. 341 
The introduction to the English translation notes the 
'calm assumption that our navy is incapable of taking its 
own part, and is inevitably doomed to succumb in a 
conflict with that of Russia'. 342 The 'frank hostility 
towards this country animating the whole composition lends 
a pungent zest to the flights of fancy... '343 It is clear 
that in the 1880s war between Britain and Russia was more 
likely than at just abdit any time before or since. 
However, the need to maintain and raise morale of the 
Russian navy emerges as a key issue. Always the Cinderella 
service in Russia, the navy appears to have suffered 
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continual crises of morale. Fred T Jane, the notable 
British analyst of naval affairs, made this point in The 
Imperial Russian Navy in 1904, a book which eulogised 
Russian naval power and foretold the day when the 'white 
flag with the blue St Andrew's Cross' of the Imperial 
fleet would 'one day rule the seas, as the white flag with 
the red cross of St George now rules it'. 344 Nevertheless, 
Jane noted that 'Ivan realises that he exists to be shot 
at, Jack, that he exists to shoot at others, and this 
psychological difference is... all the difference in the 
world'. 345 
The importance of professionalism and morale as a 
concomitant of constantly evolving equipment also 
permeates another future war novel produced in this period 
of extreme antipathy between Britain and Russia. Vice- 
Admiral AK Belomor's The Fatal War of 18?? (1889) is a 
more minute and considered scenario than the Russian Hope, 
and not restricted to war at sea. It provides startling 
predictions of the Great War of a quarter of a century 
later. The Germans invade France and reach the environs of 
Paris, just as they did in 1914. They lay their 'heavy 
hand' on Belgium and Holland. Finally, Germany begins to 
present a threat to Britain at sea. However, Belomor makes 
the same error as Bliokh: Russia, with 120 million people, 
is not threatened, behind her 'unassailable frontiers'. 
346 
The Abyssinians attack the Suez canal and sever Britain's 
communications with India. The 'new naval power', Germany, 
requires colonies overseas. But 'which colonies could be 
more useful, more accessible, more desirable, than 
Britain's? '347 
Belomor likens this world war to the Punic Wars, but 
'still more terrible, more horrific, than ancient 
history'. It is subsequently christened by historians and 
writers 'The Fatal War', a name which carries much the 
same sense as 'The War to end War'. 348 
Belomor uses the intersting analogy between cruiser 
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warfare and partisans. Striking at the enemy's commerce 
was just like partisans attacking the enemy's lines of 
communication on land. However, cruisers were not limited 
to this role which, ultimately, would be auxiliary to the 
major battles. Belomor also envisaged armoured cruisers 
having a battle role. 349 The Fatal War... is a striking 
prediction of World War I, virtually unknown to scholars - 
in the west. It was translated into German in 1897.350 
Besides the remarkable military-political scenarios, it 
stresses the continued importance of the human element in 
war, and the problems generated by changing times and 
changing technology: 
'Tempora mutantur [the times are changing] ... Sic but is there anything less relevant to the 
fleet than this Latin quotation? There, 
where everything has to be built successively 
over decades, and depends on the soul and 
inner qualities of the personnel, - where yet 
more ships are not enough. These most 
sophisticatesd but, nevertheless, soulless 
vessels must be driven by peo le"""" On the 
basis f known computations the practical 
man can even show a certain skill and daring 
in the construction of hulls. But all these 
hulls, even if they will be covered with 
two-foot thick armour, if they will 
be armed with 20-inch guns, if they will move 
at the speed of a bird, do they make a Navy? 351 
Some of the Battleships of World War II came close to 
Belomor's deliberately extravagant 1889 prediction in 
terms of armour and gun calibre, while modern Soviet 
ships, fast attack craft and hovercraft carrying massive 
cruise missiles arguably fulfil these criteria of 
firepower and speed, though at the expense of armour 
protection. 
The emphasis on coastal defence and cruiser warfare 
continued until the mid-1890s, when a gradual shift 
towards building a blue-water navy began. This was in 
part influenced by the writings of Mahan, which penetrated 
Russian naval thinking both directly and through the 
writing of Nikolay Klado (1861-1919). 352. This school was, 
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however, discredited by the disastrous Russian naval 
performance in the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War. After the 
war, an energetic debate began as to Russia's naval needs, 
led by Klado, and documented in the pages of Morskoy 
Sbornik. 
Not unsurprisingly, a return to 'cruiser warfare' was 
one option discussed extensively during the period between 
the Russo-Japanese and First World Wars. 353 So was a 
return to coast defence. 354 Technological developments 
were followed enthusiastically, notably the appearance of 
the Dreadnought, 355 sea-planes, 356 balloons and 
airships. 357 Foreign litereature, particularly British 
and Italian, was widely translated, on such subjects as 
'The warship of the future', 
358 and 'Flying machines in 
naval warfare'. 359 After about 1910 attention focussed on 
heavier than air aircraft. 360 
To its credit, the Russian Naval Ministry does not 
appear to have allow itself to be mesmerised by 
technicalities, or tinker with peripherals while failing 
to consider basic choices. During 1911 two important 
analyses appeared. the first covered the 'Present and 
Future of the Japanese Navy', which already looked forward 
to 'a future war' in the Pacific, foreseeing the analyses, 
Soviet and emigre, of the 1920s. 361 Another addressed the 
crucial first period of any conflict, 'A Sudden Attack 
across the Sea as a means of beginning Military 
operations'. 
362 
There was also a fundamental appraisal of the 
questions: why did Russia need a Navy and, if it did, what 
sort of navy. In 1908, a provocatively titled analysis, 
'Why does Russia need a Navy? ', was published. 
363 In 1913, 
the first parts of Klado's 'Studies in Strategy' appeared, 
which it would not be extravagant to suggest, laid the 
framework of Russian and Soviet thinking about future war 
at sea until the nuclear era which began 32 years later. 
Klado pointed out that naval weapons technology was more 
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complicated and expensive than that used on land. Russian 
naval strategy, because of her geographical position, was 
closely entwined with the country's land strategy. Control 
of the Gulf of Finland out to the Aland Islands was 
essential to permit movement of Russian land forces, while 
the Black Sea also had to be held to permit access to the 
Danube, the Balkans and, through the Straits, to the 
outside world. In the Far East, a triangle from 
Vladivostok, to Nikolayevsk, to Khabarovsk and containing 
most of Russia's Pacific population had to be defended. 
Klado noted the mineral resources of Manchuria and the 
central position of Korea. The Japanese interest in this 
area between the world wars, and the struggle between. the 
-west and the USSR over Korea attest to the farsightedness 
of Klado's geo-political and geo-strategic views. _364 
Hitherto, the Russian Navy had shown no particular 
interest in the vessel which would revolutionise naval 
warfare more than any other: the submarine. But after the 
Russo-Japanese war, the submarine appeared to some to 
offer a relatively cheap but highly effective way of 
restoring Russian naval power. In 1908, for example, in 
reply to Captain Rimskiy-Korsakov's article 'Why-does 
Russia need a Navy? ', a Lieutenant argued that a force of 
submarines could perform many of the missions he had 
outlined more cheaply and efficiently. Rimskiy- Korsakov 
having established the strategic significance of Korea, 
the author argued that a 'well organized detachment of 
submarines', based at Vladivostok, could secure the area, 
given a radius of action of 2,500 nautical miles. 365 
Whereas surface ships were highly visible, and rapidly 
became out of date, the same did. not apply to submarines. 
Even if obsolescent, they could still do the job they were 
designed for, a remarkably perceptive point. 
'I do not deny the need for a balanced surface, 
fleet [lineyny flot): it is necessary as an 
aggressive weapon for operations in distant seas 
far from our own, for, demonstrations, bombarding 
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fortresses. Russia, as a great power, 
needs such a fleet. But now, when all our 
sea frontiers lie completely undefended before 
our enemies, a balanced surface fleet would 
be a luxury for us. 
It is necessary to build a submarine fleet 
independent of external influences, to 
guarantee defence of our coasts and to fulfil 
the most important strategic missions... 
a submarine fleet can be used for its role 
independently of the shipbuilding programme 
of our rivals, and every boat represents a 
most important and independent military 
, 366 entity, even if it is of an obsolete type. 
Already, some Russian officers were talking in terms of 
a navy of 500 submarines and little else, an extravagant 
and extreme position, but one not inconsistent with the 
penchant of some Russians to advocate early and massive 
re-equipment with new means of warfare. 
367 It was a view 
that would find favour in the early Soviet period, and has 
been reflected in the Soviet emphasis. on submarines-ever 
since. - 
The need to recover the position lost in 1905 rapidly, 
and general financial stringency led to some remarkable 
innovations. Russian battle cruisers were more like high- 
speed battleships, a type of vessel that did not appear in 
other navies until the 1930s. Three Dreadnoughts laid down 
in 1911 had guns with a uniquely high angle of elevation, 
making them the longest range Dreadnoughts afloat. This, 
combined with the Russian purchase of the Pollen fire 
control computer, invented by a British officer to perform 
the complex calculations needed to hit a moving target 
from a moving platform, and an excellent short-wave radio 
system for fire control, meant that Russian naval gunnery 
proved highly advanced'during World War 1.368 There were 
also a number of remarkable innovations in naval aviation 
(see 3.4, below). 
During the decade from 1922 to 1932 naval limitation 
treaties retarded naval developments. Although the RSFSR 
did not particpate in the 1922 Washington Treaty on naval 
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limitations, she benefitted from this as she was in no 
position to compete in any naval arms race., Only with the 
five year plans could serious rehabilitation of the navy 
begin. A naval construction programme was announced in 
1928, which included some submarines and naval aircraft. 
The more far-sighted considerations of future war focused 
almost exclusively on land-air operations. Triandafillov's 
Character of the Operations of Contemporary Armies does so by 
definition, but Svechin's Strategy also largely ignores 
naval matters, with the exception of transporting armies 
across the sea, which he deals with under the heading of 
'communications'. 369 Finding fault with Svechin's views 
on naval forces therefore presented his critics in the 
1931 Leningrad Komakad session with a problem. The short 
section criticising Svechin's views on naval forces began 
by condemning his lack of emphasis on the role of 'Red 
Commanders' and his likenening the Red Army's occupation 
of Poland to the conquests of Genghis Khan, and had 
nothing to do with naval matters at all. Not until-the 
fourth page out of seven did the critic admit that 'in 
fact, in all Svechin's Strategy you will not find a single 
word about naval forces or maritime theatres, except for a 
single example from the 16th century, concerning the 
Spaniard Fernand Cortes'. 370 The critic chose to ignore 
Svechin's treatment of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, but 
turned to The Evolution of Military Art, where Svechin had 
'totally denied the significance and necessity of the Navy 
in the general system of armed forces'. 371 Svechin's 
emphasis on the strategic defensive was held to blame. 
Svechin was prepared to let the enemy seize forward 
cities and industrial centres, and therefore coastal 
regions were also a low priority. Svechin's emphasis on 
the strategic defensi\"e on land was likened to the 
classical emphasis on command of the sea-advocated by BB 
Zherve, (1879-1937), a lecturer at the Naval Academy from 
1918 and its Chief from 1928-to 1931.372 This seems a 
2E 8 
somewhat tenuous argument. Svechin's argument that the 
Russian army could only achieve technological parity with 
the Germany if Russia forsook development of a new navy 
after Tsushima was criticised as 'for the naive and 
militarily illiterate', although it made some sense, as 
was his conviction that the development of railways had 
made assaults from the sea (desk) easier to counter. 
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The Soviet emphasis on submarines and flotilla 
vessels, which was similar to the French 19th century 
'young school'-jeune ecole - was arguably a function of 
naval weakness, but could be supported by military 
arguments. Writing in 1931, Tukhachevskiy sharply 
consigned major battleships to history. 'After the 
appearance of submarines a decline in the significance of 
ironclads is inevitable'. 374 He attached great importance 
to torpedo bombers, a view which World War II vindicated. 
Ironclads, he said, were designed the wrong way round, 
with fewer anti-aircraft guns than surface to surface 
weapons, whereas in fact they were likely to be attacked 
by far more aircraft than ships. Torpedo craft also had 
great potential, and were consistent with his view on land 
and air systems that there was obvious merit in using 
platforms which were nearly identical with civilian ones. 
'Having a speed of 50 knots and more, presenting 
a small target and with a powerful torpedo 
armament, these boats can be made ready in 
huge numbers and used for peaceful purposes, 
sport, at holiday resorts, and so on. 
Certain limitations on these boats' 
seaworthiness make them especially 
important for the defence of internal seas. 
Thus, naval forces are undergoing as 
fundamental a restructuring (perestroika) 
of views, and perhaps an even more decisive 
one, than on land. The old, familiar relationship 
of views on military forces is changing 
fundamentally. Gigantic creative thought, 
freed from calloused traditions, now requires 
sailors to march in step with the contemporary 
development of technology and to use all those 
inescapable possibilities which the 
industrialization of the country is creating, 
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, and not just to use them, but to use them with 
maximum effectiveness and. determination. 
It is also a characteristic feature of naval 
forces that in the country unprecedented 
reserves of naval araments are being-created: , 375 aircraft, torpedo boats and armed civilian ships. 
Tukhachevskiy's comments reflected the views of AP 
Aleksandrov, who wrote a monograph criticising traditional 
naval strategy, including the concept of command of the 
sea, in 1930. He also suggested that the light forces 
which he and Tukhachevskiy advocated could be produced 
rapidly, so that productive capacity during a war, rather 
than strength at the beginning of a war, was the true 
determinant of victory. 376 With all the discussion of the 
'opening period of a war', the veteran naval analyst 
Viktor Novitskiy was prompted to remind readers of the 
importance of naval forces in 1935. After general remarks 
indicating that the character of the next ('a future') war 
had become a subject of debate almost immediately after 
the Treaty of Versailles, he pointed out the enormous 
changes wrought by aircraft. Previously, military and 
industrial mobilisation and strategic deployment had been 
concealed by a cordon of forces on the ground. Now, these 
activities could be disrupted without warning from the 
air. 
377 Greater use of water transport would help, as, 
unlike railways, rivers could not be closed by a single 
bomb. Nor were they so"vulnerable to air assault landings 
(vozdushnye desanty), a comment which shows that the new 
device of parachute and air-landing which had only emerged 
in the previous five years had already been incorporated 
in other areas of military thinking. 378 It was unnecessary 
to protect the route against air attack: merely the 
individual shipments ('echelons'). His advocacy of water 
transport was weakened by the unfortunate geographical 
fact that most of western Russia's rivers ran 
perpendicular to likely operational lines in the next war, 





Novitskiy also pointed out that transatlantic 
communications might be critical, alluding to the 
deployment of American forces in the final stages of the 
Great War. By this time, allied command of the sea had 
assured a , 'significant level of reliability' to-these 
communications. 380. Alongside some rather obvious comments 
about the relevance of naval forces to securing the flanks 
of Soviet land armies, Novitskiy pointed to the recent 
appearance of the German-'pocket battleships', which, he 
said, absolutely rightly, were 'designed first of all for 
attacks in the opening period [of the next war] on the 
mobilisation and deployment of the enemy's armed 
forces. '381 The deployment of 'pocket battleships' before 
the outbreak of hostilities and their attacks on shipping 
recall the Russians' own thoughts on 'cruiser warfare' 
from the 1860s. 
An abrupt change in Soviet attitudes to the future sea 
warfare in which they might be involved occurred in 1936- 
37, for a variety of possible reasons. -These were: Soviet 
inability to guarantee supplies to the Republicans in the 
Spanish Civil War; Germany's renunciation of the Treaty of 
Versailles in 1935; the increasing threat from Germany and 
Japan, with an increased German threat in the Baltic and 
Japanese involvement on the Asian mainland, which 
increased the importance of the Pacific maritime flank; 
and the emerging realisation that-the Jeune Ecole 
philosophy contained within it an implied scepticism about 
the capabilities of Soviet technology and industry, 
combined with the genuine achievements of the first two 
five-year plans; and Stalin's own vanity. 
382 The Soviet 
government decided to build a 'blue-water'-navy. 
The new policy was announced in Morskoy Sbornik in 
january, 1938, in an article by IP Smirnov, the newly 
appointefd People's Commissar for the Navy. He cited 
Molotov's words to the Supreme Soviet, that 'A mighty 
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Soviet power (derzhava) must have a sea and oceanic fleet, 
corresponding to its interests, adequate for our great 
task'. 383 The USSR was now 'a great naval power'-, an 
example of reification, of deciding that something must be 
and therefore saying that it was already attained. Molotov 
pointed out the great extent of the Soviet coastline, 
Italian adventurism in Abyssinia and Italian and German 
intervention in Spain. 384 After an extensive quotation 
from Stalin, Smirnov alluded to the advances of Soviet 
industry, which 'fully guaranteed the requirements imposed 
on it by the construction of a great sea- and ocean-going 
fleet'. He added that 'a modern warship is, from a 
technical point of view, the most complicated 
construction'"385 
The next month, February, 1938, Smirnov went public in 
Pravda, saying that 'we need a still more powerful navy, a 
more modern sea and ocean going navy. so decided the 
Party. So decided the government. The whole Soviet people 
so decided. i386 The whole Soviet people had little to do 
with it, but Stalin could hardly remain oblivious to the 
high-profile, prestige value of major warships as an 
expression of the powerful, industrialized state which the 
Soviet Union had supposedly become, especially in the 
light of Engels' views on the subject. It was hardly 
coincidence that the previous year, Morskoy Sbornik had 
reported the presence of the Soviet battleship Marat 
alongside 200 other British and foreign warships at the 
Spithead Review in the English Channel. The British 
newspapers were duly impressed by the attractive lighting 
of the ship and the illuminated five-pointed stars at the 
mastheads. 
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The Third Five-Year Plan (1938-42) included a 
grandiose shipbuilding plan with the addition of two 
capital ships and two aircraft-carriers. However, there 
were constant problems with the supply. of technology from 
abroad. Italian design was incorporated into two 59,000 
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ton battleships laid down in 1938, in Leningrad Nand 
Nikolayev, and two battle cruisers laid down in 1939. 
Italian influence can still be seen in the graceful design 
of modern Soviet surface warships. But both the USA and 
Germany refused to pass on aircraft carrier designs. Work 
on the first battle cruiser, believed to have been named 
Strana Sovetov (Country of the Soviets), was suspended in 
late 1940 before the bow and stern sections were added. 
Photographic interpreters examining German air photographs 
saw the squared-off hull and believed it was an aircraft 
carrier, an error which persisted after the war. 
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A remarkable Italian analysis of future war at sea was 
translated in Morskoy sbornik in 1937. The article 
predicted that the 'navy of the future' would comprise: 
'big ships "with the strongest possible 
armour"; 
special air defence ships; 
small aircraft carriers for reconnaissance 
and torpedo carrying aircraft, and aircraft 
for close-in defence; 
big submarine cruisers 
submarines of a size corres? gpqing to the 
tasks allotted to them... 
Although the first prediction has not transpired, the 
remainder form a striking prediction of subsequent naval 
developments and modern naval forces. Specialised air 
defence ships, now called destroyers, are a distinct class 
of vessel, and the Soviet Kirov class cruisers may have a 
specialised air defence role. The modern small aircraft 
carrier, sometimes called an anti-submarine cruiser, with 
helicopters and vertical take-off fighters for self 
defence, a product of the 1960s and 1970s, conforms to 
this description: the British Invincible class, the 
Italian Giuseppe Garibaldi, the Soviet Kiev and Moskva. 
The 'big submarine cruiser' is represented by the 26,500 
ton Soviet Typhoon, and recent Soviet predictions of 
massive nuclear submarine ships (see 4.7) recall this 
article of half a century before. The article also 
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stressed the vulnerability of naval bases to air attack 
(Pear Harbor), and the need for 'great protected hangars 
for submarines', a prophecy again fulfilled with the World 
War II German U-boat pens and the covered silos for 
submarines in the Kola peninsula. 
One area where the Russians remained behind other 
naval powers was that of very large calibre guns. A 1937. 
article examined the possible development of. future large 
naval guns of 500mm and 600mm calibre, and howitzers of 
750mm and 900mm. Shells might increase in size in 
proportion to calibre, or elongated while retaining the 3 
same calibre or even reducing it. The potential of sub- 
calibre rounds, so important in the recent and continuing 
artillery revolution, was not considered in this context 
although the author did mention superguns with a range of 
up to 110 km, the Paris gun, which so fascinated Soviet 
artillerymen in this period. This had used a significantly 
lightened' special shell, but the potential of this idea 
to increase the range of large naval guns was not 
mentioned. 
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In the years immediately before the Soviet-German war 
the Soviet desire to develop a 'blue-water' fleet was 
constrained by limitations on industrial development and 
changing political and strategic circumstances. In 1937, 
the USSR had decided to build up a large fleet at Murmask 
with access to the open ocean, and reduce forces in the 
Baltic where treaties appeared to assure the neutrality of 
Poland, the Baltic States and Scandinavia. By 1939, German 
aggression necessitated a return of emphasis to the 
Baltic. 391 The Nazi-Soviet Pact and the outbreak of World 
war II caused the British intelligence services to 
reappraise Soviet intentions and abilities. at sea, but the 
embryonic 'blue-water'ýnavy was not seen as significant. 
Analysing 'What Naval Action can the USSR take against 
Great Britain', the Directorate of Naval Intelligence 
began: 
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'USSR modern surface vessels at present are - few in number and the question can be summed 
up in one [sic] word: "Submarine action". ' 392 
Even with completion of the current naval programme, in 
three to four years' time, the Soviet Navy ewas only 
expected to be able to achieve command of the northern 
Baltic. 393 
Of four capital ships and 14 modern cruisers laid down 
between 1935 and 1941, only four heavy cruisers and one 
Italian built light cruiser were operational in June 1941. 
Two heavy cruisers were completed in the far est in 1944 
and five 'Chapayev' class cruisers were completed in 1949- 
50.394 The effect of the Great Patriotic War on Soviet 
naval ambitions was catastrophic. The blue-water navy 
envisaged in the late 1930s arguably did not-see the 
light of day until it appeared in updated form the 1960s 
or even 1970s. This is a reminder both of the 
extraordinary time taken to build individual major 
warships, let alone a coherent fleet, and a reflection of 
Engels' observation that a major warship is the most 
sophisticated and demanding product of an advanced 
nation's industry. Only at the end of the 1980s did the 
USSR produce a fully developed conventional aircraft 
carrier. Because of the USSR's geo-strategic position, it 
has not needed such aircraft carriers in the way that more 
predominantly maritime nations have: the USA, Britain and 
Japan. However, a search for specific roles and concepts 
of operations to justify Soviet development of such 
vessels is unrewarding. As the authoritative Jane's" 
Fighting Ships commented, 'If you. have a vessel that can 
carry and operate 60 or so fixed wing aircraft, its 
potential roles are as wide as the ocean itself'. 395 The 
uncertainty of the future strategic environment would seem 
likely to encourage greater emphasis on naval forces, "with 
their unique flexibility. 
.. ý. 
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4. FUTURE WAR IN THE AIR, AIR DEFENCE AND AIRBORNE 
OPERATIONS, 1914-41. 
Of'course, war in the air and the partial 
replacement of siege artillery with flying 
machines are still a long way off, but 
the new means must be evaluated correctly. 
The core of a fortress, which until now people 
have tried to protect from the fire of siege 
artillery in some way or other, presents an 
area of significant dimensions. It is 
subjected to explosives thrown from on 
board airships. Therefore the way of 
protecting valuable installations and 
the means of attack from demolition and 
destruction must be different from before... ' 
Fortresses and Contem_porary396 
Warfare, Octofier, 1914, 
During World War I, military aviation developed far more 
quickly than this observer predicted. The Russians had 
already built the first four engined bomber in the world, 
the Russkiy Vityaz, which flew on 23 July 1913, followed 
by the Ilya Muromets (IM) type A, flying on 11 December.. 
Along with the Italian Caproni Ca30, these were the first 
large aircraft specifically designed as bomb carriers. The 
Russian General Staff was impressed with the military 
potential of the design and ten were ordered. These 
aircraft were designed by the brilliant Igor Sikorskiy 
(1889-1972), who emigrated to the United States in 1919 
and placed a distinctly Russian brand of technological 
imagination and flair at the service of the Americans, 
beginning a long career as an aeroplane and helicopter 
designer. The Ilya Muromets had a wingspan of 113 feet and 
an enclosed cabin. Sikorskiy recalled that flying in it 
was 'just like Jules Verne, only more practical'. 397 
Sikorskiy stressed practicality, and the IMs proved 
remarkably rugged aircraft, complete with specially 
designed fireproof fuel-tanks and armour protection, below 
the pilot's cabin. They flew operationally on the eastern 
front, carrying up to seven machine guns, which made them 
a formidable opponent for the fighters of the time. One 
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was even equipped with an experimental 50mm cannon. A 
total of 80 IMs were built and only three were lost. 
According to one authority, they 'remain among the "might 
have beens" of the early history of aerial warfare'. 
398 
But the development of military aviation in the Great War 
proceeded from more mundane designs produced en masse. The 
remarkable Ilya Muromets aircraft, well ahead of their 
time, reflected the divide between long-term vision and 
immediate utility which can be observed throughout the 
history of Russian and Soviet development of new means of 
warfare. 
The Russian navy produced one notable vision of the 
future in 1916 when an American observer reported the 
launching of seven seaplanes in 14 minutes from a 
primitive carrier task force comprising two cargo vessels 
converted at the beginning of the war and three 
warships. 
399 
During the Civil War, the fledgling Soviet air forces 
benefitted from the personal interest of Lenin. Lenin 
appears to have been convinced that aviation would 
exercise a profound influence on operations and issued a 
series of decrees on the use of aircraft. These included 
attacks on enemy forces in the field, particularly 
cavalry, reflecting the fluid and transient quality of 
Civil War operations; liquidation of 'banditism' and 
centres'of revolt in the rear of Soviet forces, the 
distribution of propaganda and for communications. 400 
War in the air is more directly and inflexibly linked 
to the development of the appropriate technology than 
warfare on land or even at sea. The Soviet categorisation 
of the development of air warfare in the 1920s and 1930s 
is based almost entirely on technological criteria. The 
first phase, from 1921 to 1929 was concerned with the 
establishment of an indigenous aircraft industry and the 
move from wood and canvas aircraft to those made of metal. 
The second phase, 1929 to, 1941, involved the development 
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of aviation against the background of a more developed 
industrial base and developing ideas and procedures for 
the operational and strategic employment of aircraft in 
war. 401 
Soviet inventiveness in the field of aviation between 
the wars was impressive. Throughout the developed world, 
military aviation'developed rapidly. As one Soviet 
commentator noted in'1940, 
'Since the end of the First Imperialist War,, 
the last twenty years, as it were, aviation 
has gone further down the road of 
technological development than other arms402 
of service (rody voysk) have in hundred'* 
It is significant, however, that the 'air arm' is 
referred to as such, almost as part of the army. This did 
not prevent consideration of the possible strategic role 
of air power, however, or remarkable technological feats 
including parasite fighters carried by the bombers they 
were to protect; large calibre recoilless guns mounted on 
aircraft; rocket powered fighters; prototypes of 
intercontinental spy-planes and high-altitude bombers; 
air-to-air missiles; 'armoured aircraft and tanks with 
wings. 
403 The rapid development of aircraft technology in 
this period made it difficult for'military thinkers to 
base their ideas on reliable data. As Triandafillov 
commented in 1929, 'We can expect, that in the near future 
these records will become the normal tactical performance 
characteristics of military aircraft' 0 
404 
By the end of the 1920s, Triandafillov considered that 
aviation had the advantage over 'super-long, -range 
(sverkhdal'naya) artillery' for striking at the deep rear 
of enemy armies, because of the size of the projectile, 
accuracy and effect on morale. 405 The last is perhaps ' 
surprising. There is undoubtedly something more, personal 
about an aircraft attacking you, but on the other hand 
artillery fire can be kept up incessantly. 
A prominent early Soviet air power thinker was A N' 
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Lapchinskiy (1882-1938). His Aviation Tactics was 
published in 1926,1928 and 1931and his work on The Air 
Army in 1939. In his introduction to the former, 
Lapchinskiy stressed that air combat was not an end in 
itself, but 'onlyýa means to attain success on land or 
sea'. 406 Lapchinskiy came into conflict with the 
important naval thinker, Novitskiy in 1929 over an article 
he wrote in War and Revolution, over the assertion that 
'in the opening period of a war aviation will have an 
extraordinarily wide field of action'. 407 Novitskiy 
responded, 
In our opinion, in the opening period of a war, 
the characteristic feature is a struggle for the 
character of the future war (bor'ba za kharakter 
budushchey voyny), which deve ops, first 
ofaall, as a struggle for mobilisation and 
deployment. In these circumstances, seeing 
that mobilisation and deployment are the 
basic feature, to a significant degree 
predetermining the outcome of the military 
collision, it is essential to concen- 
trate 408 all resources on this struggle . 
Besides the almost unique use of the term budushchaya 
voyna in this context - the war as it will develop - this 
quotation once again underlines the importance of the 
opening period of the war and strategic deployment in 
Russan and Soviet military thinking. 
Lapchniskiy demanded attacks on political and 
industrial centres at the outbreak of war: Novitskiy 
thought this dangerous and illogical. It might unite the 
enemy population behind the war effort, as it arguably did 
in both Britain and Germany in World War II. If the enemy 
had not based his war plans on mobilisation of industry, 
but aimed for a lightning blow at the start with reserves 
assembled in peace-time, then attacks on industry would 
have minimal effect. If, on the other hand, he was 
relying on industrial mobilisation, then at this stage in 
the war that process would be incomplete and the attacks 
would, in effect, be against peacetime rather than wartime 
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targets, and would not have much-effect, either. 409 
Novitskiy also criticised the tendency of Lapchinskiy 
and others to devise missions for long-range bombers which 
utilised their maximum range -strikes against the 'heart' 
of the enemy country, when in fact they might be better 
employed at shorter ranges breaking up the enemy ground 
and naval forces' deployment. This view presaged the 
arguments which raged over the employment of heavy bombers 
against operational and tactical targets before 'D' 
Day. 410 Novitskiy concluded by warning that Lapchinskiy 
had talked of air forces being able to begin action 
'immediately after the declaration of war'. The Japanese 
surprise attack at Port Arthur was a lesson to be 
remembered, he said. 
'In modern conditions, in an era when the struggle 
for mobilization and deployment has become a 
reality, the significance and results of our 
military action before the declaration of war 
have increased so much, that the move towards 
the readiness of air forces, proposed by 
Lapchinskiy, is too risky. And not only air 
forces, but also the command and communications 
(komandovaniye i svyaz'), must, in modern 
conditions, be at a higher state of readiness'. 411 
On 22 June 1941, there was no declaration of war, and a 
large proportion of the Soviet air forces was destroyed on 
the ground where it lay. Command and control was 
paralysed. Novitskiy's worst fears came true. 
Tukhachevskiy, who was Peoples' Commissar for Armaments 
from 1931 to 1934, was particularly interested in 
aviation. Isserson gives a unique insight into his 
talents. 
'Having command of several languages, Tukhachevskiy 
followed foreign literature and was au fait with 
all new technological developments and inventions. 
He had a very inventive mind and often flabber- 
ghasted the engine`k, rs by setting completely new 
tasks. That happened-with torpedo carrying 
aircraft. Experimental aircraft were built 
and tested... So: Tukhachevskiy also put forward 
the idea of mounting a rapid-firing [large- 
calibre) cannon on an aircraft to the artillery 
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designer Kurchevskiy. To this, Kurchevskiy 
replied that a gun on an aircraft could 
not have recoil and would have to be 
recoil-less. "Of course" - said Tukhachevskiy - "use the reactive principle and you've 
got a recoil-less gun". It was done'. 
412 
The first Soviet recoil-less cannon(DRP) was constructed 
in 1926. For aircraft, it gave a crucial advantage in 
range compared with the standard 7.62mm machine guns. In 
1931, two DRP-76 cannon (76.2mm - 3-inch) calibre, were 
tested under the wings of a fighter. Recoil-less guns 
appeared to have particular potential for. use against 
large bombers and ground targets. At first', those mounted 
on aircraft could only fire a single round, but in 1935 
guns which could be reloaded in flight were mounted on 
ANT-29 aircraft. One of the more ingenious designs, The I- 
12, used the recoil-less. cannon barrels to form the 
aircraft's twin tail booms. Although the Soviet 
experiments ultimately proved unsuccessful, they 
illustrate the versatile imagination of Soviet 
designers. 413 
Tukhachevskiy, writing in 1931, drew attention to work 
on raising the ceiling of aircraft flight, including 
making engines able to operate in the stratosphere. This, 
he said, in turn allowed speed to be increased in the less 
dense atmosphere. 414 Aircraft operating at this height 
were also more difficult for enemy aircraft and ground 
fire to engage and moved above cloud and rain. In the 
1930s Soviet designers devoted much attention to high 
altitude flight, especially the construction of .. 
pressurized cabins. Prototypes. of the BOK-11, a 
strategic reconnaissance aircraft, the 'K' standing for 
'krugosvetniy' - 'around the world', were delivered at the 
beginning of 1939.415 
Tukhachevskiy noted the potential of the autogyro, 
invented by the Spanish inventor la Cierva, in 1919, and 
early work on helicopters. An artillery officer, Boris 
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Yur'ev, had designed a helicopter in 1911 while working 
under the aviation pioneer NE Zhukovskiy at the Moscow 
technical school. In 1930 Yur'ev had built a helicopter, 
TsAG1-EA, which attained an altitude of 605 metres in 
1932.416 Tukhachevskiy must have been aware of these 
developments. 
Tukhachevskiy also referred to increases in gun calibre 
and thus the range of air-to-air engagements, increasing 
to several kilometres. This not only referred to his 
interest in'the ultimately unsuccessful large calibre. 
recoil-less cannon, but also the rapid firing cannon which 
became increasingly important in air. combat during World 
War II. 
Improvements in bomber aviation were not only a 
function of the armament of indiividual aircraft, but of 
their 'collective armament', that is, fire and bomb-aiming 
by flights and squadrons. This question requires not only 
a system of armaments, but also the development of new 
methods of fire control'. 417 This foreshadowed the 
deployment of US B-17 aircraft in groups which permitted 
mutual support during World War II. A combat wing of 54 
aircraft each carrying about 9,000 rounds of ammunition 
could bring 648 0.5mm machine guns to bear. 418 
The Soviet interest in the collective effects of air 
armament was also evident in the early development of air- 
to-air missiles. Tukhachevskiy supported the work of the 
'Gas-Dynamic Laboratory'(GDL) which produced rockets for 
the land-based katyusha rocket launchger and for aircraft. 
Heavy 82mm and 132mm missiles were intended for attacking 
ground targets: the 76m- missiles, first tested in late 
1937, 'were designed to break up groups. of enemy aircraft, 
so that the indiuvidual aircraft were then more easily 
destroyed. 419 
Tukhachevskiy also noted the greater resilience of heavy 
bombers built of metal,, again foreshadowing-the B-17 
which, besides being all metal, incorporated 30 pieces of 
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armour. 420 'The country which builds the strongest 
aircraft will have an enormous advantage', he said, and 
'the strongest country in a future war will be the one 
that has the most powerful civil air fleet and aircraft 
industry'. 421 Tukhachevskiy was undoubtedly right: in the 
next war, it was the United States. 
Tukhachevskiy also referred to 'very secret' 
experiments with a reaktivny motor, which could refer 
either to a rocket or a jet engine. 422 A number of 
experimental rocket-powered aircraft were built in the 
USSR in the 1930s. Soviet interest in rockets may have 
distracted them from work on air-breathing jets. 'Although 
one A Gorokhov allegedly designed a jet engine-as early as. 
1912, a book on the theory of jet propulsion was published 
in 1929 and the rocket pioneer Tsiolkovskiy designed a jet 
engine in 1932, Soviet development of jets was behind 
Germany and Britain. The first MiG and Yak jet fighters 
did not fly until 24 April, 1946.423 
Tukhachevskiy realised that the greatly increased 
importance of aviation was likely to reduce close 
cooperation with ground forces to 'ancillary status'. 
Their main role would be 'the so-called "independent" 
operations of air forces in cooperation with land and sea. 
forces on a wider scale. '424 These independent operations 
would consist of both bombing and airborne operations. 
Tukhachevskiy's most prominent pioneering role. was in the 
field of airborne forces: parachute and air landing 
troops. The parachute designer Grokhovskiy experienced a 
number of failures, but Tukhachevskiy supported his work, 
leading to the world's first large-scale experiments with 
airborne forces in the early 1930s (see Appendix H). His 
stress on the need for mechanized airborne forces was 
extremely far sighted: one of the problems with airborne 
or air-landed troops is that they¬ tend tobe, too lightly 
armed and insufficiently mobile to deal with heavy 
conventional forces. 425 It'should not be thought, however, 
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that Tukhachevskiy advocated the independent use of air 
power as some did in Britain. He seems to have agreed with 
Lapchinskiy that in the end air forces existed to assist 
victory on the surface. Thus, although he saw 
'independent' operations by air forces 'in cooperation 
with land and sea forces on a wider scale', they were not 
totally independent of land and sea forces as were many of 
Bomber Command's operations in World War II. He described 
the role of 'large-scale, motorised airborne forces' as to 
'seize the enemy's railways, putting the key lines out of 
action, paralysing the deployment and mobilisation of his 
forces. ' These were still military objectives. Thus, he 
said, one could 'turn previous operational concepts inside 
out'(perevernut'). By this, he appears to have meant 
beginning the war behind the enemy and preventing his 
coalescing, rather than starting in front of him and 
having to break through and then splinter a deployment 
already formed. 426 It must be said, however, that nobody 
in World War II succeeded in doing what Tukhachevskiy 
envisaged on any-scale. 
By 1934, it was recognized that modern aviation was as 
far from that of 1918 as the German Gotha raids on Paris 
and London were from Bleriot's Channel crossing. 'There is 
no doubt, that in a future war aviation will play a still 
greater part, which the reinforced air forces of the` 
bourgeois states also supports'. 427 The problem of air 
defence was particularly acute. Drawing on the experience 
of World war I as the 'prototype of machine warfare, and 
of chemical warfare, those responsible for Soviet air 
defence drew the same grim conclusion as-their foreign 
counterparts. They- believed that chemical weapons would 
be used against civilian targets, a belief dramatically 
illustrated by the issue of gas masks to every man woman 
and child in Britain at the outbreak of World War II. 
'The task of defending a large number of 
population centres against air attack is , extraordinarily complicated-and requires 
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huge resources, which remain fixed to the ground 
while aviation is relatively free to choose. 
its targets. And then, the very means of 
destruction, used by aviation, have been 
developed significantly. In particular, 
during the World War attacks on o üuä ion 
centres did not use chemical wea ons. Now, 
regardless of the reassuring discussions 
of bourgeois states concerning a renunciation 
of chemical weapons, we can say with 
conviction that-the imperialists will use all 
the weapons of destruction at their 
v428 disposal, including, obviously, chemical. 
The writer in the Soviet Air Defence Journal took issue 
with the theories of the Italian air power theorist 
Douhet, that an independent air war could take place and 
that command of the air could be achieved, making air 
defence unnecessary, since the enemy could be destroyed at 
will on his bases. A diametrically opposite view was 
expressed by those who exaggerated the role of air defence 
as an independent form of war. Some placed stress on 
massive deployment of anti-aircraft guns: others on 
fortification of population centres and industrial areas. 
The former view was exemplified by the British writer 
General Ashmore, who believed that anti-aircraft artillery 
could virtually remove the air threat. The latter was 
popular in France, based, fascinatingly, on the ideas of 
the renowned French architect le Corbusier. Towns might be 
designed specially to be less susceptible to air attack, 
houses could be turned into miniature fortresses, 
workshops and factories buried underground. 
429 The latter 
reflected the 'Maginot mentality' which was also present 
in preparation for land warfare. 
'We know from the writing of, a whole pleiad 
of bourgeois literatteurs, portraying the 
picture of a future war kartina budushchey 
voyny), that the bourgeoise dreamms., off -dealing 
with the Bolshevik state using its aviation in 
particular -a weapon allegedly capable of 
putting the population "on its knees" in 
two or three days. Such a picture of war is 
presented by Major Gelders, who is known to the 
t430 Soviet reader, in the book The Air War of 1936. 
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Whereas Gelders described an air war between France and 
Britain, a German fascist writer, Axel, had published a 
book in 1932 called Battle over Berlin. He described a war 
between a National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union, 
in which the Soviet air force is finally crushed by the 
united forces of a bourgeois coalition, in a few days, 
'simply and easily'. 431 The Soviet author believed that 
there was a deliberate plan to cultivate the impression 
among the populations of western Europe that future war 
would be quick and easy, in order to make them willing to 
fight, and that bourgeois governments were terrified of 
prolonged war because, as in the 1914-18 war, it would 
lead to revolution. 432 Whatever the faults of bourgeois 
thinkers, the Soviet author believed that there was 
'for us, a clear and important-tendenýX: one 
can say with conviction that t eilcapitalist 
world, in a future engagement (skhvatka) which 
will be decisive for it, is trying organize 
a merciless air war against the Soviet Union, 
will try to destroy the most important population 
centres of our country, terrorise the working 
population and bro5§ its resolve to achieve a 
final victory... 
The author rejected the various extremes, saying that, 
obviously, the struggle for supremacy in the air and the 
most effective possible air defence were not 
contradictions. Preparing and organizating the population 
was also important, through the society for air and 
chemical training, 0soaviakhim, and the trade unions. 'The 
enemy in the air, having encroached on Soviet territory', 
he wrote, 'must be met with a powerful counterblowfby 
well-appointed Soviet aviation, the active resistance of 
all air defence systems, and the iron organization of the 
working masses'. 434 Photographs, from the siege of 
Leningrad, in particular, paint just such a picture. 
Soviet thinkers were- clearly concerned about foreign 
views on the possibility of independent air warfare. In 
the same year, another perceptive article set out a 
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balanced view. An understanding of the term 'air warfare' 
or 'war in the air'(vozdushnaya voyna) had still not been 
established. Some 'capitalist' thinkers believed that 'war 
in the air is waged by independent air forces alone in the 
depth of enemy territory with the aim of moral suppression 
of the wide masses and dislocating the economic life of 
the country'. 435 But the very flexibility of air forces 
made this limitation unsatisfactory. The air forces could 
and should work in conjunction with the army and fleet, 
and one should not make air warfare, war at sea and on 
land, mutually exclusive. Air warfare was but 'one of the 
elements in a complicated and integrated complex of war in 
all its many forms and unbroken development'. 
436 The 
article established three basic categories for air forces: 
independent-air forces, those 'servicing! 
(obsluzhivayushchiy) the army, and those servicing the 
navy. The former had three missions: action against 
independent enemy air forces to destroy, chase off or 
neutralise them; action against enemy communications on 
land, sea and in the air; and attacks on sea and land 
targets, whether military, economic or political. 
437 
However, most of the stress fell on missions which would 
assist surface forces. The air forces could, furthermore, 
be assisted in their operations by surface forces, 
especially mechanized units and cavalry, and airborne 
landings, which could seize or destroy airfields. 438 
Purely economic and psychological missions were not 
favoured, a view which the later lessons of the Spanish 
Civil War tended to support. 
'the theory of terror and destruction, 
propagated by General Douhet... casts a 
thick coating over Spain... however, the 
fascist bandits, having killed thousands of 
innocent women and children... miscalculated 
in their attempts to suppress the moral 
resistance of, the Spanish people. -The more cruelty the fascist interventionists showed, 
the stronger became the hatred of the 
, 439 Spanish people for the foreign invaders. 
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The lessons from Spain had formed the core. of a wide- 
ranging, informed and articulate debate in the pages of 
Krasnaya zvezda during 1938, which was crucial to the 
development of Soviet air power. It focussed not on 
whether air power should be used independently against 
economic and psychological targets (strategic), or against 
reserves and the enemy rear (operational), but on whether 
it should be used more operationally or on the battlefield 
itself, for close support (tactical). 
In January, P Mikhailov considered the bombing of 
Republican towns and cities by Italian and German 
aircraft. It was only dramatically effective in the 
complete absence of air defences, he said. The Battle for 
Madrid had shown that where defending fighters equalled 
those escorting the attacking bombers in strength, that 
was enough to see the attackers off. Air defence artillery 
was particularly effective in breaking up bomber attacks. 
In some cases the 'rebel'(fascist) aircraft had scattered 
with the first bursts of. ack-ack fire. 
440 However, he 
noted the effectiveness of land-based bombers against 
naval targets, although the heavy anti-aircraft armament 
of modern ships forced them to fly high 
441 
In April, another article said that while'conclusions 
drawn from the employment of land forces were of dubious 
reliability, 'prognoses, made in relation to the use and 
role of aviation in a future war can now be made with more 
conviction, on account of the widespread use of aviation 
in Spain'. 442 In particular, the bombing of Madrid had 
shown that a population which 'knew what, it was fighting 
for' could withstand any amount of hardship, 'no matter 
how strong the effect of air action'. 443 Meanwhile, 
Mikhailov had examined the use of fighter ground° attack 
(shturmovaya) aviation, noting that the fascists used only 
fighter aircraft, for attacks on the battlefield and the 
immediate rear, while the Rebublicans also-had-some ground 
attack aircraft, and concentrated. exclusively', on the rear, 
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attacking supply columns; "troops on the move, and air 
defence installations. 444 
In May, Brigade Commander (kombrig) Ionov began an 
intense debate on 'Aviation in offensive operations'; 445 
'Every war is distinctive (konkretna) and there- 
fore one must not transfer the experience of one 
war into the conditions of another mechanistically. 
Differing war aims, a different military-political 
situation, a different enemy and Theatre of 
Military operations may often show questions, which 
appear immutable from the experience of one or 
even several wars, in a completely different light. 
Analysing the experience of using aviation in 
offensive operations in the contemporary 
(sovremennaya) war in Spain one has to take 
into account those peculiaritiý46 which 
applied and still apply there. 
The most interesting question, Ionov said, was the role 
of aviation against, on the one hand, dispersed forces and 
artillery positions on the battlefield and, on the other, 
the effect against enemy reserves and enemy air. The 
Spanish experience had shown the former to be 
relativelyineffective in terms of casulaties inflicted but 
the effect on morale was most significant. 447 Ground' 
attack aircraft suffered heavy casualties when employed 
tactically, and therefore needed to be armoured and have 
high horizontal speed. 'Hedge hopping flight'(breyushchiy 
polet)was one way of keeping casualties down. However, 
'all this leaves the question of action by fighter ground 
attack aircraft in a great contemporary war open'. 
448 The 
fulfilment of battlefield. tasks would be at the expense of 
other missions, for example, isolating the area of the 
offensive from the concentration of enemy 
reserves('interdiction'), and combat. with enemy air 
forces. 
The deployment of a breakthrough exploitation echelon 
of highly mobile forces (see 3.2) had not been practised 
emerged in Spain, but if such an echelon were'deployed it 
would create a range of other missions,, which would also 
affect the use of aircraft for tactical purposes. The same 
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went for parachute or air-landed assaults. 
449. Ionov's, 
conclusion was that the particular qualities of aircraft: 
their range and flexibility, made them better suited for 
interdiction and attacks on the enemy rear - operational 
uses - than for close-support. In the Teruel operation in 
December 1937, air forces had bee used most effectively to 
prevent enemy reserves countering the attack, and against 
enemy air. By achieving air superiority, they had 
prevented the enemy interrupting the offensive, 
guaranteeing a 'brilliant victory' for the Republican 
attack. 450 
Ionov was immediately criticised as one of those who 
insisted that a 'big ship' must make a 'long voyage'. The 
critic cited Voroshilov, inferring that all the new 
mechanical means of war existed to help the infantry, -and 
concluded that three groups of aircraft were required. One 
was to engage enemy aircraft, one for operational tasks, 
and one for tactical close-support. 
451 
Two days later, another critic contrasted the 
employment of aircraft in Spain with the likely form of 
future large-scale operations. 
'One cannot transfer the experience of the 
Spanish war in general to the future. Can one 
in reality, for example, compare the action 
of a few hundred aircraft, in total, used in 
Spain (and that only recently) with, the action 
of several thousand aircraft which will appear on 
(probably even less extensive) fronts in a 
future war?... The scale of a new European (in 
other words, World) War will undoubtedly be 
different. Without corrections, one cannot 
transfer the Span is sýar experience-to another situation. ' 
The article focussed on PU-36's emphasis on attacking the 
enemy simultanoeously throughout-the whole depth. This 
meant using aircraft against the rear and reserves. But, 
it said, 'Comrade Ionov wants to convert these general 
instructions into, an operational template'. 453- The critic 
agreed with Ionov that aviation would suffer heavier 
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losses directly over the battlefield than when attacking 
deeper targets, but pointed out that in so doing it would 
save lives and 'valuable materiel' on the ground. 'In a 
future war aviation will be used on the battlefield often 
and with success. '454 
There was little doubt that the Spanish experience had 
highlighted the complex interaction of different arms as 
never before. 
'One cannot approach the study of war in a 
mechanistic fashion.... However, every war may 
either underline or contradict and correct, 
peacetime theories. The wars in Spain and China 
have refuted General Douhet's theories. But they 
have shown the growing role of aviation in con- 
temporary warfare in general and most of all on 
the battlefield in cooperation with ground forces. 
455 
Others thought that Ionov was right, the title of one 
article. Obvioiusly, aviation ought to be used for attack 
on those targets which infantry and artillery could not 
reach. Thre Spanish experience had shown that-avaiation 
had a strong effect on the morale of forces already 
demoralised by other action, but that the 'universality of 
the effect on morale remains a thorny problem' 0 
456 
The debate concluded that 'the use of aviation on the 
battlefield will be not-only possible, but necessary'. 
457 
This philosophy was reflected'in the design of the 
famous World war II Ilyushin-2 shturmovik. Ilyushin 
confirmed the conclusions from Spain in an interview in 
1945. 
"'We never agreed with the Italian General Douhet 
who first advanced the theory in 1921 that 
aircraft would play a decisive and independent 
role in the next war, ýand that by bombing towns 
and vital centres ofa country, the outcome could 
be decided... We believed that in the next war 
the air force would be an indispensable arm of the 
land troops. It would carry out, independent actions 
against vital points in the enemy's rear, and 
do serious damage, but it would not by itself 
decide the issue. It was clear to us that, in 
the main, the air force must be used for 
combined operations with the ground forces 
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and the navy. "458 
Ilyushin said he discussed the implications of this 
conclusion with Stalin several times. Stalin took a 
personal interest in new aircraft designs. The I1-2 
shturmovik emerged, the world's only 'flying tank'. The 
engine, pilot's compartment and fuel tanks were all 
protected by steel armour, and the pilot's windscreen was 
of 66 millimetre bullet-resistant glass. It could attack 
ground targets with machine guns, 32mm cannon, bombs and 
rockets. 459 The I1-2 shturmovik provides a classic case 
study of a clear view of future warfare translated into 
hardware. 
The sobriquet 'flying tank' applies equally to the Mi-24 
Hind helicopter in widespread service at the time of 
writing. It also applied to one of the most extraordinary 
military aircraft ever built, the T-60 krylya tanka - 
'wings for a tank', literally a light tank with wooden 
biplane wings and a tail. Tukhachevskiy's obsession with 
the need to make air-delivered forces more resilient and 
mobile than infantry on their feet appears to have 
survived his death in 1937. The winged tank was tested in 
1942, towed like a glider behind a TB-3 bomber. It was 
released and glided to a rough landing, its tracks already 
spinning before it touched the ground. The idea was not 
developed: one of the more exotic 'might have beens' of 
future warfare. 460 
Soviet aircraft designers in this period showed 
remarkable inventiveness, and were assisted by the 
personal interest of Stalin and the popularity and utility 
of aviation which was viewed, as a vital tool in opening up 
the vast territory of the Soviet Union. Some of the 
reports are hard to beiieve.. A recent report based on 
eyewitness accounts described, the testing of an 'invisible 
plane' in the winter of 1938. It was supposedly built by a 
team headed by professor GK Kozlov, a well-known 
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scientist, and a faculty head at the Zhukovskiy Air Force 
Academy, another instance of a military, 'academy' being 
directly involved in research and development of new 
technology. 461 
According to VB Shavrov, a Soviet authority in the 
field, the"aircraft comprised transparent acrylic panels 
treated with a substance described as 'rhodoid', made in 
France. This may refer to the use of rhodium, which when 
electroplated forms a hard, wear resistant, permanently 
bright surface and is used in mirrors and reflectors. The 
spars and other structural parts were also coated with 
'rhodoid'containing a mirror amalgam. the opaque surfaces 
- engine cowling, wheels and cockpit - were supposedly 
treated with special paint containing aluminium powder. 
The aircraft was reported to have sparkled unusually while 
standing on the runway, but in rapid movement was 
virtually invisible. Work on this 'stealth' aircraft of 
over half a century ago was discontinued, allegedly 
because the rhodoid cracked after a short time and also 
because 'there was no guarantee that the plane would not 
be seen by more modern means of detection'. Although it 
might be nearly invisible to the eye, it would be seen by 
radar, which was under development at the time. 
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Despite the long term potential of a wealth of. 
ingenious effort, the Soviet General Staff concentrated on 
ingeniously rugged designs produced en masse to assist 
the land and, to a lesser extent, sea battles. They had 
little incentive to plan for an independent, long range 
{ 
air offensive and had they attempted to, this might have 
squandered resources which they could ill afford given 
their unsophisticated production base. Given the course of 
events after 1941, the Soviet decision, based on pre-war 
thinking, about the next war. and the lessons fromSpain, 
from, the'fighting in China after the full-scale Javanese invasion 
of. 1937, - and : iarshal-Georgiy Zhukov's exemplary operation in Mon- 
golia in 1939, appears to have been the best, indeed, the only 
one possible. 
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3.5. ROCKETS, THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS, 'AND 
INTERACTION WITH CONVENTIONAL OPTIONS, CA. 1944-77. 
The 'Revolution in military affairs' of the 1950s and 
1960s and Soviet thinking on the use of battlefield and 
strategic weapons have, unlike the earlier period, been 
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widely analysed and many of the relevant texts translated. 
Therefore, the author will not deal with this period in 
any detail, unlike the earlier period or that immediately 
preceding the present. Furthermore, unlike the earlier 
period, we have no actual war with which to compare the 
predictions. However, the briefest survey, including some 
of the most interesting material, is necessary. 
In 1944, even before the German V-2 ballistic` missile 
offensive against Britain began, the remarkably talented 
General Pokrovskiy published a remarkable article on 'The 
Use of Long Range Rockets' (Appendix F). Long range 
rockets firing beyond visual range were relatively 
inaccurate at that time and Pokrovskiy believed they would 
be unsuitable for use against moving targets. But they 
could devastate comparatively large areas as weapons 'of 
mass destruction', the term now used for nuclear, 
biological, chemical and some incendiary weapons. 464 By 
implication, they would be used, like the V2s and as 
proposed for the earlier nuclear missiles, against 'soft' 
civilian and industrial targets. Pokrovskiy portrayed a 
barrage of several such rockets, to compensate for 
inaccuracy. US Intelligence reports of 1948 indicate that 
the Soviet General Staff continued to, believe that, given 
the technology of the V-2 type rockets with which they 
were experimenting, this would be their modus operandi in 
a future war. 
465, In October 1944 and March, '1945 the 
journal Air Force Technology published details of the jet 
powered, unmanned V-1.466 
Understandably, it was airmen who dominated the 
earliest discussion of the dawning the 'Revolution in 
military affairs'. Major-General of Aviation Tatarchenko 
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noted the likely emergence of the nuclear balance of 
terror as early as 1946, before the USSR had nuclear 
weapons. He noted that air forces now occupied an 'equal 
place' with armies and navies, operating at the 
operational and strategic as well as tactical levels. 
This was a recognition of British and American experience. 
in the war, and a major shift from the Soviet'position in 
1941.467 
Under the heading 'The Atomic Bomb', Tatarchenko linked 
the emerging paradigm change (see part two) with an 
earlier one, already described, and the first recognisable 
nuclear arms negotiations. 
'The Second World War was the first mechanized war 
or war of motors [see part 3.2] . But the Second World War was, along with that, a war, in which 
the widespread use of atomic energy (vnutroatomnaya 
energiya) did not occur. However, two atomic 
bombs... on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and also the 
experimental atomic bomb detonated in New 
Mexico.. . were harbingers(predvestniki) of new 
, methods of waging war. 
Almost simultaneously with the birth of the 
atomic bomb appeared a new term - "atomic politics". 
The problem of utilising atomic energy is discussed 
in the Security Council of, the United Nations 
Organization... In their presentations eminent 
American scientists have quite rightly spoken of 
the very risky attempt to monopolise work in the 
area of atomic energy... In one of their speeches 
the American scientists say, correctly. 
"We cannot pretend to a prolonged monopoly in 
relation to the atomic bomb. Other scientists 
can use the basic principles and, maybe, even 
more successfully, than we have... The unique 
bit, which remains secret, - this is the 
technical details and the technological 46S processes of factories and equipment. 
Tatarchenko then turned to"the influence of the atomic 
bomb on the development of armed forces. He cited an 
article in the British journal'Army Quarterly, which had 
suggested that the nuclear weapon had sounded the death 
knell for battleships, 'aircraft carriers and possibly 
heavu cruisers, but would lead to an abundance of'flying 
fortresses'_(in fact, aircraft akin to the-B-29 
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Superfortress which the Russians were busy copying to make 
the. Tu-4)W9. 'and maybe even larger aircraf t. 4 a0 
Tatarchenko noted the potential of jet engines for 
operating at 'super-height' and 'super-speed', leading to 
'super-long-range flight'. In order to enable future 
aircraft to fly at very slow speeds as well as, supersonic, 
he believed that aircraft would have both jet and non-jet 
engines, something which has not materialised. 
Developments in the USA were noted, which by 1946 
included machines 'automatically controlled from-the 
ground, that is, robot aircraft' and guided missiles, the 
modern term upravlyayemy raket already being in use. He 
mentioned the possibility of misssiles like the German V-2 
in future homing in on light, heat or. metal, foreseeing 
infra-red and laser guidance. Television guidance for 
bombs was also mentioned. The atomic bomb, jet propulsion, 
radar and radio were identified as the four elements with 
greatest military potential at this stage. 47,1 
The question had already arisen whether long range 
bombers would be completely replaced by missiles. Guided 
surface-to-air missiles, and high speed jet fighters would 
probably stop the 'giant bomber' from being a cost- 
effective means of attacking distant targets. Missiles 
would probably be cheaper, and the Russians noted that 
from 1944 London and south-east England had'been attacked 
with rockets only. The Germans had also planned to attack 
New York and other conurbations on the eastern coast of 
the United States with. missiles. 
'Undervaluing this new powerful means of waging 
war would be a fatal mistake. It should be clear to 
every moderately well-informed person that this 
new weapon appeared in 1944-45 in its most 
primitive, initial form One can scarcely doubt 
that in-future it wi l1zreceive significantly 
greater. development. 
However, missiles would not totally, -replace bombers. 'Of 
course not! _'4.73 As with navies, the appearance of, a new 
system did not mean that others would disappear. there 
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would be several types of giant aircraft: bombers, troop- 
carrying and cargo-carrying. 474 
World War II experience and the appearance of the 
atomic bomb had already caused a sharp turn in Soviet 
attitudes to strategic bombing, that is, attacks on the 
enemy's centres of power and population. During the war 
'giant aircraft'(samolety-giganty)had undergone relatively 
far more development than other types. Besides constant 
improvements in range, payload and speed, the Soviet Air 
Forces noted improvements in armour protection, sights, 
defensive armament, an all-round ('spherical') arc of fire 
and automated fire control. 475 In addition to cooperation 
with armies and navies, emphasized before 1941, air forces 
would in future carry out 'destructive. strikes on 
administrative-political economic and military objectives 
in the deep rear'. 476 
'Relating to the form of a future war, the 
following thoughts are proposed: in future 
operational battles the place where the main 
efforts will be directed will be not so much 
the front as the rear of the enemy. The 
main military action will be aimed 
directly against the most important 
populated regions on the enemy's 
territory, which must be subjected to 
air bombardment with all available means, 
and also to seize them with airborne 
armies, reaching the enemy's deepest 477 rear in thousands of giant aircraft'. 
Tatarchenko's conclusions concur with those of the 
British Tizard Report of the same year, which assessed 
that atomic bombs which were still few in number and 
could only be delivered by large aircraft, would make 
attacks on economic and c. ivilian targets unquestionably 
the most profitable form of operations in war, and 
presaged views on the character of a future major war 
throughout the late 1940s and 1950s. 478 
Immediately after the detonation of the first atomic 
bombs, experts were sceptical about its true military 
value. This scepticism pervades the Tizard report and also 
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featured in a remarkable letter from the Soviet scientist 
Petr Kapitsa (1894-1984) to Molotov in December, 1945. 
The letter was published in 1990. 
'The effectiveness of atomic energy against 
military targets , as used in Japan in the form of bombs, has not been proved. This is 
not only because its production is not 
proportionate to the cost, as technology 
will evidently soon overcome this problem, 
but mainly because, as calculations and 
experiments show, in a nuclear "burst"(vzryv), 
thanks to its small mass, only a part of its 
huge energy goes into the shock wave (vzryvnaya 
volna), which therefore does not have the 
expected destructive power. A great part of 
the energy is lost as radiation [sic. - surely 
heat and radiation], which incinerated so many 
people and houses. One can safely say that if 
the Japanese had not lived in "paper houses", 
and had they not been taken by surprise, 
then casualties would have been considerably 
smaller, because one can protect oneself 
against most of the radiation [and heat, 
presumably] of an atomic blast. . It is also interesting to note that in the 
atomic bomb in its present form the most 
precious elements, which are necessary 
for the production of atomic energy in 
other substances, are ý5ýbarously and 
irretrievably wasted. ' 
Kapitsa was arguing that atomic energy was far more 
efficiently used for peaceful purposes, and asking if he 
might publish an article on the matter. He was told to 
'wait' a while, and the article was never published. 
480 
T. he following year, the Air Force officer 
Tatarchenko noted the global character of future war. The 
Soviet Union's most formidable and,, it appeared, likely 
adversary, was not accessible by land and enjoyed 
overwhelming superiority in, the air and at sea. The Tu-4 
could reach the United States, on a one-way mission or with 
air-to-air refuelling;, but the Soviet Union did not 
develop the latter until the late 1950s. But. rocketry, in 
which Russia and the Soviet Union had always been strong, 
provided a way of redressing the balance. 481 
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The first short-range ballistic missile, based on the 
V-2, was deployed in 1947 and in 1948 Stalin initiated an 
intercontinental missile programme. Western intelligence 
noted that there was 'little or no return to the research 
and study of fundamentals but instead the Soviets seem to 
be engaged in a vigorous programme of getting test 
vehicles to the hardware (test vehicle) stage with a 
minimum of research'. 482 In 1948 it was noted that the 
Russians were producing a large number of guided missiles, 
perhaps because they needed them for testing, perhaps to 
compensate for inaccuracy. Stalin prize winners in the 
same year included two awards for research in exterior 
ballistics which were believed to be connected with guided 
missile development. The lack of accuracy probably also 
encouraged Soviet research into a still more powerful 
nuclear weapon, the thermonuclear (fusion or hydrogen) 
bomb, which they detonated in 1953. However, only one 
rocket was developed before Stalin's death in 1953, the 
SS-2.483 
Stalin's successor, Malenkov, believed that when the 
USSR achieved some form of parity with the United'States 
in nuclear forces, the balance of terror would make 
conventional conflict more likely than nuclear war (just 
as chemical weapons had not been used, even in the most 
dire circumstances) in World War II). His opponents, 
Molotov, Bulganin, Zhukov and finally'Khrushchev, placed 
the emphasis on strategic surprise and nuclear war. 
Malenkov was deposed in February 1955 and-the'way was 
clear for revision ofýthe view of future war based around 
mass employment of nuclear weapons. 
484 
Meanwhile, the ground forces had been developing the 
experience of World War II. Sharp reductions-in the 
numbers of men on-the ground meant that the available 
motor vehicles could'-be'used to mechanize the-entire army. 
At this stage, the new=technologies had little influence 
on army weaponry or organization. " By, 1953, a mechanized 
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corps had the same mobility as a World War II Tank Army, 
but just as the USSR sought to balance US air and sea 
power with a quite different force structure - nuclear 
missiles, so the massive army in Europe also constituted a 
counterweight of a quite different material. 485 
Stalin's death in 1953 once again opened up the field 
of strategy - the conduct of war at the highest level - 
for study. previously, it had been Stalin's preserve. A 
study was carried out by the Frunze Military Academy 
between 1953 and 1957 and endorsed by the General Staff 
after two years of further study. 486 It was no 
coincidence that in 1959 the Strategic Rocket Forces were 
formed, becoming the elite and primary service, ahead of 
the army, air defence force, air forces and navy. 487 
The conclusions of the study were incorporated in the 
book Military Strategy, attributed to Marshal Sokolovskiy, 
first published in 1962. It was thus nearly a decade from 
the start of the study to its appearance in public, but 
its conclusions were radical. Essentially, the Frunze 
Academy and the GeneralýStaff had concluded that nuclear 
weapons, particularly strategic weapons, were central to 
the conduct of'any future war and not auxiliary or even 
equal to other operations. From this, it followed 
logically that equipment organization and procedures 
should be designed around a full-scale nuclear war. 
The work Military Strategy has been translated and 
every edition analysed in meticulous detail by western 
commentators, and therefore requires no detailed attention 
here. A series of articles appeared during the 1960s in 
the authoritative journal Military Thought which expand 
upon elements of the study and contributed to its 
revision. 488 From the viewpoint of the time of writing, 
it is clear that the central position of large scale 
nuclear war in Soviet ; future, war thinking dominated the 
design of what appear, to be 'conventional' systems. The 
Soviet emphasis on the tank, which has left a vast and 
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problematical legacy of ironmongery in eastern Europe, 
arguably stemmed not so much' from Soviet experience of 
tamnk operations in World War II, but from the fact that 
the tank, with its armour protection, 'weight and hermetic 
sealing was the ideal vehicle for the nuclear battlefield. 
The same appears to be true in the design of the BMP 
armoured fighting vehicle. The organization of Soviet 
forces into a rigid structure of armies, divisions and 
regiments, a pattern dominant for about 15 years from 1967 
to 1982, was suitable for a nuclear battlefield where 
everything had to be carefully controlled from the top. It 
was quite inconsistent with the experience of protracted 
conventional operations in World War 11.489 
During the 1960s the first discussion of war in space 
appeared. An`important article by N Talenskiy in 1964 
discussed the dilemma of anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs). 
Whereas the west believed them to be destabilising,. that 
is, ' that they made nuclear war more likely by offering 
some defence against nuclear attacks, the Soviet poosition 
was that they gave one the ability to defend oneself 
regardless of the attitude of. the other side. 490 At the 
same time, Valentin Larionov, still an important figure in 
Soviet future war thinking and the composing editor of 
Military strategy (see part'4), published an article'on 
the "'Doctrine" of Command of Space'. 491 Accompanied by 
humourous illustrations, Larionov noted that certain 
circles in the USA were giving I ". 
'priority to space research, which-indicates' ' 
that space is regarded by46ýem, above alias . a theatre of future war'. 
The Apollo programme to put men on the moon was seen as a 
vehicle for development of space weaponry. The ability to 
carry outs long journeys in space was seen as conferring 
the potential to deploy 'orbital ships, able to execute a 
strike from orbit, either'at the earth', or at'enemy launch 
sites in space'. 491-Presumably the" I enemy' could only be 
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the USSR. 
Meanwhile, emphasis on nuclear war on the surface of the 
planet continued. According to recent first-hand testimony 
from Colonel Tsygichko, a European theatre nuclear war was 
modelled in 1968. If 30 percent of the warheads available 
then were used, the resultant destruction of the transport 
grid would mean that no regrouping of forces would be 
possible at all, and the advance would stop. 
494 Similar 
conclusions had been drawn from an exercise in the 
Carpathian mountains as early as February, 1954, and 
emerged from modelling a nuclear exchange in 1970-71, at 
which both Brezhnev and Kosygin were present. There was 
not enough left on the Soviet side to continue 
hostilities. Nuclear weapons, it appeared, not only wmade 
war unthinkable, but actually impossible to fight. 
Turning to full-scale strategic nuclear exchange, even 
under favourable intial conditions, with strategic 
surprise, the Soviet Union lost so much that no-one could 
speak of 'victory'. According to Tsygichko, the findings 
of these studies were not accepted, and according to 
larionov the Soviet General Staff continued to try to find 
a way of making nuclear war winnable until about 1985.495 
It is significant that the authoritative Soviet 
Military Encyclopedia article(1979) on the Revolution in 
military affairs is by MM Kir'yän, one of the most 
prominent modern? authors. encountered in this study. He 
does not limit-. the Revolution . 
in military, affairs to the 
1950s, to nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles, but 
describes it as'a phenomenon which became amore widespread 
after World War: II and,, by-implication,, was still going 
on. Most significant aspects, apart from 'the nuclear 
rocket weapon', from the highly highly economical Russian 
for a wide range of systems, 'were: nuclear submarines, 
rocketry, electronics, ` automated control systems (see part 
4). He placed great stress on the economic base of the 
countries involved, ands the' increase in military 
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expenditure which the Revolution in military affairs had 
brought about. We thus arrive at the situation which has 
preceded the recent dramatic changes in the attitudes of 
east and west to each other, to the utility of warfare, 
and to military spending. 
496 
This selection of past Russian and Soviet views of 
future war is not exhaustive, but it has indicated that 
their past views of the character of future warfare have 
tended to be correct: that the implications of new 
technology are recognised quite quickly, and that radical 
solutions to massive problems have been adopted and made 
to dominate the entire system of procurement and military 
organization. An example of the latter is the decision to 
gofor missiles because it would be impossible to compete 
in the sphere of heavy intercontinental bombers. These 
decisions are not taken hastily, but only after voluminous 
research and prolonged reflection, typically a decade. 
This process has always taken place in the military 
academies and the General Staff, though the personal 
influence of the leader (Stalin, Khrushchev) can be 
crucial. 
The relevance of the more distant past is stressed in 
Zakharov's history of the General Staff before the war. 
'The experience of events which took place a long 
time ago, which preceded the Great Patriotic War 
have not lost their significance, even now. 
Extracts from it are all the better and more 
useful to help solve multi-faceted and 
complex problems of today. In this, historical 
examples, the lessons of the past lead to 
critical reflection not to dogma, to understanding 
Lenin's words that 
"Marxism 
requires absolute 
historical examination of the question of the 
forms o struggle. To put this question 
outside the particular historical situation 
indicates a lack of understanding of 497 the ABC of dialectical materialism"'. 
Should, as seems likely, the Communist Party lose its 
dominant position in Soviet intellectual life, the thought 
processes which have been instilled over the past 70 years 
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will surely "'remain for a while' longer. 'Fürthermore, ''the' 
relevance of the pre-Soviet period as `a source of 
precedents 'shaped by Russian historical exTperience, 'geography 
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